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This thesis examines how de-ethnicisation of politics takes place in Malaysia.  Malaysian 
politics has been dominated by ethnic politics since independence in 1957, yet currently 
there are indications that there may be a recent move towards a de-ethnicisation of 
politics.  Although the scenario of de-ethnicisation of politics in Malaysia is still in an 
embryonic stage, it is interesting to look at how such de-ethnicisation could take place in 
Malaysia.  This thesis applies the concept of de-ethnicisation of politics in discussing the 
issue.  In a context of very limited literature on de-ethnicisation of politics due to a lack 
of scholarship on de-ethnicisation of politics, this thesis offers a three-dimensional 
exploration of whether, how and to what extent de-ethnicisation of politics is taking place 
in Malaysia.  These three dimensions comprise party membership, party stance and party 
electoral strategy.  As party membership is determined by party Constitutions, discussion 
is centred on how the Constitution enables\makes difficult the party from moving away 
from ethnic politics.  On the dimension of party stance, focus is paid to the direction each 
political party is taking in practising/distancing from (non-)ethnic politics.  The third 
dimension explores on how these two dimensions relates to electoral politics, which 
inclines towards power politics rather than rhetorical politics.  As the main unit of 
analysis in this thesis are political parties, a qualitative interviewing method has been 
employed with high-level party leaders who have the authority to speak on behalf of their 
party.  The thesis, then, investigates whether, how and to what extent de-ethnicisation of 
politics is currently taking place in Malaysia at the level of and in the competition 
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Since Independence, ethnicity has played a central role in Malaysian politics. Political 
parties formed at that time are largely ethnic-based. Politicking during Independence 
inclined towards ethnicity issues, too. This kind of political scenario was inevitable due to 
the historical background of Malaysia. Different ethnic groups were segregated within 
their own ethnic communities. There was a lack of inter-ethnic communication. It is, 
therefore, not surprising that ethnic politics emerged due to the condition of the political 
landscape at that time. 
 
 Such an emergence of ethnic politics endured for four to five decades before a 
new trend of negating ethnic politics began to emerge. Usually, there are two general 
elections that are linked to the de-ethnicization of politics in Malaysia. The first was in 
1999. The then deputy prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim, was sacked from his position and 
jailed the following year on charges of corruption and sexual misconduct, charges that 
were strongly denied by Anwar Ibrahim. Such a scenario also propelled the emergence of 
a new movement, the Reformation movement, which sought Ibrahim’s release, justice 
and such like. It was also during this time, before he was sent to jail, that Ibrahim became 
actively involved in opposition party events, including those dominated by Chinese 
opposition leaders. He seemed able to break the ethnicity barrier, and inter-party (also 
inter-ethnic) cooperation between opposition parties was forged to face the incumbent 
ruling party. Unfortunately, such political cooperation between the opposition parties did 
not last long. However, upon his release in 2004, Ibrahim tried to reunite opposition 
parties once again and managed to form an opposition alliance, which continues to exist. 
In the 2008 general election, this opposition alliance managed to create an all-time record 
by denying the ruling two-third majority in Parliament and gaining control of five states. 




 With such occurrences in Malaysian politics, does it signal the decline of the role 
of ethnicity in politics? Or is ethnicity simply reinventing itself into a new, more 
inclusive or multicultural guise? Is Malaysian politics, which has been dominated by 
ethnic politics, being challenged by the emergence of non-ethnic politics? The aim of this 
dissertation is to explore how the role of ethnicity has changed in Malaysian politics in 
recent years. As political parties can be viewed as one of the main factors in the shaping 
of Malaysian politics since Independence until the current day, I will therefore in this 
research focus on membership criteria, discourse and election. While the literature on 
ethnic politics is good at explaining how ethnicity becomes relevant in politics, it has less 
to say about how it becomes less so. This thesis is about the de-ethnicization of politics in 
Malaysia. It makes an important contribution to the scholarship because apart from filling 
a gap within scholarship regarding the de-ethnicization of politics, this research may also 




THE HISTORY OF ETHNIC POLITICS IN MALAYSIA 
In this Introduction, I will give some of the historical background for the emergence of 
ethnic politics in Malaysia. I do this in three parts. I begin with the post-World War II 
colonial period, a period when the administration of the Malaysian government was ruled 
by the British, followed by the Independence era in which the local people started to rule 
on their own. This is when 'old politics' emerged and continued for decades. The third 
part is contemporary politics, which is also known as 'new politics'. The emergence of 
'new politics' is often a challenge to the existing 'old politics' and a means for politicians 
to distance themselves from ethnic politics. The post-2008 general election is mostly 
accepted as the period when 'new politics' emerged, although there are different timelines 
in drawing the line for the emergence of 'new politics', with some drawing it in the 1999 





Post-World War II Period 
Malaysia is a diverse society with different ethnic groups, religions, cultures and many 
more social divisions. Although Malaysian (or Malayan) politics can be traced back to 
centuries ago depending on how we clarify ‘politics’ in a Malaysian scenario, the most 
obvious era when local politics started to emerge should be considered as post-World 
War II. With the return of British rule to its former colonies (including Malaya) after an 
interruption caused by Japanese occupation during World War II, the political landscape 
of Malaya at the time seems to be different when compared to previously. Upon the 
return of British rule to Malaya, Malaya was then ruled by the British Military 
Administration through Harold MacMichael (the de facto administrator at that time). 
During that time, the British tried to introduce a union system for Malaya in 1946 called 
the Malayan Union. By putting all these under a single union system, it could ease the 
British situation a great deal, such as making administration more convenient, cost 
savings and so on. However, some elements within the Malayan Union, specifically the 
Malay communities, made strong objections. For example, with the introduction of the 
Malayan Union, Malay rulers (referring to royalty) would lose their political power, with 
their power thereafter limited to Islamic and cultural affairs only. It was then unveiled 
that Malay rulers were forced to give consent due to the threat of dethronement (Ariffin 
Omar, 1993). Furthermore, the Malayan Union, which suggested a jus soli citizenship 
policy, caused an uproar from the Malay community because they felt that such a 
citizenship policy would numerically increase the citizenship of non-Malays, which then 
threatened the position of native Malays in Malaya.   
 
 Such anger from the Malay community propelled them into forming a nationalist 
union among themselves to defend their rights and welfare. This is because they believed 
that Malays are the original owners of the land, while the Chinese and Indians are 
immigrants from China and India. Due to the intense rejection of the Malayan Union, the 
United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) was formed in 1946, the same year as the 
Malayan Union was introduced. Not only UMNO but other ethnic-based parties such as 
the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) were 
also formed in the 1940s, although they did not intend to each become a political party to 
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begin with. These inclined more towards an association that helped or defended their 
community members when in need. Such an emergence of ethnic politics is more evident 
when most of the main (with political power) political parties are formed based on 
ethnicity. Although there are different reasons for each political party to be founded at 
that time, the main surviving and ‘acceptable’ ones by British political parties, namely 
UMNO, MCA and MIC, are purely ethnic-based, be it from the membership eligibility or 
the core values held by the party to the level of ‘representative’ of respective 
communities at that time. The argument above on the formation of an ethnic-based 
political party (UMNO specifically) in Malaya suggests that it was the Malayan Union 
that caused the Malay community to form a political party of their own. Regardless of the 
processes or causes for the formation of an ethnic-based political party, the interest from 
the historical part is that ethnic-based political parties were formed prior to Independence. 
It consisted of Malay, Chinese and Indian political parties respectively and these three 
ethnic groups happened to be the three most populated ethnic groups in Malaya at that 
time and even now. Such a political trend of ethnic-based politics continued even after 
Malaya gained independence.  
 
Independence Era and 'Old Politics' 
In the effort to prepare Malaya for independence, a more structural political landscape 
looked set to emerge. The British had included local leaders in their administration 
through the Member System (similar to the Cabinet system in the UK) in 1950. The 
selection of local leaders consisted of Malays and non-Malays. The British tried to build a 
working relationship among leaders from different ethnic groups. From here, we can see 
that the ethnicity of leaders did take this into consideration by making it more inclusive 
rather than dominated by a single ethnic group. The introduction of such a system also 
does not ‘pretend’ to include local leaders in the Member System by giving them 
unimportant portfolios. But in fact, these local leaders were given the responsibility to 
head important portfolios, such as home affairs, education, health and so on, 
acknowledging that such an arrangement, which was to prepare local leaders for self-
governance in later years, was a composition of local leaders from the main communities 
in Malaya: Malay, Chinese and Indian. From here, we can see that the tone set by the 
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British at that time was to include all ethnic groups in governmental administration. They 
did acknowledge the existence of different ethnicities and the importance of allocation 
based on ethnicity. However, at the same time, these different communities had to work 
together (mostly through over-arching leadership cooperation rather than a mass over-
arching relationship) in preparation for their self-governing direction. 
 
 To further strengthen the premise that ethnic politics stands a strong salience, it 
can be viewed from another standpoint when the founding chairman of UMNO, Onn 
Jaafar, suggested opening up the party membership to non-Malays, thereby making it a 
multi-ethnic/non-ethnic-based political party. Such a suggestion was aggressively 
rejected by UMNO members, forcing the resignation of Onn Jaafar in 1951. Although 
UMNO members could not accept the opening up of party membership to non-Malays, 
ironically, in 1952, UMNO did cooperate with the MCA in fighting for the Kuala Lumpur 
local election, which later formed the Alliance Party (an UMNO/MCA coalition, which 
later included the MIC). This shows that, at that time, UMNO could not accept their party 
membership being opened to non-Malays but could accept working with MCA, including 
the distribution of seats. The former UMNO founding chairman, Onn Jaafar, went on to 
set up a new party called the Independence Malayan Party (IMP). This was a multi-
ethnic/non-ethnic party, similar to the proposal he tried to bring up during his years as 
UMNO’s chairman. However, the party performed badly and years later, IMP was 
disbanded and Onn Jaafar formed another new party, the National Party (Parti Negara). 
Interestingly, the National Party was akin to UMNO, where membership was restricted to 
non-Malays, making it a Malay-based party. These two incidents of UMNO reluctance to 
opening up party membership and Onn Jaafar’s formation of the IMP and National Party 
show that Malaysian politics at that time was heavily related to ethnicity. 
 
 All these incidents neatly characterise the kind of politics inherited since the 
Independence era, which is acknowledged as 'old politics'. 'Old politics' generally refers 
to the political landscape where ethnic politics triumphs over any other kind of cleavages 
or divisions. Such ethnic political trends may be hard to compete as those main ethnic-
based party (UMNO, MCA and MIC) had been in strong political position based on 
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electoral results. Although there are times where one or two of these three parties were 
weaker by an election-winning measurement, the overall coalition party remains ‘strong’ 
in terms of managing to remain a federal power without interruption. 
 
'New Politics' 
Although ethnic politics may seem to hold a dominant position in Malaysian politics 
similar to politics in other parts of the world, the political landscape does not remain 
stagnant. It faces challenges in altering the political scenario, although the success of 
overthrowing the current political arrangement is not guaranteed. In Malayan/Malaysian 
politics, ethnicity cleavage did face challenges from other cleavages, although some of 
these cleavages are clearer than others. This includes class cleavage and religious 
cleavage (which will be discussed in more depth in the Background chapter). Regardless, 
these two cleavages are not the foremost concern of this research. This is because firstly, 
they did not pose much of a challenge to the existing ethnicity cleavage politics and the 
importance of ethnic politics was still clearly viable. Secondly, these two cleavages could 
not detach themselves fully from ethnicity salience because, for example, in class 
cleavage, as suggested, the class cleavage does not refer to the general class cleavage 
which happened in other countries where people were divided by class. In Malaysia, 
although some scholars prefer to argue from the class perspective instead of the ethnicity 
perspective, they are looking at class within the ethnic group itself. They do not talk 
about class divisions across ethnicity boundaries but class divisions within each ethnic 
group. Even the religious cleavage did not involve non-Malays (more accurately Muslim) 
as the contesting of religious matters surrounded UMNO and the PAS (PAS-Malaysian 
Islamic Party), outbidding each other to portray themselves as more Islamic, as religion in 
Malaysia is highly attached to ethnicity, especially Muslim (as Malays must be Muslim). 
 
 The discussion above shows that, previously, Malaysian politics was often being 
characterised in ethnicity terms, be these at the explicit or implicit level. On the explicit 
level, we can see that many of the dominant political parties were formed based on 
ethnicity. At the same time, some other political parties formed that, although according 
7 
 
to their constitution they were based on multiethnicity, in practice they became a party 
dominated by certain ethnic groups only. At the implicit level, we can see the difference 
between ‘old politics’ (which usually refers to the politics of ethnicity, especially before 
the late 1990s) and ‘new politics’ (which usually refers to politics after the late 1990s or 
after the 2008 general election). This latter can be in the form of non-ethnic politics, new 
cyberpolitics, such as social media and alternative media, the rise of opposition parties 
and so on. Although there is no clear definition as to when to draw the boundary between 
‘old politics’ and ‘new politics’, and what constitutes ‘new politics’, most of the 
informants agree that the political landscape post the 2008 general election is acceptable 
for inclusion as ‘new politics’ in Malaysia, while politics before the late 1990s are 
considered as ‘old politics’. Although the period between the late 1990s and 2008 is 
slightly harder to define, this does not create much of a problem, as the terms ‘old 
politics’ and ‘new politics’ are merely referring to the commonly acceptable political 
scenario rather than rigidly describing a specific scenario. The discussion above shows 
how ethnicity cleavage was challenged by other cleavages which were unsuccessful due 
to the salience of ethnicity cleavage. Many from that time still feel that ethnicity should 
come before any other division, be it class or religion. However, the latest political 
scenario in the ‘new politics’ era provides a newer dimension in challenging ethnicity 
cleavage. Since the emergence of ‘new politics’, political parties have started to reform 
themselves to be periodically more inclusive, through the formation of new, non-ethnic 
parties or the repositioning of existing political parties’ direction. The working 
relationship between political parties since the late 1990s or the post-2008 general 
election is quite different from those before, although this working relationship itself is 
not rigid and changes from time to time. 
 
 In the late 1990s, with the sacking of the then deputy prime minister, Anwar 
Ibrahim, and his imprisonment, various movements arose. Ibrahim’s wife and followers 
set up a new political party, the National Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Nasional), a 
predecessor to the PKR (Parti Keadilan Rakyat or People’s Justice Party). This party 
intended to be a non-ethnicity party (putting aside those other intentions or core values 
for the moment, such as seeking the release of Anwar Ibrahim, fighting for justice and 
much more). Malaysia at that time had ‘no’ active multi-ethnic/non-ethnic party. ‘No’ 
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because even if, technically, there were multi-ethnic political parties, these political 
parties were generally dominated by a certain ethnic group. The PKR, even from its 
formation, could be seen as the most ‘genuine’ non-ethnicity/multi-ethnicity party when 
compared to their counterparts in terms of the composition of party members, party 
leadership, core values and so on. Apart from the PKN issue mentioned above, another 
ripple of ethnicity was present in the 2008 general election, when main opposition parties 
cooperated once again and formed an alliance. The 2008 election did not emphasise 
ethnicity outbidding or a similar kind of approach. Instead, the focus in their propaganda 




In general, and by looking at the current political landscape, Malaysian politics seems to 
be moving away from ethnic politics as previously practised. Political parties have shown 
that they are encouraging and moving towards the direction of de-ethnicization. With the 
political scenarios that are taking place in current politics, it leads to the main research 
question of how de-ethnicization has taken place in Malaysia. With the attempt to answer 
the research question, a three-dimensional view of political parties will be utilised as a 
parameter in explaining the situation. As political parties are the main unit of analysis in 
this research, political parties will be analysed from three perspectives, namely party 
membership, party stance and party electoral strategy. 
 
 With the scope of discussion and problem statements as explained above, this 
research will focus on the main research question of to what extent de-ethnicization has 
taken place in Malaysia from the perspective of political parties.  With the main research 
question as above, it leads to three dimensions for the research question, as below: 
1. Party membership 
2. Party stance 
3. Electoral strategy  
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 With the attempt to answer the research question, a three-dimensional view of 
political parties will be utilised as a parameter in explaining the situation. As political 
parties are the main unit of analysis in this research, political parties will be analysed 
from three perspectives, namely party membership, party stance and party electoral 
strategy. For party membership, as membership forms the basis of any political party, the 
eligibility of admission as a member would be viewed as the level of inclusiveness of that 
political party. Likewise, with the dimension of party stance, the political position taken 
would be evaluated by the inclination a political party tends to follow. Such inclination 
could explain the direction of the political party and what they intend to do, as all these 
could be perceived as their party stance. Finally, on electoral strategy, political parties 
make promises through their party stance or even through their party membership 
structure. However, when it comes to candidature selection, it is the time for them to 
practice what they preach. Ideal ambition may sound good, but when it comes to electoral 
competition, the party would have to make a decision whether to remain with the 
conventional candidature selection method or give newcomers, especially minorities, in 




Scholars provide different insights on how to understand ethnic politics, although most 
agree that ethnic politics is a kind of politics where the level of ethnicity incorporated into 
the political field is high. This can be in the form of an ethnic-based political party, 
political rhetoric using ethnicity as the main issue of contention, favouritism in ethnicity 
policies and much more. However, they have agreed to differ on how ethnic politics can 
emerge.  
 
             One group of scholars believe that the emergence of ethnic politics is due to the 
external interventions which divide society. One of the most common external 
interventions is the distribution of materials and goods. Shamsul (1996) views ethnicity is 
crucial in certain political landscapes as it attaches privileges according to particular 
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ethnic groups. With such special privileges accorded to a particular ethnic group, the 
materials and goods they receive will instil conflict between these groups. The salience of 
ethnicity may also be higher because different ethnicities come with different 'values'. 
Horowitz (1993) does agree that the distribution of goods, whether material or non-
material, may have to do with the identity of a person in some societies. Due to the 
different treatments being accorded to different groups of society, it brings about the 
emergence of such differentiation in their local politics. These scholars do agree that 
ethnic politics is encouraged, if not yet highly inclined, towards that direction. Although 
there exists such differentiation in terms of benefits received by certain ethnic groups 
within the same society, this does not automatically mean that ethnic politics must occur 
in such a society. Apart from the historical background, inter-ethnic group relations (at a 
mass level), their willingness to accept such inequality and so on, another important 
factor that determines whether such a society is inclined towards ethnic politics is the 
political system itself. 
 
 Another group of scholars believe the differences among ethnicities causes society 
to fragment further. From Furnivall’s (1948) research in Burma, he is able to describe the 
inter-ethnic group relationship, suggesting that the low level of inter-ethnic interaction 
may provide a wider space for political interest groups, especially political parties, to 
make themselves representative of a particular ethnic group. Such small divisions 
occurring within the non-political sphere encourages political stakeholders to advance 
their interests in society. As such representations of particular ethnic groups develop, it 
tends to divide the already divided society further. Such a principle is agreed by Ufen 
(2012) when he argues that a diverse society tends to split into factions (or ethnicity) 
within a society, and such divisions, when incorporated into the political field, encourage 
the development of ethnic politics. 
 
 Due to the salience of ethnicity emerging within a society, it is safe to say that 
such salience opens up space for political parties to flourish based on ethnicity cleavage. 
However, ethnicity salience, similar to other kind of cleavages, may not be in a 
continuously dominant position without being challenged by other cleavages. Scholars 
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such as Dunning and Harrison (2010) argue that the shift of cleavage from one to another 
may weaken the existing cleavage. If the level of salience held by the newer cleavage is 
higher than the old or existing cleavage, it is not impossible for such new cleavage to take 
over the role as new cleavage, or at least, create a competitive landscape for political 
cleavages. Chandra (2012) and Zuckerman do agree that in the event of an existing 
ethnicity cleavage being no longer as salient as before, it is not impossible for political 
parties to move towards a newer direction of de-ethnicization should such a shift 
strengthen their political position. Apart from Dunning and Harrison’s (2010) suggestion 
of shifting the attention from an existing cleavage to a new cleavage, Milikowski (2000) 
also suggests the application of a ‘similarity strategy’ to commonalise the contention 
differences between ethnic groups into the dimension where they hold onto similar 
characteristics. As ethnic politics flourishes based on the differences between ethnic 
groups, Sussane (2006) suggests that in order to de-ethnicize such a society, it is crucial 
to find out the similarities and apply such similarities to overcoming differences. While 
most of the scholarship explains how politics becomes ethnicized, it is less focused on the 
ways in which it can also become de-ethnicized. 
 
 The idea of de-ethnicization explored by the scholars named above, despite 
mentions of the principle level of how de-ethnicization could take place, does not narrow 
down the mechanism of how it could be utilised. There are various factors that cause de-
ethnicization to emerge. This includes, but is not limited to, the role of political parties 
(Horowitz, 1993, Lijphart, 1968), influences from the outside world (Fenton, 2003), 
economy (Gomez, 2012) and others. There is no doubt that all these factors could affect 
the salience of ethnicity cleavage in a society, especially in Malaysia, but this research 
inclines towards political parties as a unit of analysis. This is because this research 
intends to examine how political parties position themselves in a complicated society 
such as Malaysia. This is because other factors, apart from political parties, could 
undoubtedly cast an influence on the political landscape of Malaysia, but it is political 
parties which have a direct influence upon whether or not they wish to continue with the 
‘old politics’ or progress to the challenge of ‘new politics’. Furthermore, political parties, 
in the event of being made a unit of analysis, would have to encounter many 
complications, such as what constitutes ethnic politics, how they can negate ethnic 
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politics (or push for the de-ethnicization of politics) and how to deal with the terms 
‘ethnic-based party’, ‘non-ethnic-based party’ and ‘multi-ethnic-based party’. 
 
 As the local political scene has less problem in defining what constitutes an 
ethnic-based party and non-ethnic-based/multi-ethnic-based parties, the local political 
landscape has a greater issue in drawing the line between non-ethnic-based parties and 
multi-ethnic parties. Although, academically, these two types of political parties should 
be defined in a different manner, in this research attention may not be interested in 
separating them. Scholars such as Chandra (2012) do define that an ethnic party may not 
necessarily contain a particular ethnicity membership or a particular ethnic group core 
struggle. An ethnic group can be defined in a more inclusive manner. At the same time, 
Lijphart’s (1977) suggestion of a party including an ethnic-based party to form a grand 
coalition of component parties will thereafter turn the grand coalition party into a multi-
ethnic party. Proponents for non-ethnicity politics try to distance themselves from ethnic-
based discussions. Although such definitions may contribute most to the philosophical 
arguments of how to classify these three types of political parties, due to the nature of the 
Malaysian political landscape, differentiating between ethnic politics and non-
ethnic/multi-ethnic politics is possible, while separating non-ethnic politics and multi-
ethnic politics does not seem to be a viable move in the local political scenario. 
 
 One of the main elements of ‘new politics’ in Malaysia is in regard to the shift of 
the political landscape from ethnic politics to non-ethnic politics (or multi-ethnic politics). 
Non-ethnic politics and multi-ethnic politics may have different perspectives of their own. 
Non-ethnic politics is largely being used academically to describe the political landscape 
that does not touch on ethnicity issues, while for multi-ethnic politics, it may refer to 
politics which is inclusive of all ethnic groups. These definitions may be true for an ideal 
description or for nations that have been practising it for a long period but not for an 
embryonic stage of de-ethnicization in Malaysia. Countries such as the United States, the 
United Kingdom and Australia, which are among the most popular immigration nations, 
have acknowledged their multiculturalism. However, there are not many nations which 
are as diverse but could successfully call themselves non-diverse nations. One such 
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example is France, where the government tries to eradicate differences among them, at 
least in the public sphere: no religious symbols are allowed in public areas and policy 
discussions are based on native French groups instead of diverse groups. Although ideally, 
those actions may be seen as having no relevance to individual identity, commonality 
does not necessarily mean fairness, or at least, it is arguable from the opposite sides. For 
instance, a blanket ban on public symbols in the public sphere may principally mean that 
no individual identity is allowed. However, if such a ban is to be narrowed down into 
individual needs, this does not mean that all religions could be equalised in their 
acceptance. One example is the wearing of religious symbols for other religions, such as 
Christianity, Buddhism and Hinduism, against the wearing of religiously-allowed attire 
(the headscarf for Muslim women and the turban for Sikh men). The wearing of religious 
symbols for the former is not compulsory, although it may be a preferred option. 
However, for the latter, the attire is required by the religion. Therefore, to have a blanket 
ban on all does not necessarily means fairness. Ultimately, a non-identity policy in the 
public sphere may not be a practical success. A similar principle is being applied to the 
Malaysian political landscape. It is worth noting that multicultural politics follows on 
from post-immigration diversity, and thus may be expected to be rather different than 
multi-ethnic politics in a country like Malaysia. 
 
 The description of de-ethnicization in Malaysia in this writing would include both 
multi-ethnicity and non-ethnicity as a single concept. This is because as an embryonic 
stage of de-ethnicization in Malaysia, a balance ethnicity composition may still be 
required in a certain sense (at least in the political sphere) to show that ethnicity is not the 
main consideration. At the same time, even with a balanced composition, the rhetoric 
may not necessarily mean inclusivity but could incline towards non-ethnicity. Although 
the premises described above are slightly contradictory, as earlier discussed, due to its 
embryonic stage of de-ethnicization, a certain level of leverage is needed to balance 
inclusivity (multi-ethnicities) and total wipe-off (non-ethnic politics). 
 
                Therefore, in this research, the definition applied when discussing de-
ethnicization refers to a deviation from ethnic politics. Such deviation from ethnic politics 
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covers both non-ethnic politics and multi-ethnic politics in this research, as the intention 
of this research is to argue that ethnic politics is less viable in Malaysian politics rather 
than to argue whether Malaysian politics is moving towards non-ethnic politics or multi-
ethnic politics, as these two concepts are integrated as ‘one’ throughout this research. 
Therefore, as political parties form the main focus of research, such a mechanism is 
narrowed down to three dimensions. First is party membership. A party is considered to 
be an ethnic-based party and needs to have a membership which can portray such an 
identity. Membership, as argued by scholars, could represent personal interest, which has 
nothing to do with ethnicity. At the same time, some party memberships function in the 
perspective of ethnicity, such as membership that could reflect the strength of a political 
party through their own community support (in the sense of becoming an ethnic party 
member). This concept will be incorporated into the roles of members or membership in 
helping or harming the effort towards de-ethnicization. 
 
              Second is party stance. This approach is being used to explain how political 
parties maintain or alter their party position when compared to a previous stance taken in 
an effort to face a new political scenario. Party stance is born out of the mentality of a 
political party. Each political party has its own set of principles to uphold. Some may 
uphold identity as their core struggle, some may be dynamic according to situations at the 
time, and some may even insist on maintaining their traditional core values. This 
approach is to look at whether political parties remain or change their party direction 
according to the political wind. If they do make changes, do these changes help or harm 
the process of de-ethnicization? 
 
 The third is electoral strategy. The electoral system remains largely as it was 
during previous elections. However, the way political parties approach the electoral 
system is different from time to time. Due to the diversity of election candidates, a 
political party could choose how to nominate their candidate. Nominating candidates 
without examining ethnicity as the main consideration is helping to push the political 
scenario towards de-ethnicization. Contrarily, should ethnicity remain the main 
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consideration and election winning put above party principles, it may cause a hindrance 
to the process of de-ethnicization. 
 
 Therefore, in summary, de-ethnicization of politics in Malaysia for this research 
focuses on these three domains: party membership, party stance and electoral strategy. 
Such a narrow mechanism is believed to be able to dissect the role of political parties in 
pushing or preventing de-ethnicization from taking place. 
 
 
SCOPE OF THE PROJECT 
There are two scopes to the project in this research. The first is geographical location. In 
this research, the geographical location covers only Peninsular Malaysia where eleven 
states and two federal territories are located. The two states that are excluded are Sabah 
and Sarawak, which are located in East Malaysia. Such limitations are due to Sabah and 
Sarawak having very different political landscapes when compared to Peninsular 
Malaysia. Political parties dominant in East Malaysia are mostly active in the state 
boundary only, although no doubt there are some slight exceptions. The cultural 
background there is very different to the cultural background in Malaysia, which causes a 
generalisation that could not be made in regards to Peninsular and East Malaysia. Some 
autonomy is granted to these two states according to the Malaysian constitution, which 
leads to a different manner of political competition. Aside from these, there are many 
more differences between Peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia. For this reason, this 
research will focus only on Peninsular Malaysia. 
 
 The second scope is in regard to time. As this is real-time research, many changes 
are taking place while this research is being conducted and even after fieldwork is done. 
It is impossible to follow up with the latest political development, as every new day may 
mean a new development. For this reason, a limitation is being set for the end of the 
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period when fieldwork is being completed. This means that for this research, the 




This thesis is divided into seven chapters. These seven chapters begin with Background 
on Malaysian Politics, followed by Literature Review and Methodology, before moving 
onto three substantive chapters of Party Membership, Party Stance and Electoral 
Strategies, followed by the Conclusion. 
 
Chapter 1: Background on Malaysian Politics 
In the first chapter, readers are provided with background information regarding the 
politics of Malaysia, including the past and current political development. As a case study 
for a particular country may be less suitable for general consumption, this chapter 
portrays the history of Malaysian political development. This explains the basic political 
system in Malaysia, major events that have taken place and the emergence of cleavages in 
Malaysian politics with a particular focus on the evolution and development of ethnic 
cleavages. This continues with the discussion of the current political configuration, with a 
focus on the two main political fronts, namely Barisan Nasional (BN) and Pakatan Rakyat 
(PR) (and the major component parties within these two political fronts). Its purpose is to 
give an overall idea of the political parties in Malaysia before moving into a more in-
depth discussion in later chapters about the development of these parties. With such an 
arrangement, readers are able to follow the political development in Malaysia, starting 
with the history of Malaysian politics and followed by the current political configuration 






Chapter 2: Theoretical context 
As explained by its title, this chapter focuses on a review of past literature in relation to 
this research. The chapter critically evaluates the scholarship on ethnic politics before 
setting out the approach it will take in this thesis. This chapter is divided into two main 
sections. This first section is to discuss ethnic politics generally and the de-ethnicization 
of politics specifically. This begins with a brief comparison on the definition of 
‘ethnicity’ by different scholars before moving onto a discussion of how ethnicity is 
related to politics. This final subsection for this chapter is to look at the literature which 
relates ethnicity to cleavages. 
 
               The second main section of this chapter is to examine the field of ‘de-
ethnicization of politics’. This section rolls the ball by examining how scholars look at 
the idea of de-ethnicization. Although there is a wealth of literature on de-ethnicization, 
there is a limited literature concerned with the de-ethnicization of politics, and the 
situation is even worse for technicalities and mechanisms on how politics is being de-
ethnicized. Therefore, for the general discussion of de-ethnicization of politics, this 
section includes subsections on how politics could be de-ethnicized in mechanism terms. 
A three-dimensional approach has been introduced. This includes party membership, 
party stance and electoral strategy in looking at the development of de-ethnicization of 
politics.  
 
Chapter 3: Method 
This chapter explains how this research is carried out. Apart from the common overall 
introduction in this chapter, this chapter begins with a discussion of the methods chosen 
for this study and why those methods are appropriate. It then turns to a discussion of the 
selection of samplings for data collection. As this research applies qualitative interview 
methods, the selection of samples is crucial, as the method of selection could affect the 
overall data collected. For this research, explanation focuses on why purposive sampling 
is chosen and how each sample is selected, including the number and principles behind 
the method. This chapter further discusses how data is collected from the samples and 
18 
 
how this collected data is to be analysed. These three steps of selecting samples, 
collecting data and analysing data are interrelated as a different approach being applied to 
whichever steps may have an impact on the other two. 
 
                Although these steps above justify the methodology of this research, another 
section paid attention to and integrated during and after fieldwork is ethnical practice. As 
this research involves human beings, a certain level of ethnical practice should be upheld. 
This is to protect the interest and ‘safety’ of informants, while at the same time, produce 
an ethnically accepted action in obtaining information for this research. In this section, 
how such ethnic practices are being upheld are discussed. 
 
Chapter 4: Party Membership 
This chapter explains how each political party views party membership in the new wave 
of political de-ethnicization. Apart from the Introduction as the opening of discussion in 
this chapter, the coalition party is explored, as the five main political parties to be 
discussed in depth are within the coalition party. Furthermore, as the coalition party 
functions as a bridge for different component parties, compromise, if necessary, happens 
within the coalition party. The discussion of the coalition party of both the BN and PR 
comes first, before narrowing it down to each component party. Separating both the 
coalition party and the component party is necessary, as although party leadership 
generally possesses two positions – one in their own component party, the other in the 
overall coalition party – there may or may not be some contradiction or priority for these 
political leaders. Therefore, the first section is to discuss both coalition parties to start the 
ball rolling. 
 
 In this chapter, the discussion also focuses on how party membership impacts on 
the effort to de-ethnicize the political landscape. As UMNO and MIC are fully Malay- 
and Chinese-based, while PAS is highly dominated by Malay, making their parties more 
inclusive is tough but not impossible. Similarly, for the Democratic Action Party (DAP), 
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although it is technically a multi-ethnic party due to its high Chinese membership, DAP 
may need to make their party even more inclusive, as urged by their constitution.  
 
Chapter 5: Party Stance 
In this fifth chapter, the discussion surrounds the idea of what kind of party stance does 
each political party take in facing the trend of ‘new politics’ in the Malaysian political 
landscape? Similar to the approach above, a general discussion of de-ethnicizing 
Malaysian politics through party action and direction is being discussed before narrowing 
it down to an individual party. Such general discussion is necessary as it could provide a 
bigger picture of the political development in Malaysia, especially on how de-
ethnicization of politics could take place through a political party's stance. This is 
thereafter narrowed down to the action taken by each component party and the direction 
in which these component parties are heading. 
 
 In this chapter, focus is paid to what kind of action or party direction each 
political party wishes to take, be it in de-ethnicizing themselves through events and 
programmes which are more inclusive and less ethnic-based politicking or to remain with 
the status quo without making many changes to the way they handle the de-ethnicization 
issue. This chapter would also be able to examine how informants view their own party, 
as an ethnic-based party or conversely. 
 
Chapter 6: Electoral Strategy 
In this sixth and final substantive chapter, there will be an examination of how political 
parties walk their talk when it comes to electoral election. It is meaningless if the 
suggestions from the previous chapters remain suggestions without being applied to 
electoral politics by the respective political parties. In this chapter, a detailed analysis is 
made on whether voters vote according to ethnic preference or not, according to ethnic 
bloc voting. As voting is secret, this chapter applies two approaches to arguing whether 
voters vote according to ethnicity or not. The first approach is to determine which seat 
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can provide a chance for comparing the voting trend due to ethnicity. As a brief 
explanation, seats contested by different ethnicities are considered. Should a seat be 
contested by the same ethnic candidates, it could not be verified through the electoral 
results on the ethnicity voting trend. 
 
 On the second level, in the event of these seats being selected, a safe assumption 
is made based on the voting results, such as seat composition (voters by ethnicity), 
majority votes won by the candidate and history of the seat result. Although an 
assumptive method could not be ascertained, as there are chances for common law 
principles not to be followed, why such an assumptive argument is safe when based on 
common law, the law for the common people principle, is further argued in this chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
This seventh and final chapter provides a clear and concise answer to the research 
questions about the ethnicization of politics in Malaysia. The first three sections in this 
chapter individually analyse whether these three dimensions, namely party membership, 
party stance and electoral strategy, provide for de-ethnicization of politics in Malaysia. 
This is then followed by an overall view of whether de-ethnicization of politics in 
Malaysia by political parties is a success. As the beginning of this chapter has mentioned, 
this research intends to look at the de-ethnicization development in Malaysia, which is 
still in an embryonic stage, and the intention is not to prove that de-ethnicization has 










BACKGROUND ON MALAYSIAN POLITICS 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Malaysia is a diverse nation with multiple ethnic groups, multiple religions, multiple 
languages, multiple cultures and so on, living under the same roof (Nagata 1974). This 
diversity has much to do with the history of colonial era (Siddique & Suryadinata 1981). 
Mass migration into the country has been colonial mainly for economic reasons, the 
Chinese from mainland China, and Indian from India. With the migration of Chinese and 
Indians into the country, these new immigrants start to build their homes and became part 
of the Malaysia people (Neo 2006). With such a historical background, this diversity has 
been carried forward to the modern-day Malaysia. 
 
 As during the colonial era when immigrants were brought into Malaya 
(predecessor for Malaysia), these immigrants could barely communicate beyond their 
own community. As suggested by Furnivall (1948) in his research in Burma, different 
segments of society communicate in the marketplace for buying and selling purposes, but 
not much more beyond that activity. They could hardly understand one another, and the 
highest level of relationship between them would only reach up to a "mixing" level and it 
was almost impossible to reach the stage of "combining". In the case of Malaysia, 
especially on the last colony of Malaya established by the British, the scenario is worse 
due to the divide-and-rule policy implemented which segregated different communities 
(Abraham 1997). This geographically segregated society, with different segments of the 
society living in different areas and working in different economic sectors, there is barely 
any space for them to interact with one another. Therefore, it is not surprising that these 
communities formed their own organisations among themselves through a loose 
community network, a clan (Lim 2006) or into more organised kinds of political parties.  
The path different ethnic groups took toward first ethnic associations and then political 
parties, however was neither linear nor uniform. 
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 Unlike the formation of the UMNO (which was formed because of the protest 
against the introduction of the Malayan Union; a more politically driven reason for the 
establishment of UMNO) which is explained in the introductory chapter, the formation of 
Chinese and Indian ethnic groups had less to do with political issues. The main purpose 
for these immigrants leaving their home town for a new place is due mainly to the 
purpose of generating income (Madhavan, 1985). Furthermore, the ties between these 
immigrants and their homeland remain strong compared with the sense of belonging that 
these groups feel towards Malaya (Lim, 1977). When these immigrants arrive in Malaya 
they do not have much in the way of protection from the colonial government (Lee, 1989) 
but, even so, these immigrants did group together and extend their assistance to one 
another. This kind of "groupness" had much to do with their identity, however, it was also 
to do with their narrow identity in the beginning. 
 
 Chinese immigrants at that time grouped themselves according to the dialect they 
speak, the geographical area of their home town (which could be as small as a village or 
as wide as a province). This intensified the formation of associations, guilds, clans and 
even secret societies (Moese, Reinknecht & Schmitz-Seisser, 1979). For instance, 
Cantonese-speaking immigrants were grouped together as one, and Hakka-speaking 
immigrants were grouped together as another. It is not surprising, therefore, that groups 
speaking different dialects fought among themselves for various reasons, most notably 
economic, even though they were all Chinese, came from mainland China and were alike 
in identity and background.. However, as time passed more Chinese resided and were 
born in Malaya (unlike their senior generation who were born in mainland China and 
migrated to Malaya) and their ties with Malaya were stronger compared to their senior 
generation (Wang, 1970). The level of concern towards Malaya (including politics) as 
also higher and when the British colony tried to repatriate these immigrants or the 
Malaya-born generation back to China because of the impact of communism in Malaya at 
that time (as most members of Malayan Communist are Chinese), the MCA was born as 
an umbrella body to defend the Chinese community as a whole, while at the same time 
being acknowledged by the British government (Pek, 1988). The repatriation plan was 
called off and the MCA was highly accorded as a Chinese association, mainly taking care 
of the welcome of the people. During the period of independent struggle, the MCA joined 
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the negotiation delegation and started to become involved more directly with local 
politics and started to contest in the early days of elections held by the British 
government. Although the MCA was mainly focused on the Chinese community, its 
leaders did realise the importance of working together with other ethnic groups. During 
an election, the MCA and UMNO established political cooperation as the UMNO-MCA 
alliance (Fernando, 2003) before forming a coalition party which consisted of the main 
ethnic groups in Malaya (UMNO represents Malays, MCA represents Chinese and MIC, 
which joined later, represents Indians). 
 
 A similar situation occurred with the Indian community. Indian immigrants were 
brought in through the Kangani system (Ramasamy, 1992), where one of the labourers is 
made their leader and he is responsible for taking care of the rest. No doubt in the process, 
there are some leaders who misuse their power and suppress their own people (Basu, 
2011). Like the Chinese immigrants, their loyalty inclined more towards their home land 
instead of Malaya. The main purpose for the establishment of the MIC was to help India 
to gain independence. Due to the commonality among Indian immigrants in Malaya, this 
was also one of the unifying factors among them. When Malaya tried to negotiate with 
the British for independence, like the MCA, these three main ethnic groups, through their 
respective parties, worked together for independence of Malaya (Md Shukri Shuib, 2010). 
This is how MIC, like the MCA, ventured into local politics directly, which differed from 
their founding objectives. For these reasons, ethnic-based political parties are among the 
earliest forms of political parties.  For these reasons, ethnic-based political parties are 
among the earliest forms of political parties. 
 
 Such politics, which relies heavily on ethnicity, had dominated the political 
landscape of Malaysia (Gomez 2007). As these political parties are formed based on 
ethnicity cleavages, it is not surprising that these parties are championing ethnicity more 
than other issues. However, at the same time as these political parties are cooperating 
with one another under a coalition party, their struggles have to be within the same 
parameters of such a coalition (Shamsul 1994). Interaction between different ethnic 
groups largely depends on their representative political parties. The leadership of these 
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ethnic-based parties would then overarch their communication among themselves. This is 
part of Lijphart (1977) suggestion in his consociationalism theory, although 
consociationalism theory has been negated by some scholars, especially after the racial 
riots happened in 1969. At the same time, the issues championed by political parties have 
much to do with their opponents. The intensity of ethnic outbidding may at some point 
have been higher and some point lower, depending on the ethnicity issue confrontation by 
opponents (Rabushka & Shepsle 2009). Such ethnic politic trends were carried 
throughout Malaysian politics for most of the time until the late 1990s, or some draw the 
line in 2008. 
 
 The issue of de-ethnicisation in Malaysian politics started to rise up in the late 
1990s (commonly known as the "Reformation Era") when Anwar Ibrahim, a former 
Deputy Prime Minister, had been sacked (Gomez 2007). He, together with his followers, 
formed another political front in opposition to his former party UMNO, a Malay-based 
political party (Prasad 2015). This is a time in modern politics where the issue of non-
ethnic politics (or multi-ethnic politics) started to resurface. A more solid inter-ethnic 
cooperation had started to emerge for the opposition bench (Gomez 2007). Some argue 
that this is the time when de-ethnicisation of politics in Malaysia started to take place, 
while others argue that the result is not well as the opposition bench hardly put any 
pressure on the incumbent government, not even managing to break the two-thirds 
majority in Parliament that was held by the government. In the 2008 General Election, 
another similar political cooperation existed in the opposition bench and they managed to 
break the two-thirds majority in Parliament held by the incumbent government (Tunku 
Mohar Mokhtar 2008). During this election, opposition parties seldom, if not any longer, 
speak on ethnicity anymore. Even when it is necessary to touch on ethnicity, it will then 
refer to all the major ethnic groups in Malaysia. 
 
 Although the terms ‘multi-ethnicities’ and ‘non-ethnicity’ carry two different 
meanings academically, in Malaysian politics, at least at this stage, both of them have the 
same meaning. When "Malaysian politics" (referring to politicians as individual, political 
parties and so on) speaks about multi-ethnic politics, it refers to the inclusion of all as the 
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subject. When talking about non-ethnic politics, it refers to issues that are not tied down 
to politics principally, although practically, the over-dominance of a particular ethnic 
group on non-ethnic issues could pave an easier path to turn it into an ethnic-based 
discussion. That is why, for Malaysian politics to move towards de-ethnicisation, I will 
refer to this as the embryonic stage, requiring a certain level of definition compromise. 
 
 In this chapter, I will split it into three sections. The first section will give an idea 
of what Malaysia is all about, with attention paid to those Malaysian backgrounds that are 
related to ethnicity and are necessarily a foundation for understanding further discussion. 
In the second section, discussion will focus on the past political landscape in Malaysia. 
These past political events are necessary to understand the development of Malaysian 
politics more fully. Furthermore, these past political events lead to the current political 
configuration. Although ethnicity is the main concern of this research, this sub-section it 
does touch on class and religious cleavages to give a better and more wholesome 
understanding of the flow of political developments in Malaysia. The third section will 
include discussion about the current political configuration. This section necessitates a 
foundation for further analysis in subsequent chapters. 
 
 
1.2 MALAYSIAN BACKGROUND 
Malaya gained independence from the British on 31st August 1957. Malaya at that time 
consisted of only the Peninsular of Malaysia. With the effort taken by leaders from 
different ethnic groups negotiating with the British, they managed to convince the British 
of their ability to rule by themselves with a diverse society (Hutchinson 2015). Although 
the British had granted Malaya independence, other places within the region such as 
Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei are still under the rule of the British. At that 
period of time there was a heightened level of communism in Southeast Asia due to the 
Cold War, and the British tried to grant independence to these nations as a counter-
measure against communism, while at the same time adhering to United Nations 
encouragement of decolonisation (Fernando 2012). There was a suggestion of combining 
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Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei all together, as this could expedite the 
decolonisation of the other four states as well, apart from Malaya which had already 
gained independence. With Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak agreed to join into a 
federation in 1963, this federation was named Malaysia, a name which is still in use today 
(Md Shukri Shuib et.al 2010). However, due to political incompatibility between the 
Prime Minister of Malaysia (federal-level government) Tunku Abdul Rahman, and Chief 
Minister of Singapore (state-level government) Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore was split from 
the Federation of Malaysia in 1965 and became a country of their own (Chan 1969, 
Munusamy 2012). Therefore, Malaysia today consists of Peninsular Malaysia (formerly 
named as "Malaya") Sabah and Sarawak. Although three locations have been gazetted as 
Federal Territories, geographically they are still within the land of these 13 former states 
 
Moving forward from the historical aspect of Malaysia, it is generally known as a 
plural society consisting of three main ethnic groups (Malay, Chinese and Indian) and 
some smaller indigenous communities (mainly living in Sabah and Sarawak). According 
to the Department of Statistic Malaysia (2016), the percentage of Bumiputera (son of the 
soil) consists of 68.6%. This 'son of the soil' group generally refers to Malay and 
indigenous groups. According to Siddique & Suryadinata (1981), "bumi" can be 
translated as "earth" while "putera" means "prince". Although these terms are borrowed 
from Sanskrit, it has been used in a Malaysian context which carries the meaning as the 
"owner" of the land. This group is acknowledged as the origin of the land and, therefore, 
is entitled to certain special privileges as enshrined in the Malaysian Constitution, Article 
153. Such privileges are applied through the implementation of governmental policies 
(Debernardi 1994). Due to this, such categorisation of 'ethnicity' cannot be ignored in this 
research. The second largest population in Malaysia is Chinese, who stand at 23.4%, 
followed by Indians at 7.0%, while the balance of 1.0% is other than these three main 
categories (Department of Statistic Malaysia 2016). This is where the idea of Malaysia 
having three main ethnic groups comes from. This percentage will be useful for further 
analysis in the later chapters as such percentages will affect how the political systems are 




 As the above ethnic group percentages show, the overall population division by 
ethnicity is not equally divided as a percentage throughout Malaysia. In Malaysia, there 
are 13 states and three Federal Territories as shown in Table 1 below. Geographically, 11 
states and two Federal Territories are located in the Peninsular of Malaysia, which is the 
focus of this research as mentioned in Chapter 1, while another two states (Sabah and 
Sarawak) plus one Federal Territory (Labuan) are located in the east of the Peninsular 







Number of states 11 2 
Number of Federal Territories 2 1 
Table 1: Number of states and federal territories according to geographical location. 
 
 As explained in Chapter 1, the political landscape in East Malaysia has vast 
differences in their political landscape, therefore, East Malaysia is not included in this 
research. In the Peninsular, out of the 11 states there are six states where they have a 
significant percentage of Chinese, while in most of the other states the Malay have the 
highest population numbers. Such percentages could directly affect the political 
arrangement of particular states. For example, in Penang, according to Penang Institute 
(2016), a state government research think tank, the Chinese population in Penang is 
41.5% of the overall population, while Malay numbers come in at 40.9%. The gap 
between these two ethnic groups was larger decades ago as compared to now. For this 
reason, the position of Chief Minister of the state (head of state government) is held by 
the Chinese from independence until now. This is also the only state where the head of 
government is a non-Bumiputera. 
STATES 
PERCENTAGE OF CHINESE POPULATION 
(%) 
Penang > 40 
Perak, Selangor, Negeri 20 - 30 
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Sembilan, Malacca and Johor 
Kedah, Pahang and Perlis 10 - 20 
Kelantan, Terengganu Less than 10 
Table 2: Percentage of Chinese population according to states. (Department of Statistic 
Malaysia 2016) 
 
Apart from Penang, all the states beyond Penang to the south of the West Coast of 
Peninsular Malaysia have a significant percentage of Chinese population, estimated to be 
between 20% and 30% as shown in Table 2 above. These include Perak, Selangor, Negeri 
Sembilan, Malacca and Johor. This is one the reasons why the political power of non-
Bumiputera in these states is significant especially in the states of Perak and Selangor 
where the opposition managed to win against their non-Bumiputera counterparts in the 
election (Lee 2010). This is because, in the 2008 and 2013 General Elections, opposition 
parties seemed able to garner a lot of non-Bumiputera votes, particularly from the 
Chinese community (Chin 2013). In Penang, where the Chief Minister is from DAP, the 
DAP managed to make a clean sweep for all the seats it was contesting. 
 
 For the balance of five other states, three states, namely Kedah, Pahang and Perlis, 
have a much lower percentage of Chinese population. Even so, the influence of non-
Bumiputera elected representatives is still present, although the magnitude is not as great 
as the six states discussed above (Chin 2013). For the states of Kelantan and Terengganu, 
these states are generally Malay-dominated and it is rare to have a non-Bumiputera 
elected representative (Gomez 2007), although it is not impossible for certain reasons. 
For instance, in the state of Kelantan, a converted Chinese Muslim has been a state 
assemblyman and state EXCO member (akin to cabinet at federal level), while in 
Terengganu, MCA Chinese candidates did manage to win a state seat there, although the 
seat has a large majority of Malay voters compared to Chinese voters. This could be due 
to the concept of power sharing that the BN is practising (Saravanamuttu 2016). With this, 
it shows that UMNO is not contesting all seats and left their component partner with none 
to contest, although such seats have a higher number of Malay voters than non-Malays. 
The discussion of ethnicity distribution in Malaysia above could give a good picture of 
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the ethnicity landscape in Malaysia. Such description is the statistical data (Table 2) that 
Malaysia is having currently. Even so, it is helpful to have a general view on this 
historical background of Malaysia, too, as the historical background could explain why 
Malaysia is has such ethnicity composition and why ethnicity has become part of 
Malaysian politics. Apart from that, such demographic distribution does have an impact 
on the electoral strategy due to the electoral system that is practised in Malaysia. 
 
In terms of the Malaysian electoral system, they practise a single-member district 
plurality system (first past the post) for all elections held in Malaysia (Balasubramaniam, 
2006). This includes parliamentary elections (Lower House or Dewan Rakyat) and 
elections for seats in state assemblies. A plurality system means that a candidate can win 
a seat even with a narrow majority of votes and all factors, including the ethnic 
distribution within a seat, is taken into consideration although the importance of ethnicity 
does decline over the time. This is explained in detail in Chapter 6 on electoral strategy.  
 
The same plurality system applies for both parliamentary and state assembly 
elections. As Malaysia is practising a federation system, technically elections for 
parliamentary and state assembly seats are separated, although in actuality most of the 
state assemblies tend to call off their elections at the same time as parliament dissolution. 
Also, due to the nature of the federation system that Malaysia is practising, the division of 
power between the federal government and the state government is clear according to the 
Ninth Schedule of Malaysian Constitution (Loh, 2010). The main power accorded to the 
federal government includes foreign affairs, finance, defence, security and more. For state 
governments in Malaysia, land, local administration, forestry and licensing are among the 
jurisdiction of the state government. 
 
1.2.1 History of Malaysia 
Historically, in the post-Sultanate era in Malaysia, it was colonised by four superpowers 
over five periods of time. After the fall of Malacca Sultanate in 1511, Malaya was 
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conquered in sequence by the Portuguese, Dutch, British, Japanese (World War II) and 
lastly by the British again (Loo 2009). Eventually, the British granted independence to 
the Federation of Malaya (which consists of 11 states in Peninsular Malaysia) on 31 
August 1957 (Shennan 2002). Although there was a Japanese interruption, most of the 
British policies carried out in their first term of colonisation (in regards to this research, 
the migration of Chinese and Indian immigrants in Malaya) were not affected by the 
Japanese interruption. During the first term of British colonisation, the British had 
brought in immigrants from China and India to work in the labour industry in Malaya 
(Neo 2006). Chinese brought in were mainly concentrated in the mining industry, who 
later ventured into business as well. Due to this, we can see that during that time city 
areas were mostly populated by Chinese, compared to the other two ethnic groups. At the 
same time, Indian immigrants that were brought in were assigned to the plantation areas. 
Malays remained in the rural areas, focusing on agricultural. From here, we can see that 
this "divide-and-rule" policy implemented by the British was meant to segregate different 
ethnic groups so that they had very little space for communication among them 
(Munusamy 2012). With such policy, ethnic polarisation gets thicker and each group has 
to self-feed in order to survive (Abraham 1997). Such policy could give advantage to the 
ruler, in terms of ease of control over the colony, while at the same time it is tough for the 
local diverse society to unite as a single unit. 
  
 During the second term of British colonisation, they tried to introduce the 
Malayan Union (Neo 2006), a union that put all the 11 states under the same 
categorisation. Such suggestion was unpopular in the Malay groups for various reasons, 
for example the way citizenships were granted. The British suggested that citizenship be 
granted through the principle of ‘jus soli’, which meant a person who was born in Malaya 
could automatically gain citizenship (Miller 1965). This had been fiercely rejected by the 
Malays because, by implementing jus soli, it would open up citizenship widely. As Malay 
had an upper hand in dominating the majority of the total population, such policy would 
reduce that dominance in terms of population and hence, eradicate Malay position within 
the nation. The heavy presence of Chinese and Indian communities in Malaya too, was a 
concern for them, with such principles of citizenship being granted to those people 
considered to be foreign immigrants (Mauzy 2006). At the end of the day, the British had 
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agreed to retract Malayan Union and introduce the Federation of Malaya (Neo 2006). 
During this fiasco, too, it instilled the formation of the UMNO in uniting Malays to 
counter the British. 
 
 For the Federation of Malaya, some amendments had been made to cater to the 
will of the locals. The issue of citizenship had been addressed by changing the way 
citizenships were granted, from jus soli to jus sanguinis. The principle of jus sanguinis is 
to grant citizenship to the new-born of a citizen (Rodziana Mohamed Razali et.al 2015). 
This means that, in order to be a citizen, at least one of the parents of a new-born must be 
a citizen, and at the same time there were tightened citizenship requirements for existing 
Chinese and Indians. Such principles are still adhered to today. Furthermore, the British 
had acknowledged the "ownership" of Malay in Malaya by empowering them in the 
Constitution of Malaya. This includes recognising them as the ‘son of the soil’, the 
original founder of the land (Bakri Musa 1999). Therefore, the Malaysian Constitution 
grants certain special rights to the community (Neo 2006). For example, special 
privileges of Malays, Malay language as the official language, Islam as the official 
religion, and the Head of State must be a Malay Muslim (including state and federal 
level). The royalty system in Malaysia is unique compared to other places in the world. In 
Malaysia, nine of out 13 states are spearheaded by each royal family symbolically, as 
Malaysia practices a Constitutional monarchy. Out of this, nine Heads of State ("State" 
over here refers to literal state-level leadership), or locally known as "Sultan", elect 
among themselves a king to be Head of the Nation (literally translated) according to a set 
of rules and conventions. Even the head of government for particular states, Perak for 
instance, must be a Malay Muslim, quota in education, business and so on. In return, the 
immigrants, the Chinese and Indians, were then granted citizenship in Malaya (as 
formerly known until 1963 when the name Malaya changed to Malaysia) (Means 1972). 
This social contract has been practised from independence up until today (Ahmad Ali 
et.al. 2011). It performs on a basis of mutual understanding among elites of different 
ethnic groups. The validity of the social contract did not face any hindrance in the early 
independence period, as those who agreed upon it were the leaders of communities. 
However, successors may or may not agree with the spirit of this social contract (Holst 
2012). Even for the people today, a person may accept the existence of such a social 
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contract, but refuse to accept it on the basis of inequality. This forms the basis of racial 
cards to be played, especially by the politicians during elections. 
 
 From the historical background of Malaysia, even though this research argues for 
de-ethnicisation, ethnic politics being practised did not cause bloody clashes between 
different ethnic group in Malaya or Malaysia over the years except for one instance. 
Before this unfortunate incidence, Lijphart’s (1977) concept of consociationalism worked 
well up to the point where ethnic clashes on 13th May 1969 happened. However, for 
McGarry & O'Leary (2004), they see the traditional consociationalism theory as unable to 
maintain the stability of such a fragmented society. Such ethnic clashes happened, largely 
due to the 1969 General Election, which was held days before the incident. In that 
election, new opposition parties such as DAP and Gerakan managed to win many Chinese 
seats in Kuala Lumpur, while the Alliance Party (predecessor of BN) could not maintain 
a two- thirds majority in parliament for the first time (Rudner 1970). During the victory 
parade of Chinese elected representatives, there happened to be clashes between those 
parading the Chinese victory and some Malay people (Holst 2012). It happened in a 
Kuala Lumpur area where the opposition parties won their seats. When talking about 
ethnicity that wins the seats, it may be similar ethnic groups that will win those seats as, 
generally in Malaysian politics (especially "old politics") there is a tendency for main 
contesting parties, in filling candidates, coming from the same ethnic groups (Mat Jali 
Mohd Fuad 2011). This is because each party does look at the voter composition when 
filling in their candidate for large ethnicity marginal seats. Unless those seats have 
balanced ethnicity composition, or some other special circumstances, it will be the former 
premise that stands. Unfortunately, such election results in 1969 did occur and such 
clashes triggered a domino effect where other locations were also affected by it. Due to 
the critical situation at that time, Malaysia had declared a state of emergency through 
Head of State, the king (Yaakop 2011). With that emergency declaration, Parliament had 
ceased from proceedings while the daily life of ordinary people was largely affected, too. 
Although there are many versions of stories from different people, different interest 
groups and so on, the fact that bloody clashes did happened and the clashes involved 
Malay and Chinese communities could not be disputed. Only the reasons, processes and 
chronology is disputable. 
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Such incidents had taught Malaysia generally, and politicians specifically, of the 
fragility of ethnic relations at that time. Ever since pre-independence, up to the prior 
ethnic riots, although different ethnic groups did not have great inter-ethnic 
communication, and each of them was focusing more on their own part, there had not 
been bloody riots that claimed hundreds of lives and much properties. After the 
occurrence of the 1969 ethnic clash, as the nation was in emergency declaration, the 
National Operations Council was formed as a means of a caretaker government 
(Saravanamuttu 2016). This was to deal with the dire situation and to restore peace to the 
nation. Two main actions taken by the National Operation Council were implemented; 
the New Economy Policy (NEP) and formulation of "Rukunnegara" (a kind of pledge of 
allegiance). As the caretaker government felt that one of the reasons for such a clash was 
due to disparity among different ethnic groups in Malaysia, the Council introduced the 
NEP with a two-pronged strategy (Fakhrul Anwar & Wan Norhayate 2011). First, it was 
to restructure the society. As the society at the time was isolated among one another, with 
each particular ethnic group dominating particular fields, the first strategy was to 
restructure the society so that all different ethnic groups could be involved in different 
sectors (Samad 2009). The second strategy was to eradicate poverty. This was done 
regardless of ethnicity, although generally, Malay groups were among the poorest 
compared to Chinese at that time (Wicks 1971). Although these two strategies did seem 
to work, there was a lot of criticism against it, especially by non-Malays due to the 
favouritism towards Malay groups (Khairiah Salwa Mokhtar et.al 2013), while the 
proponent felt that such policy was fair and did not favour any ethnic group (Fakhrul 
Anwar & Wan Norhayate 2011). 
 
The second significant effort from the National Operations Council was to 
formulate a national philosophy to reunite the people of Malaysia (Mujibu Abd Muis et.al. 
2017). The five philosophies include: belief in God, loyalty to king and country, 
upholding of the Constitution, rule of law and good behaviour and morality. Such 
principles not only came in English versions as shown here, but also came in Malay, 
Chinese and Indian versions. Generally, public schools would recite this "Rukunnegara" 
in their weekly compulsory assembly (Gill et.al. 2012). Although these five principles do 
not seem to directly touch on inter-ethnic unity, no doubt they were one of the main 
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efforts taken by the National Operations Council at that time and were carried forward 
until today. If "similarity strategies" (as discussed in the Literature Review chapter) are 
applied in this situation, they may work at getting Malaysians to uphold the same 
"Rukennegara" and create a commonality among them. Similar to NEP as discussed 
above as another main effort taken by the Council, whether these two policies do 
contribute to bringing peace to the country is uncertain in regards to the direct linkage, 




1.3 PAST POLITICAL LANDSCAPE 
Different eras come with different political arrangements or landscapes. The is little 
doubt about the salience of ethnicity within Malaysian politics since early independence 
until today.  There are times when ethnicity cleavage forms the contestation between 
different political parties.  There are also times where other cleavage overtook ethnicity 
salience as a higher degree of political contestation among them.  According to Wyatt 
(2009), he defines cleavage as political divides more than the social division within a 
society.  Due to different characteristics within a society, it is not surprising that such 
differences may divide the society into different segments.  However, such division, be it 
into a large or tiny number of community composition, it does not necessarily creates a 
cleavage among them without political contestation.  Such description of cleavage is 
supported  by Lipset, Rokkan (1967) in the sense cleavages can challenge the political 
position of status quo.  They suggested for two important cleavage, namely territorial and 
functional.  Territorial cleavage covers for most of the primordialism values, ideologies, 
cultures and so on while functional cleavage generally focuses on economy such as 
development, conflict between elites and workers, primary economy against 
manufacturing industries and alike. This may also due to the challenge towards the core 
of the power holder parties by the periphery opposition against incumbency (Lipset 
Rokkan 1967).  However, cleavages within the political system at a particular time does 
not necessarily negate all other lesser degree of division within the society (Klesner 2005). 
In his research on Mexican political system, he sees that even though the two sets of two-
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party-system run concurrently (Institutional Revolutionary Party-PRI versus National 
Action Party-PAN; PRI versus Party of Democratic Revolution PRD) in which intensifies 
the pro-regime versus anti-regime cleavage, this does not means that the old ideology 
propagated by PAN and PRD is totally abandoned.  Even though PAN and PRI tried to 
project themselves into a catch-all-party direction in order to broaden their support base, 
they may not be able to achieve huge success by only moving towards the center but 
neglecting their original support base especially by the example of PAN's Presidential 
success.  Therefore, sometimes a division within the society may not (yet) build a 
cleavage for political contestation within the system, but such divisions are not 
neglectable.  At the same time, it is not uncommon for overlapping of cleavage and 
division to happen.  Klesner (2005) argues that when the previous cleavages such as left-
right, rural-urban and regionalism shift to proregime-antiregime cleavage, this former 
divisions may still exist within the proregime-antiregime cleavage.  These 
cleavage/divisions are not mutually exclusive.    
 
 These definitions above well-explained on the shift of cleavages in Malaysian 
politics.  Such shifting may be due to the changing demands of the masses towards the 
political system, or it could be due to the outbidding effort by political parties against 
their direct opponent. In this section I will discuss the four kinds of cleavage that existed 
in Malaysia, which are ethnic cleavage, class cleavage, religious cleavage and reform-of-
politics cleavage. To Crouch (2001), almost all policy issues ranging from education, 
security, immigration, business licence and so on, are related to ethnicity, while Ufen 
(2012) argues that the religious cleavage between UMNO and PAS has emerged from the 
ethnicity cleavage, particularly during the 1980s and Mahathir’s administration. Crouch 
and Ufen both have a point, however, I argue that Malaysia has gone through four stages 
of different cleavage, starting with ethnicity cleavage as the main contention during the 
independence era, until the occurrence of a racial riot in 1969, where the cleavage started 
to incline towards class cleavage. Religious cleavage took place from the 1970s up to the 
1980s when the main political competition was between UMNO and PAS, convincing 
individuals that they were more Islamic than the other. In the latest development, 
contestation between political parties is not about identity contestation anymore, but 
starting (in fact, has already started) to develop towards a value-based cleavage. Each of 
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the political fronts is trying to prove their ability towards good governance, practice and 
universal values. Of these four, class cleavage and religious cleavage could co-exist with 
ethnic cleavage, which has been practised throughout these cleavages eras. The fourth 
kind of cleavage is a counter-ethnicity cleavage, where the success of reform-of-politics 
cleavage means the collapse of ethnicity cleavage as the former inclines towards 
eradicating ethnicity-based issues or propaganda. 
 
1.3.1 Ethnicity cleavage 
As acknowledged by Crouch (2001), Abdul Rashid (2009), Chin (2004) and many more 
scholars, contestation in Malaysian politics has often been based on ethnicity. Even 
Suhana (2013), in her latest argument, opines that political parties have often worked 
together along the ethnic line. Even though the modern politics of Malaysia seem to be 
moving away from ethnicity, this ambition is still at an embryonic stage. It is evidenced 
through the allocation of candidates according to the majority of ethnic voters for that 
particular seat (Maznah 2008). In general practice, a coalition party will nominate a 
candidate who is from the same ethnic group as the electorate in the seat (Ng et.al 2015). 
For example, if it is a Malay majority seat, generally it will be a Malay UMNO candidate 
against another Malay candidate as the challenger (there have been exceptional cases as 
well, particularly in this latest political landscape). Due to the seat allocation, the 
ethnicity cleavage takes the form of a proxy war against the other ethnic group. The DAP 
(Chinese-based opposition party) will fight the UMNO (Malay-based incumbent party) 
by contesting against the MCA (Chinese-based incumbent party). This is how the 
ethnicity issue is being played out within the political scene. Of course, the second way of 
battling is through direct challenge between different groups. 
 
Lim (2002) also argues that ethnicity cleavage in Malaysia is strongly related to 
the developmental status for an area. In Malaysia, most of the rural areas are occupied by 
the Malays, while the Chinese are living mostly in the urban areas. Therefore, 
contestation of ethnicity cleavage is directly linked with the developmental status of an 
area. However, I argue that in statistical calculations he is right, but quite often ethnicity 
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will be valued higher in the developmental status of an area. For instance, the UMNO 
gain strongholds in most of the rural Malay areas, primarily because of ethnicity, while 
developmental status is secondary. This is why the UMNO failed to cross-cut the 
ethnicity boundary and failed to perform in the Chinese rural areas. Furthermore, with 
special privileges accorded to the Malay community as an indigenous people, it is 
impossible to disregard differences within the society. Chopra (1974), in his writings in 
the 1970s, argues that ethnicity becomes a cleavage in fighting for political powers due to 
the fact that the Malay community felt threatened by the minorities, and at the same time 
minorities felt dissatisfied with the privileges. However, Nagel (1994) is softer on that 
issue, even though he still thinks that the special privileges have caused dissatisfaction 
within the non-Malay community, making it difficult to combine them as ‘one’, but not in 
terms of violence or hardcore dissatisfaction. These communities can mix within the 
same ‘pot’, but they do not melt into ‘one’ in the same pot. The ‘us-them’ relationship 
does still exist, however, by looking at the new developmental trends, the young, 
particularly the educated, do not make special privileges an essential issue. They are 
confident in themselves competing with others, regardless of whether or not they are 
given handicapped privileges by the government. Therefore, this is how ethnicity 
cleavage starts to weaken in 21
st
 Century politics in Malaysia. 
 
Another factor that contributes to ethnicity cleavage is the education system. The 
existence of multiple streams of school means that students from different ethnic groups 
are separated from each other. This education system may creates antagonism within the 
school children (Samuel 2012). As education is the main source of nurture for the 
mindset of the people, students in vernacular schools may tend to mingle with people 
from the same ethnic group only (Sivapalan Selvadurai et.al 2015). If this phenomenon 
were to be carried out after their schooling, it may or may not then be translated into 
antagonism against people from other ethnic groups. Generally, politicians and political 
parties are not the decision-makers for the direction in which the party should go, but 
instead they decide the best way to gather support. If the community is shaped by way of 
an antagonism, the political institution will follow the same direction and hence, deepen 
the ethnicity cleavage so the political institution can take advantage of it. This is how 
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education becomes part of the medium for deciding the level of depth of ethnicity 
cleavage within the political system. 
 
1.3.2 Class cleavage 
After the racial riot in 1969, the government had implemented a new form of economic 
policy called New Economy Policy (NEP). Theoretically, NEP’s two main objectives 
were to restructure society so that it would not become segregated according to ethnic 
group (such as Malay in agriculture, Chinese in business and Indians in plantations), and 
to eradicate poverty. However, Ben (2006) argues that the implementation of the policy 
restructured ethnicity and class. In practice, the main beneficiaries were the Malays who 
benefited from this policy when they were accorded various subsidies and policy support 
from the government. Yet, the policy did not manage to help the poor, but instead created 
a new cronyism-based Malay middle class (Tan 2015). The existence of such new middle 
class did not born from the natural cycle of the market/economy, but it is more to a 
political-inclined intervention of up-warding a particular lower class of people.  Due to 
the selective positive discrimination towards a particular segments of the society 
especially in ethnicity terms, therefore, even when the contestation move towards rich 
versus poor, urban versus rural and alike, ethnicity influence is still strong. Therefore, as 
argued above, although immediately following the 1969 ethnic riot there was an obvious 
move away from ethnic cleavage towards class cleavage through economy policies, yet 
again the element of ethnicity was still heavily invested in during this era, due to the 
target group of the policy purposely or coincidentally falling into the same category of 
society as is the Malay society, although a smaller fraction of poor non-Malay groups did 
benefit slightly from it. 
 
According to Milne (1977), Malaysian politics at that time was reluctant to veer 
more towards class cleavage (although comparatively, economy division showed just 
slightly more salience compared to ethnicity), even during the implementation period of 
NEP, in contrast to other case studies in Guyana. This is because, by changing direction 
in favour of class cleavage blanketly, multiple status quo benefits will be lost. For 
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instance, politicians from ethnic-based political parties (mainly from the BN) could not 
afford to have a zero ethnicity-based contestation as it would then reduce the importance 
of these ethnic-based parties. Furthermore, by favouring class vertically within different 
ethnic groups (meaning the political contestation within class cleavage is within the 
ethnic group.  For example, there were clearer cleavage between elite Malays and inferior 
Malays; same goes to Chinese and Indians; but there were least over-arching between 
lower class of one ethnic group with elite from another different ethnic group), their 
followers would then have to approach elites from the same ethnic group when facing a 
problem. This is why internal bargaining through ethnicity approaches within the same 
coalition is better and more beneficial to them, rather than changing to a general class 
approach (Milne 1977).  Even so, comparatively, public discourse on class was more 
popular than ethnicity as ethnicity became a subset to class. 
 
Yet, at the same time, it is undeniable that during that period of time, from 
independence up until before the growth of new politics in the late 1990s, politics in 
Malaysia were mostly held and controlled by elite groups (Gomez 1996). This separation 
of elite and commoner through the class system provides the elite with a more secure 
position to remain in power, as their power could not be challenged easily by commoners 
and their supporters (Khairiah Salwa Mokhtar 2013). They are the ones that manipulate 
ethnicity issues to make people focus on ethnicity. However, behind the scenes, it is the 
elite who mislead their own community into supporting them with the hope of remaining 
strong for the community. They will also try to make sure that this vertical manipulation 
by each ethnic elite will not cut across each other (Brennan 1982). It means that there is a 
mutual understanding that the elite from a particular ethnic group will dominate the lower 
class of their ethnic groups, and not another ethnic group. 
 
1.3.3 Religious cleavage 
In Malaysia, a Malay must be a Muslim according to the definition of the Constitution. 
This ascribed identity will definitely have vast influence in politics, especially when 
Islam is always equated with being a Malay. The main religious cleavage competition of 
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Islam in Malaysia is between the UMNO and the PAS. The UMNO, being moderate on 
religious issues, has often been pressured into religious contention by the PAS, who are 
so-called more religious than the UMNO. Both are trying to claim authority and be the 
“religiously-correct” Islamic party (Ben 2006). 
 
Depending on the location and era religion can be a non-issue, and yet a deciding 
dominator at the same time. For the case in Malaysia, the rise of Islamisation occurred in 
the 1970s to 1980s, when the Malays held strong political positions (Thayer 2008). Due 
to its strength, focus within the Malay community had moved away from inter-ethnic 
contestation towards intra-ethnic (Malay) competition. A selling point of the PAS is its 
image as a religious party, and at the height of Islamisation in Malaysia and the rest of the 
world, the UMNO itself had to move synchronically with the PAS in order to get more 
support from the Muslim community (Thayer 2008). Religion had moved from its 
peripheral position to a central point with a lot of Islamic pressure groups being founded 
at that time (Chin 2004). Many more religious extremist groups were founded and they 
would definitely have favoured the PAS, a religious party. Some of the religious 
extremists even had the intention of overthrowing the government through undemocratic 
means (Chin 2004). For security of the nation, and also for self-motivated political gains, 
the UMNO had positioned itself as more of a religious party than ever before. This is how 
the cleavage focus in Malaysia moved from common ethnicity cleavage towards religious 
cleavage. Even though the rise of Islamisation in the world had its impact on Islamisation 
in Malaysia, before being able to move the position of ethnicity and religion, the Malay 
Muslims themselves needed to position themselves in a strong position before intra-
competition could take place. During that era, too, the implementation of an NEP 
economy policy that favoured the Malays and gave various advantages and handicap-
based privileges to them, brought about hardship for the non-Malay community. 
Therefore, challenges coming from the non-Malay community were fewer and their focus 





1.3.4 Reform-of-politics cleavage 
The latest form of cleavage that exists is status quo versus reform (Ufen 2012). As 
discussed in the ethnicity cleavage section, in order to eradicate ethnicity cleavage people 
must be willing to put aside identity differences. However, putting aside identity 
differences will create a vacuum to be filled. There was hardly any common ground 
among the Malaysian people until the late 1990s, when people started to hunger for 
reform. Elections are generally free in Malaysia, but not fair (Croissant 2002). Electoral 
rules are set by the ruling party (Croissant 2002). For this reason, a lot of reform 
movements, particularly the recent one regarding free and fair elections, have been 
founded. In parallel to the rise of Islamic pressure groups during the peak of Islamisation, 
the creation of these universal-value-based pressure groups has intensified the urge for 
status quo versus reform cleavage. Furthermore, the success of an opposition front in 
creating an alternative choice of governance makes it another option for the people to 
choose. The PAS and DAP have managed to come together and form a common reform 
front between them (Abdul Rashid 2009). However, according to Gomez (2012), the 
issue of ethnicity is still relevant even though the trajectory can already be seen moving 
towards a more non-ethnic-based debate. Extremist Malay political power is reducing for 
national unity to take charge (Suhana 2013). Since the 2008 General Election, factors in 
determining the winning side have diverged to everyday insecurity, leadership and 
internet campaigning, rather than ethnicity-based propaganda (Maznah 2008). According 
to Loh (2003), the spark for this new form of politics is also due to ethnic fragmentation. 
Not only can elites and commoners within the same ethnic groups be unified together, but 
contestation among elites from the same ethnic groups has also brought about this new 
form of politics. This is further intensified by the introduction of an alternative choice 
electoral system. Some push for social-economic change; some push for democratisation 
(Jayasuriya & Rodan 2007). 
 
The interesting point about the reform cleavage is that there is a possibility for the 
contesting fronts to come to a common stance at the end of the day. Both fronts are still 
separated by different political parties, but their stance may be similar. This is because the 
status quo front is trying to make changes through transformation and by having healthier 
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politics, such as less corruption, better welfare and so on, while the reform side is trying 
to make a more drastic change by having zero corruption, populist decisions on welfare 
and so on. This can be seen in their latest manifesto from the 2013 General Election, 
where a lot of their stances are principally similar, except in the way of implementation. 
In this new form of political cleavage too, the track records of the incumbent government 
and new governance by opposition parties could not avoid being compared. As the BN 
government is trying to improve their current governance to brush off their negative track 
record, PR government is trying to show their competency in ruling the whole nation as 
well. This is one of the points of contention in proving which side is more competent to 
rule and which can rule in a healthier way. 
 
 
1.4 CURRENT POLITICAL CONFIGURATION 
In current Malaysian politics, there are two main political divides that dominate the whole 
political landscape. BN, the incumbent government at the federal level, has been 
contested by PR since the 2008 General Election, where the BN started to feel the 
challenge (Berger 2010). Although these two "coalition parties" are standing at directly 
opposite stands, they do have many differences between them (Weiss 2013). Such 
differences may or may not have direct relation to ethnic politics (or de-ethnicised 
politics), it is useful to understand the structure of these two political coalitions before 
venturing deeper into the substance chapters. Furthermore, the structure itself could 
directly or indirectly influence the decision-making on the issue of ethnic politics or de-
ethnicisation of politics in Malaysia. In this section, the discussion will focus on four 
areas which are the partnership of both the coalition and its registration; the nature of its 
parties; whether it is ethnic or non-ethnic-based; the supreme leadership of the coalition; 






1.4.1 Partnership and Registration 
The BN is a registered coalition of political parties with the Registrar of Societies (Abdul 
Rashid Moten 2014). Therefore, in an election, all the component parties will be using the 
same symbol when displaying their party flag, contesting qualification, campaigning and 
so. While the PR is not yet an official registered coalition political party, this causes some 
issues to the component parties especially during by-elections. The Election Commission 
once ruled that only the parties that are contesting in an election can display their symbols. 
While the BN is using a common representation, the ruling does not affect them at all. 
For the PR, particularly in a by-election, only a component party that is contesting can 
display their affiliation. Their cooperation partners are not allowed to use their affiliation 
(Abdul Rashid Moten 2014). For instance, if the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) is 
contesting that seat, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and People’s Justice Party (PKR) 
are not allowed to display their party flags. This may cause some problems for them as 
the Chinese are associated with the DAP logo, while the Muslim community is more 
comfortable with the PAS logo. However, it is not a huge issue as the ruling is still 
negotiable and the practicalities very often over-rule the theoretical ruling. The PR, too, is 
strongly attached to their own political parties. There is no solid organisational chart for 
the PR, unlike the BN where they have an organisational chart for their leadership. The 
council that binds all three component parties within the PR together is the People’s 
Alliance Leadership Council, where the council is considered as the highest body in 
making decisions for the whole coalition. 
 
1.4.2 Membership of Barisan Nasional (BN) 
The BN is one of the oldest political parties in Malaysia. It was first founded as the 
Alliance Party (Parti Perikatan), pre-independence, to contest in the Federal Legislation 
Council organised by the British. During the Federal Legislation Council election, the 
UMNO (United Malays National Organisation), a Malay-based political party, 
cooperated with the Chinese political party, namely the Malaysian Chinese Association 
(MCA) to form the Alliance Party (Smith 1960). This coalition was later expanded to 
include the third largest community in Malaya, the Indian community through Malaysian 
Indian Congress (MIC), to compete in the first general election in 1955. After the racial 
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riot on 13 May 1969 (an incident where the Malay and Chinese clashed in a deathly 
confrontation, particularly in Kuala Lumpur, after the 1969 General Election where the 
opposition, mainly Chinese candidates, won a large number of seats), the Alliance Party 
was expanded further to include other opposition political parties to form the BN in a 
move to stabilise the political scenario in Malaysia (Heng 1996). The total number of 
component parties varies from time to time, as some parties join as part of the BN and 
some may tend to leave the coalition. This happens more frequently with local-based 
political parties in Sabah and Sarawak, rather than the peninsular-based political parties. 
The BN currently consists of 15 component parties (Amer Saifude 2009). 
 
The most senior component member in the BN is the UMNO. The UMNO was 
first founded to fight against the Malayan Union (an administration system introduced by 
the British; Malay rulers lost their political power and granting citizenship was made 
easier to immigrants). Basically, the party is only open to Malay communities to be 
members. Prior to independence, the then-president of the UMNO, Onn Jaafar, suggested 
opening membership to non-Malays in a move to consolidate all ethnic groups into a 
party in order to convince the British of their ability to self-rule (stability assured with the 
participation of all ethnic groups) (Ishak Tadin 1960). However, his suggestion was not 
welcomed by other members as they felt that the UMNO should only be a party of 
Malays (Mahathir Mohamad 2008). Nevertheless, as explained above, the successive 
president did manage to bring all ethnic groups under a single umbrella through a 
coalition system instead of a single party system. In the Malaysian Constitution, Article 
160, it states that to be Malay, he or she must fulfil three criteria: first, he or she must be a 
Muslim; second, he or she must speak the Malay language; third, he or she must practice 
Malay culture. This definition becomes blurred if interpreted literally; a Chinese 
individual who professes Islam, speaks Malay and practices Malay culture will qualify to 
be considered Malay. However, in reality, this is not the case, as the status of Malay is 
not normally granted as the Malay status tag with the special privileges mentioned above. 
Thus, an Indian-Muslim organisation whose members meet the three criteria even up 
until today have applications to the UMNO that have not yet been accepted. Generally, its 
members do fulfil the criteria above, but in Malaysia the commonly-defined slightly 
‘Malay’ is different from the authority-defined. 
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The MCA is the second largest component party in the BN (Heng 1988). 
Generally, it has represented the interests of the Chinese community since independence. 
Conventionally, it will be allocated four ministers in the cabinet (from a total estimate of 
25-35 ministers, depending on the prerogative of the Prime Minister at that time). Due to 
the nature of the MCA as a Chinese-based political party, it often relies on the Chinese 
interest and its independence contribution as a basis for their campaign. However, its 
influence in Penang state has been reduced since 1969, when the opposition party, 
Gerakan Party (who joined the BN soon after), took over control of Penang state. In the 
2008 General Election, the MCA suffered one of its most terrible election outcomes, 
winning less than half of the seats it contested (which is devastating for a ruling party) 
and winning none of the seats in the Chinese majority state, Penang (Chin & Wong 2009). 
 
The MIC is the third party that joined in the Alliance Party (former name of the 
BN at the time of joining) (Kernial Singh Sandhu 1969). The Indian-based political party, 
unlike the UMNO and MCA, seeks to garner support from other ethnic groups as well. 
Until this moment, none of the seats contested had the Indian community as the majority 
ethnic group. Therefore, even though it is an Indian-based party, all the seats that it 
contests are mixed seats. It is generally allocated with one minister and held by the 
president of the party until changes were made after the 2008 General Election, where the 
long-time president himself lost his seat in the election. 
 
The Gerakan Party is a splinter from the MCA and joined the opposition fray in 
the 1969 General Election (Heng 1996). In that election, Gerakan achieved great success 
by capturing Penang state. After the racial riot incident and the expansion of the BN, 
Gerakan agreed to join and it was allocated the Chief Minister in Penang, even though its 
elected representatives are sometimes fewer than UMNO state assemblymen. However, 
in the 2008 General Election, Gerakan lost badly, winning no seats in Penang, neither 





1.4.3 Membership of Pakatan Rakyat (PR) 
For the PR, similar cooperation was established as the Alternative Front, which consisted 
of the DAP, the National Justice Party (PKN, former name of PKR), the Pan-Malaysian 
Islamic Party (PAS) and the Malaysian People’s Party (PRM), and faced the 1999 
General Elections (Gomez 2004). However, the coalition did not last long as the DAP and 
PAS could not agree on the issue of Malaysia’s status, whether it was a secular state (by 
DAP) or Islamic state (by PAS). After the successful results of the 2008 General Election, 
the DAP, PKR and PAS agreed to establish the People’s Alliance to form a state 
government in Kedah, Penang, Kelantan, Selangor and Perak. Currently, PR consists of 
three component parties, which are DAP, PKR and PAS. The coalition’s ambition is to 
capture the federal government. 
 
The DAP is a splinter from the Singapore-based People’s Action Party. 
Technically, it is a multi-racial political party and any Malaysian can be a member or 
hold a position as allowed by law (Lim 1991). However, in practice most, if not all, of its 
positions are held by Chinese. More frequently, the issues they are fighting for are those 
that affect the Chinese community, even though they fight for general universal values. It 
stands strongly for Malaysia as a secular state, as opposed to PAS’s Islamic state idea. 
The DAP was successful in the 2008 General Election, where it managed to take over the 
ruling of Penang state and contributed to the formation of state government in Perak and 
Selangor. 
 
The PKR is a multi-racial political party which mirrors the population of Malaysia. 
Its membership consists of all the main ethnic groups in Malaysia, and its organisational 
chart consists of leaders from different ethnic groups with a Malay as the highest leader, 
while non-Malays may hold the vice-presidency in the party. It started as a movement to 
fight for justice for the then-Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, and later evolved as 
a political party to contest in the 1999 General Election with Anwar Ibrahim’s wife, Wan 
Azizah, as the president (Abbott 2000). With the release of Anwar Ibrahim, he took the 
leadership. Even though he is not officially holding a position, he is a de-facto leader for 
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the PKR and PR. He is also seen as the figure that keeps the DAP and PAS together on 
the issue of secular state versus Islamic state. 
 
The PAS is an Islamic party in which members must profess Islam. Therefore, 
most of its members are Malays, with the exception of a small number. At the same time, 
it does have a non-Muslim section of supporters, which is called the PAS Supporters 
Club. The members of the club, until this moment, are not recognised as PAS members. 
They are only considered as affiliates of the PAS. However, in the 2013 General Election, 
the PAS fielded candidates from the club itself. PAS’s main objective is to establish an 
Islamic state and implement Islamic values (Chin 2004). It did try to introduce Hudud 
Law in Kelantan, a state where 90-95% of its people are Malays, however, this did not 
materialise due to constitutional hindrance. In order to cooperate well with its component 
members, especially the DAP, PAS has lowered its tone on the establishment of an 
Islamic state as a compromise in seeking parliamentary power. 
 
1.4.4 Supreme Leader 
In the BN, conventionally, the president of the UMNO will assume the position of 
chairman of BN, which will make him the Prime Minister if the coalition wins. The 
leadership positions are clear in the BN, with conventional quotas being allocated to 
particular component parties (Mauzy 1988). For example, the position of Prime Minister, 
Deputy Prime Minister and most of the state Chief Ministers will be from UMNO, four 
ministerial positions will be allocated to MCA, while MIC will get one ministerial and so. 
However, this formula is not fixed and varies according to the current situation. 
 
The PR faces difficulties in selecting the highest leader among them, unlike BN 
where UMNO is obviously more senior compared to the other component parties. The PR 
opted to form a leadership council with the highest leader of each component party sitting 
together to decide a consensual stance among them (Tunku Mohar Mokhtar 2008). 
Unlike BN, PR does not have a clear leader who will become Prime Minister should the 
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PR win the election. Although DAP has conceded that it agrees to support Anwar Ibrahim 
from PKR as the Prime Minister should they win, PAS leadership and grassroots 
supporters are keen on having a PAS-Prime Minister. 
 
1.4.5 Working Relationship 
As described above, due to the large amount of power and popularity differences held 
among all the component parties in the BN, UMNO is the obvious leader of the coalition. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the cooperation style in BN inclines towards 
domination of a single component party (Mauzy 1988). The decision by the Prime 
Minster-cum-BN Chairman should always be the reference point. This is one of the main 
reasons for the poor performance of BN in the 2008 General Election when leaders, 
especially those in the rank of top leadership (excluding those at the highest leadership) 
from UMNO, often portray the Malay-ness and superiority of Malay in speeches, which 
causes uneasiness among non-Malays. 
 
In the PR there is no obvious leading component party, the strength of each 
component party is equal and they incline towards the cooperation of tolerance (Tunku 
Mohar Mokhtar 2008). Whenever an issue arises, none of the individuals or components 
can declare a statement on behalf of the whole coalition without first consulting each 
other. This causes some issues without conclusion, with the most obvious and 
unavoidable being the secular state versus Islamic state issue. The cooperation within PR 
is often labelled as a ‘marriage of convenience’ where they only stick together whenever 
there is an election. However, after the 2008 General Election, the need has arisen for all 
three parties to work more closely and cooperate more uniformly in PR-lead state 
governments. 
 
1.4.6 Current Political Configuration to Ethnicity 
The sub-sections above have explained the basic structure of both political fronts in the 




Issues National Front (BN) People’s Alliance 
Name/Abbreviation Barisan Nasional (BN) Pakatan Rakyat (PR) 
Partnership Coalition Party Close cooperation 
Official registration of 
coalition membership? 
Yes No 
Membership 15 parties 3 parties 
Ethnic/non-ethnic-based Both 
Technically, all are non-ethnic-
based 
Supreme leader President of UMNO No highest leader 
Working Relationship Domination Tolerance 
Table 3: Comparison of Barisan National (BN) and Pakatan Rakyat (PR) 
 
Formal registration as a coalition party is important when the sentiment of voters 
towards a particular component party within the same political front is indifferent from 
one another. In BN, they do not face such problems as they will all be voting for the BN 
logo (a non-ethnic-based party) instead of ethnic-based component parties. However, for 
PR, as currently they are not formally registered, they would technically have to go on 
their own, although they have their cooperation arrangement in action. However, when it 
comes to voting, should supporters of one component party need to vote for another 
component party (DAP and PAS are the best example in this scenario), can their 
supporters cross-voting support their component partner? If they can put aside their 
differences and political beliefs and vote for their component party, being formally or 
informally registered as a coalition party is no longer a big issue to deal with. Otherwise, 
if ethnicity (or religious) sentiment is still strong among them, and reluctant to cross-vote, 
then it will cause a big issue for the overall PR in winning seats. Therefore, the 
willingness to cross-vote within PR, although they are standing on their own party logo, 
could be an indicator of whether people, at least those opposition party supporters, are 




 As the BN’s main component parties are largely from ethnic-based parties, while 
PR is otherwise, the existence of a supreme leader is a linkable issue to deal with in the 
stance of (de-)ethnicised politics. In the case of BN, the UMNO president is the supreme 
leader of the coalition in addition to his role as Prime Minister, and it means that 
decisions made by the UMNO president, with the support from UMNO delegates, will 
have to be carried out through the coalition party of BN. Therefore, it may not seem 
encouraging that BN could technically be dominated by the UMNO but the positive is 
that it has a supreme leader to act as an adjudicator should any conflict exist between 
component parties. Contrarily, in PR, all three parties are technically non-ethnic-based. 
Therefore, it is justifiable for them to push against ethnic politics in Malaysia as such 
ethnic politics does not favour them. As they do not have a supreme leader among them, 
decision-making can be slower as consensus requires long discussion and compromise. 
At the same time, the positive side is that they do not have to subdue themselves to 
anybody as they are free to bring their party stance for PR deliberation. 
 
 Therefore, from this current political configuration, we can see that Malaysian 
politics has two different sets of party arrangements; party stance and party ambition. 
Although these are the current political configuration in Malaysia, this does not mean 
they could not be changed. In later chapters, this research will analyse whether the above 
political configuration does remain, technically and practically, or if it is moving towards 




Society backgrounds necessitate the explanation of past political events while past 
political events drive the political landscape to current political configurations. As 
Malaysia is a diverse society, the diversity itself brings political arrangement and 
encouragement for political landscapes. Although Malay forms the majority ethnic group 
in Malaysia, the discussion above has shown that the significance of other minority ethnic 
groups, especially Chinese group, could not be ignored. This is because they form about a 
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quarter of the Malaysian population. Apart from overall ethnicity composition, how this 
composition is distributed to particular states is important as well. This is because, the 
way these ethnic compositions are distributed to different states will determine the 
political power of a particular ethnic group. 
 
 From independence to the present day, the politics of Malaysia has go through 
four phases of cleavage. The existence of these cleavages is due to the political 
development at the time. The transfer from ethnic cleavage to class cleavage is due to the 
economy policies post-ethnic riot, and whole new political trends emerged from class 
cleavage to religious cleavage is due to the competition between UMNO and PAS. 
Although class cleavage and religious cleavage seem to be stronger in that particular 
period of time, compared to their cleavage strength in other periods of time, this does not 
mean that ethnicity cleavage is not important or exists anymore. This is because these two, 
class and religious cleavage, are highly attached to ethnicity. Unlike the fourth phase of 
reform-of-politics cleavage, where it is mutual exclusive with ethnicity cleavage, class 
and religious cleavage could co-exist with ethnicity cleavage. That is why ethnicity 
cleavage could survive for decades until the existence of reform-of-politics cleavage, 
which is intended to eradicate ethnic politics. 
 
 These past historical events led to the creation of current political configurations. 
By comparing the political configuration today with the period of independence about 
half a decade ago, there exist some obvious differences. These political configurations 
would form a foundation for the newer development of the latest political landscape. As 
the political fronts are at least more equally balanced, in terms of their strength compared 
to the huge gap between BN and opposition parties, the later political development is to 
be given a more challenging space to both. Therefore, further chapters will be looking at 
whether ethnic politics could still survive or whether it could be overcome by the latest 
forms of political de-ethnicisation, or whether both ethnic cleavage and reform-of-politics 








Literature in a particular field can function by giving an insight into the type of research 
that has been carried out in the past (Cooper 1989). A competent review of this literature 
creates space to advance existing scholarships (Webster & Watson 2002). The same goes 
for the scholarship of ethnic politics (including de-ethnicisation of politics). However, the 
current available scholarships may or may not be sufficient in explaining a phenomenon 
that is taking place. In the specific field of how de-ethnicisation is taking place, there 
seems to be a vacuum in relation to the question. Even so, this does not negate those 
related scholarships with regards to the main research question.  
 
In this research, the main interest is in how de-ethnicisation of Malaysian politics 
is taking place. In order to review previous literature on how this is happening, this 
chapter will start off by looking at how ethnic politics functions. Such discussion forms a 
prerequisite for the further discussion of de-ethnicisation. The term "de-" refers to the 
scenario where a particular phenomenon is negated. Therefore, in this chapter, the second 
section will look at how ethnic politics has been negated (leading to the de-ethnicisation 
of politics). Although there is substantial amount of scholarship in regards to de-
ethnicisation, there is limited literature discussing a more specific scholarship of de-
ethnicisation of politics. 
 
 Due to the limited literature on de-ethnicisation of politics, in this chapter the 
researcher intends to fill the gap for the scholarship in this field. Filling this gap is crucial 
in providing some principle insights before the research can attempt to answer (Bourner 
1996) how de-ethnicisation of politics is taking place in Malaysia. For that reason, I 
invent three dimensional approaches in an attempt to answer the question of this research. 
Therefore, the subsequent section will focus on the discussion of party membership, party 
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directions and electoral strategies. Although there are many ways to discuss how a 
political system is being de-ethnicised I would like to narrow it down to three aspects.  
This because these three aspects are able to provide overall coverage of "physical", 
"action" and "result" components.  
 
"Physical" refers to the fixed attributes of a political party. This includes written 
rules such as the party Constitution, and unwritten ideas such as the direction of the party, 
ambitions of the party and so on. "Action" refers to the execution of the "physical". For 
instance, even though a party Constitution may state that something is a fixed attribute, 
this rigidly fixed attribute may be loosened and be more accommodative and inclusionary 
of other "communities", instead of isolating to a single segment of society only. Another 
example is the action of using political rhetoric in getting messages to pass through. The 
third aspect is the "result". After placing in order the "physical" attribute and executing 
the "action", the political system should then look at the end "result", which are the 
electoral strategies. These electoral strategies can show how successfully the political 
parties and political rhetoric works, and it can also show how current work in political 
parties and their parties' direction can affect the electoral results in the future. Therefore, 
a combination of political parties, party direction and their electoral strategies can provide 
an overall scenario on how de-ethnicisation of politics works for democracies that 
practice ethnic politics as their main salience. This is because these three aspects could 
link the "ideals", "practicality" and "output" together in explaining de-ethnicisation of 
politics. 
 
2.2 ETHNICISATION OF POLITICS 
Ethnic politics is a form of politics where ethnicity shows more salience compared to 
other cleavages. This structure and membership, or in the form of the practice of 
"ethnicity-based" politics, such as rhetoric and electoral strategies. According to Cott 
(2003), he describes ethnic parties under three conditions; an organisation which is 
authorised to compete at local or national level, the majority of the leadership or 
membership are subscribed to a non-dominant ethnic group, and the nature of 
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programmes and demands are based on ethnicity and culture. Though his description is 
debatable in certain senses, especially on the issue of non-dominant ethnic groups, in 
general these descriptions are fit to describe what constitutes an ethnic party. Therefore, I 
would take the definition of ethnic party in my further argument as a party which is 
involved in election, and the party core, direction, stance, rhetoric and activity is based on 
ethnicity and culture, which relates to identity. 
 
2.2.1 Ethnicity 
Before venturing deeper into the discourse of ethnic politics, ethnic parties, ethnicisation 
of politics and so on, a lot of scholars are keen on analysing the definition of "ethnicity". 
The definition of "ethnicity" generally becomes a contestation between the schools of 
Constructivism and Primordialism. Primordialism argues ethnicity in the form of "fixed" 
characteristics and inheritance from the beginning of time, where it has not been altered 
or constructed by external parties towards the identity of the group. According to Geertz 
(1973), ethnicity of a person is “given” due to the connection of kinship; singular, 
endogenous and unchangeable. The ethnicity of a person is “fixed” since the day of birth, 
and the influx of outside influence would never change the attributes and ethnicity of a 
person. Thus, due to these “given” attributes, communities within an ethnic group will 
become tied together within the same atmosphere, sharing the same ancestry, history and 
hatred. However, Fenton (2003) opines that even though these characteristics may be 
viewed as “natural”, they are actually being “moulded” socially or culturally. Therefore, 
the “naturalness” that primordialism insists on is no longer “natural”.  
 
At the same time constructivists, such as Chandra (2012), also oppose the idea 
that a person can only have singular ethnic identity. Alonso (2008) argues that ethnicity 
has been moving around, from historically defined ‘ethnicity by birth’ to ‘ethnicity by 
choice’.  They both argue that a person can have multiple ethnic identities, and these 
identities are interchangeable depending on the situation. This is further substantiated by 
Okamura (1981) when he applies his idea of a “situationalist approach”, with the more 
salient ethnic identity being confirmed divides the community into smaller factions is 
55 
 
needed in order to achieve certain goals, for instance to compete for resources, the 
smaller factions of identity will be utilised. Hmong people in California will identify 
themselves as Blue Hmong and White Hmong when they are to compete for resources 
from the Californian government. However, when these people are travelling out of 
America they will no longer identify themselves as Blue Hmong and White Hmong, but 
instead identify themselves as American generally and will defend the policies of 
America together. Due to this reason, in shifting one's "ethnicity" from an older to a 
newer one there will be some common ground for the particular individual with the new 
ethnic group. This could be due to locality (regional or as a nation), language, religion, 
cultural practice and so on. Chandra (2012) also opines that in cases where ethnic identity 
is not a critical issue in social interactions between communities from different ethnic 
groups, to the extent that ethnic identity could have been “forgotten” in their daily life, it 
is an external party, for example colonialists or a ruling regime, that exaggerate the ethnic 
lines and cause the ethnic boundary to become more obvious. Although Malaysian’s at 
large have not "forgotten" their ethnicity in their daily lives, at the same time they are less 
keen to have an identity crisis (Shamsul 1996). Identity crisis in Malaysia means that 
people are uncertain of their own identity. This usually happens when an individual 
possesses more than one identity, such as being ethnicity A plus ethnicity B, due to their 
parents' ethnicity, and they are in limbo about which side they incline towards. The 
reason such a scenario is highly unlikely for most common cases is because of a 
significant difference between different ethnic groups in Malaysia with regards to the 
special privileges accorded to the Malay ethnic group and aborigines (Nagata 1974, Kua 
1985). Due to this situation, the government will be responsible for taking the burden of 
definition before anybody else (Shamsul 1996). Therefore, there cannot be identity crisis, 
particularly in legal terms, when it comes to drawing lines between ethnic groups 
accorded with special privileges and ethnic groups without special privileges. 
 
 The premise above is proven further by research from Meighoo (2008) in Trinidad 
and Tobago on the idea of commonality, as suggested above where different ethnic 
groups are speaking the same language, Creole. Their mixed person category reaches up 
to 20% of the overall population, a figure barely attained by any country in the world.  
Some countries do not even have this categorisation as the number is too small and 
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insignificant. Ethnicity even shows differences in terms of biological and ancestral 
inheritance, but in reality, there is not much difference between them. Those who are 
coming from mixed ethnicity will know at least something about another’s culture, some 
even more proficiently than the other ethnic group themselves (plural acculturation). 
 
 At the same time, Chandra (2012) argues that it is a revolutionary process for 
change to take place, and sometimes even on a large scale, regardless of whether it is an 
individual conscious choice to change or purposely-constructed by an external force, 
including a ruling regime. She also substantiates it with examples of large percentages of 
change in countries such as America (native population grew by 50% in 1970, 80% in 
1980), Bosnia (Muslims population increase by more than 75% between 1961 to 1971; 
Yugoslav decrease by 84%), United Kingdom (31% of Britain's identify themselves as 
English in 1992 and the percentage increased to 41% in less than 10 years) as well as 
many others.  Such premise is paralleled with Weiner's unpublished writing of 
"Community Association of Indian Politics" (mentioned in Geertz 1973). In the writing, 
she argues that the census in India in 1951, with regards to the sudden drop in numbers of 
tribal people, is a "genocide by census redefinition". A significantly large population can 
be reduced to a mosquito-sized population, merely due to redefinition. In general, 
redefinition can happen in either way, by the individual involved themselves or by the 
enforcement of a ruling apparatus. Chandra (2012) shares the same idea when she 
suggests that an identity revolution may take an immediate, short period of time when 
external forces are being applied into it, or it may span over a longer period of time 
through gradual shift or construction of new identities. It has much to do with the existing 
power structure, where the status quo differentiates one ethnic group from the other 
(Brown 1996). From here, we can see the importance of ethnicity (or identity) of 
particular forces. Should the forces intend to push identity salience to a greater height, 
this will have a direct influence on the "identity" ("ethnicity") of the ruling regime. This 
forms the basic idea of how politics could be ethnicised. 
 
 However, at the same time we must also note that the more salient ethnic identity 
will prevail depending on the need of the situation. As Kasfir (1979) puts it, if identity 
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can be changed by an individual, and such change will lead to more power resources, it in 
turn leads more individuals to change. However, Barth (1969) argues that the ethnic 
identity of a person does not only rely upon self-identification (who I am), but also on 
collective ethnic attribution (who they say I am) at the same time. A particular ethnic 
group may divide itself into smaller factions, and identify themselves according to the 
identity of the smaller factions when they are competing for inter-faction resources. 
However, this effort will be redundant if individuals outside the ethnic groups do not 
have the same perspective as them. It means that self-identification will not be of any use 
if the collective ethnic attribution does not respond according to the self-identification. 
 
2.2.2 Ethnicity and Politics 
The definition for ethnicity may or may not be significant to the landscape of a political 
system. In a political system where the salience lies on a non-ethnic foundation, such 
arguments of ethnicity may not carry much meaning. However, in a political system 
where the salience lies on ethnicity and certain ethnic groups are attached with certain 
privileges or benefits, this definition would become a contestation point for both the mass 
and the political structure (Shamsul 1996). For instance, in the example of the Indian case 
above (Weiner's unpublished writing of "Community Association of Indian Politics" 
mentioned in Geertz 1973), the census is crucial in determining the status of the Hindi 
language as pro-Hindi groups are claiming that Hindi speakers make up more than half of 
the population, while anti-Hindi are claiming that the population is less than 30%. In 
other places, some ethnic groups are entitled to certain privileges and rights due to their 
ethnic status as aborigines, or due to the availability of handicaps accorded to them for 
their less competitiveness. Also, such identification may be used for the distribution of 
goods and resources according to identity. Horowitz (1993) argues that the eligibility of a 
unit (including individual, groups, associations and so on) to be distributed with material 
or non-material goods based on ethnicity will make the issue of identity a more precious 
one. Due to the valuable attachment of an ethnic identity, the political system would be 
surrounded with an ethnicity struggle. Ethnic groups with better position will continue to 
fight for their privileges to remain. For the less fortunate groups they will fight, either for 
the same as other groups or for their own privileges to be improved. 
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 At the same time, a diverse society may not necessarily intend for differentiation 
between "you" and "me" from the idealist perspective. Even if there ought to be 
differentiation, why must there be a clash instead of living in harmony? For the Furnivall 
(1948) study in Burma, he views that different ethnic communities will generally meet at 
the market, conduct their buying and selling activity throughout the day, but will not mix 
in the sense of a non-purpose activity. This suggests that different communities tend to 
‘mix’ but not to ‘combine’. When this scenario occurs, those from different ethnic 
communities tend to live within their own sphere, instead in inter-penetrating into 
another’s sphere. This is further substantiated by Simpson (2011), who suggests conflict 
could be closely linked to power distribution. This conflict will then result in cleavages 
that split political communities apart (Ufen 2012). The intensity of action, whether a 
bloody conflict or a gentlemanly contestation, will depend on the deepness of cleavage-
memberships within the society (Zuckerman 1975). If there is no conflict, it will never 
differentiate between “this” and “that” group of people. All of them will be carrying the 
same “identity”, or at least identity becomes a non-issue regardless of their physical 
attributes or ideological belief. 
 
 Though the definition of "ethnicity" may seem to be important in certain case 
studies, especially when the formation of an "identity" itself is questionable and 
ambiguous (Milne & Ratnam 1974), in the case of this research the definition is 
secondary as the "ethnicity" landscape in Malaysia is "fixed" (Nagata 1974). Academics 
may or may not agree with such line-drawing between one ethnic group and another, but 
as this research is about how ethnicity is affecting the politics in Malaysia, the definition 
used will be the "politically" defined one. This definition may be ambiguous or even 
inconsistent (David & Dealwis 2008), for instance, should a Chinese Muslim contest as a 
candidate for the PAS party (an Islamic party) the person can be considered as "Malay" 
even though it is not technically accurate, but at the same time it is not totally 
unacceptable due to the political landscape in Malaysia (Malay ethnic group is 
synonymous with Muslim and vice versa due to the political landscape). At the same time, 
should a Chinese Muslim contest as an MCA candidate (a Chinese-based party), this 
candidate will be put in the category of "Chinese". Furthermore, in practice for this 
research, my main categorisation will be between "Malay" ethnic group and "non-Malay" 
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ethnic group for analysis purposes. Therefore, definition and classification of ethnicity is 
important, but it is secondary in this particular research. 
 
2.2.3 Ethnicity and Cleavages 
Another dimension for Zuckerman (1975) to suggest is that a nation does not necessarily 
need to subscribe to a particular cleavage per se, for the rest of the time. As suggested by 
Zuckerman (1975), a nation tends to possess primordial cleavages at the lower stage of 
economic development, and inclines towards class cleavages or status quo versus 
reformation cleavages when the nation becomes more developed. This is because the 
people are more educated and have higher levels of awareness of whether they are being 
manipulated by identity differences or if there are other differences which separate 
political parties. His suggestion seems to work for Malaysian politics too, at the moment. 
As Malaysia is progressing towards a modern state, with the birth of a larger middle class, 
higher education levels, more awareness and exposure and so on, identity politics is mild 
compared to older politics. However, at the same time, although Zuckerman’s premise 
seems to work in common sense within the scope of "modern" ideology, such capitalism 
where merits come first, but in practice, especially during the latest world political 
development events, the sense of nationalism in the UK General Election seems to be 
stronger compared to before (especially in Scotland), US presidential candidate Donald 
Trump touches a lot on identity issues such as those related to Muslims and Mexicans, 
Hong Kong's mass protest under the propaganda of defending their "identity" as well as 
many more examples. However, his notion should be noted as there are a lot of 
developing or under-developing countries that are adopting more liberal policies instead 
of conservative (and identity-related) policies, in order to ease their economic progress. 
 
 Up to this point, should it be agreed on that the premise of a diverse society tends 
to split itself into factions within the society (Ufen 2012), in this discussion on ethnicity 
the next step should be the role of "politics" in ethnicising (or de-ethnicising) the political 
system, be it on the physical level (as mentioned above, such as political party structure 
and membership) or on the practical level (such as rhetoric and electoral strategies). 
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There are multiple perspectives on how politics is being ethnicised directly or indirectly. 
Wantchekon (2003) is suggesting the idea of clientelism, where patrons tend to supply 
their clients with goods and resources in exchange for their support. This idea of private 
transfer of public goods is contested over the issue of "their clients". Although it is 
common practice that patronage-client relationships are usually built within the same 
identity group, this does not mean the whole identity group will receive benefits from the 
arrangement (Simpson 2011). Only a portion of the same identity group, who are the 
clients of the patron, can secure benefits. In the lens of Marxism, this is a form of class 
cleavage where only those elite (including clients) will get benefits from it. However, at 
the same time opponents are suggesting that such a scenario should be viewed through 
the lens of ethnicity, as only a particular ethnic group can secure benefits from the private 
transfer of goods. This does not necessarily have to do with class, as the whole group of 
clients are not necessarily coming from inheritance elites, but most, if not all, of them are 
coming from the same ethnic group as the patron. This is one way to "ethnicise" their 
actions and drive the political system into an "ethnicity-based" political structure, 
regardless of the genuine ethnicity in the structure (Wantchekon 2003). The argument 
above fits into the characteristics of Malaysian politics, where "ethnicity" is often used as 
an apparatus for convincing people to be more ethnicised. Only in the last few years has 
ethnicity started to blur (Osman & Abdul Salam Muhamad 2008), where another political 
front, the opposition, tries to bring Malaysian politics into another new dimension of non-
ethnic politics (or multi-ethnic politics). There can be a clash, as suggested above, 
between ethnic cleavage and class cleavage. At the same time, it can also be seen as 
ethnic cleavage versus reform cleavage. It does not really matter much about class or 
reform, or any other types of cleavage, as ethnic cleavage has rooted very well in 
Malaysian "old politics" (Crouch 1996). The thing that matters the most is whether ethnic 
politics can survive, or whether the utilisation of ethnicity as a tool no longer works. 
 
 In a more positive sense of "ethnicising" the political system (or it could also be 
considered de-ethnicising to a certain extent), which eventually impacts directly onto its 
people, the aim is to commonalise the uncommonness (as will be discussed in the de-
ethnicisation section of re-rooting the commonalities). Miguel (2004), in his research in 
Tanzania and Kenya, found out that one of the reasons for less ethnic salience in 
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Tanzania, as compared to Kenya, is that all of them, regardless of ethnicity, are speaking 
the same language of Swahili. Although to simply commonalise a native language for all 
ethnic groups does not necessarily mean unity or reduced inter-ethnic conflict, in 
comparison of both countries the action of "Swahili-sing" for the whole nation, especially 
for education, works very well in Tanzania. On the other hand, in Kenya, where they 
prioritise vernacular language instead of a common language for early education, ethnic 
groups tend to position themselves within the perimeter of their own ethnic group rather 
than pursuing inter-ethnic interactions. The research results above are also similar to the 
scenario in Malaysia, where a National Language (Malay language) is imposed onto all 
citizens regardless of ethnicity  (Freedman 2001). At the same time, vernacular languages 
are allowed. Undeniably, languages do play an important role in ethnic relationships.  
However, the one that is more directly involved in ethnic politics will influence the 
formation of ethnic-based parties. Due to the formation of this ethnic-based party, 
ethnicity cards will be pushed further for political mileage (Crouch 1996), although at the 
same time, I would not negate the possibility of the opposite occurring. 
 
 Moving on in the "real politics" lens, power sharing is a common way of 
stabilising a democracy, although it is not necessarily utilised by all diverse countries. 
Lijphart (1977) has an idea of consociationalism democracy and, although it does not 
directly ethnicise politics of a nation, it inclines to act as a solution for a diverse and 
ready-made ethnicity-based political system. His model of consociationalism is to create 
an interaction between different ethnic (in the case of the Netherlands, there are different 
pillars and it can be adopted in other places as well by altering the "technicality") groups 
(more accurately, ethnic parties) into a single multi-ethnic grand coalition party. With that, 
even though each party is still representing their own ethnic group per se, through the 
coalition there is representation of all available ethnic groups (providing all ethnic groups 
join the coalition). Inter-ethnic interaction is now shifted from mass to elites. His second 
idea of consociationalism democracy is to grant veto power to each coalition partner. By 
doing so, each of them will have a say within the coalition and it would not backtrack to 
the original principle of democracy where only the majority rules. With veto power, even 
minority groups can have a say in the decision-making process. Thirdly, proportionate 
representation means that the percentage composition in all matters, for example cabinet 
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positions, legislation seats, civil service and so on, is reflective of the actual population. 
The fourth pillar of consociationalism democracy is to have segmental autonomy for 
particular segment of the community, which affects them directly. For instance, if all 
coalition partners are non-Christian except for one, the only Christian-related party 
should be allowed autonomy on matters related to Christianity. 
 
 One of Lijphart's main critics is Horowitz (1985, 2004), who feels that 
consociationalism does not work in the way Lijphart has suggested. Even if it does work, 
it will create another issue: intra-ethnic competition. This has also been described by 
Chandra (2005), as the ethnic outbidding would affect where all ethnic-based parties offer 
better promises to their targeted voters to compete with the direct (same ethnic) 
opponents. As politics is not necessarily about relative gains, in most occasions where 
zero-sum game is involved, it is about either lowering their own offer or crossing the line 
into their partners (different ethnic party) "territory". Neither options are good for them. 
This is why Horowitz (2004) proposes an Alternative Vote, through which politicians and 
their parties would need to secure the second rank vote if the first rank vote is casted 
according to ethnicity line. With that, it encourages "ethnicity" moderation rather than 
just elite interaction as in Lijphart’s model. This contestation between Horowitz and 
Lijphart does not only create a space for discourse at the principle level, but also at the 
practical level of the political parties, the rhetoric of politicians and the electoral 
strategies. 
 
In summary, ethnic politics explores how politics is being ethnicised. Although 
scholars such as Geertz (1973), Fenton (2003), Okamura (2003), Barth (1969) and others 
have their respective views on what constitutes ethnicity, as discussed above, the main 
contention is that such "ethnicity" has its role to play within a political system. This can 
be seen as scholars such as Zuckerman (1975) look at the development of ethnic politics 
from the perspective of the development of a nation, while Wantchekon (2003) and 
Miguel (2004) argue their case from the perspective of clientelism and commonality, 
respectively. Similar consideration goes to other scholars, as discussed above. From here, 
we can see that no matter how ethnicity is defined, be it naturally or constructively, such 
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2.3 DE-ETHNICISATION OF POLITICS 
For ethnic politics (or ethnicisation of politics) to work, it must at least have diverse 
nations and ethnicity salience to begin with. Similarly, for de-ethnicisation of politics to 
function, its prerequisite is to have ethnicised politics to begin with. De-ethnicisation does 
not necessarily mean employing a new dimension to directly engage with the topic, it 
inclines towards negating the existing characteristic of ethnic politics. Ethnicisation of 
politics is seen as an effort in ethnicising the political system.  
 
 Generally, the de-ethnicisation of politics is carried out in two dimensions. The 
first is by shifting the existing ethnicity cleavage to another new cleavage. Such 'new' 
cleavage can be an existing cleavage or a new cleavage that is created for shifting the 
attention away from ethnicity discourse. The feasibility of such a shift, which will be 
discussed below, is to lessen the degree of ethnic salience and try to move the discourse 
away from ethnicity. The second dimension is by re-rooting different ethnicities into 
similar characteristics among them. As will be discussed below, although different ethnic 
groups may carry different identities among them within a society, at the same time these 
ethnicities may possess similarities among them. Therefore, the strategy for this 
dimension is to pay more attention to the similarities between these different ethnic 
groups rather than to exposing their differences. 
 
 The first dimension of de-ethnicisation of politics is through the shifting of ethnic 
cleavage into other form of cleavage. Dunning & Harrison (2010), in their research in 
Mali found that, even though Mali is a diverse nation, it is practising cross-cleavage 
approaches. Ethnicity can be a factor, but is definitely weakened by another more salient 
cleavage, "cousinage". Since the Empire of Mali, the people of Mali have practised 
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family alliances based on patronym (surnames from the father's side). Even if the people 
of Mali originate from the same ethnic group, this does not make them more superior or 
promote a sense of "groupness" among them. This is one of the ways, as mentioned 
above, of shifting the ethnicity cleavage to another cleavage, which could also be the case 
in Malaysia, as explained above in the section on how ethnicity cleavage is being 
downplayed by non-ethnic-based parties and shifting the cleavage to a new one. 
 
 As discussed in the section above, ethnicisation of politics is heavily driven by 
political players, especially in the eyes of constructivists for the gain of power and 
resources. However, to de-ethnicise the current ethnicised political system, it can come 
from both directions within the political players themselves and also from the masses 
(due to higher education and awareness) as brought forward by Zuckerman (1975) above. 
According to Chandra (2012), an ethnic party does not retain its fundamental struggle (of 
ethnicity) all the time. It may do so if the scenario allows them to remain in power with 
such arrangements, but in cases where ethnic politics is no longer relevant or the 
relevance is reduced significantly, the party may need a fresh direction. The position of 
the party is flexible and could be compromised into transforming itself as a multi-ethnic 
or even non-ethnic party. After all, the objective of a political party is to gain power or to 
seek for political goals (Chandra 2012). This has been seen through a couple of 
Malaysian main political parties, even including the existing ethnic-based party where 
their direction is shifting to a new one, though not totally transforming from an ethnic-
based party to a non-ethnic-based party. 
 
 In order to better compete with their opposition, political parties need to change 
their party orientation in order to have an upper hand (Wyatt 2010). Changing the nature 
of the political parties would then change the whole political system as the old political 
system, which comprised of ethnic-based parties, does not exist anymore. The creation of 
new cleavage (or new political commitment, a lighter magnitude of political cleavage) 
would then help to de-ethnicise the previously ethnicised politics. In that sense, Horowitz 
(1985) has suggested three levels of cooperation, namely coalition of convenience (lowest 
level of commitment), coalition of commitment, and coalition of alliance (highest level of 
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commitment). With this kind of inter-ethnic cooperation, the intensity of ethnic cards 
could be downplayed as the ethnic party is no longer responsible, only to itself, but also 
has to be answerable to their partners in the cooperation. This is an example of how de-
ethnicisation of politics is triggered by political parties in order to seek fresh support and, 
at the same time, such triggers are pushed by the mass as voters (Milikowski 2000). 
Similar cases happen in Malaysia too. It is very common for the coalition party system 
when individual parties are solely (or with a huge majority) based on a single ethnic 
group. Though there are some exceptions, individual parties may need to cooperate with 
another individual party in order to hit a simple majority. Unlike some countries where 
alliances (or cooperation) are formed after a general election just to hit the number, the 
case in Malaysia, especially for the ruling party, is to form an alliance before going into 
an election. 
 
 As party systems are built around the cleavages or conflicts that differentiate one 
party from the other, ethnicisation of politics may work in scenarios where ethnicity is a 
main point of contention (Wyatt 2010). This is because, when there happens to be 
contention, ethnicity often triumphs over other cleavages or issues. However, this may 
not be the case when other elements overtake the weightage of ethnicity, shifting the 
ethnic cleavage as practised before to a new type of cleavage. Even in America, where 
they champion for racial equality, the identity of Obama does have some effect in 
securing votes. White voters do carry with them the 'fear of the other' factor entering 
Obama's pre-presidential election (Redlawsk et.al 2010). This is because Obama is still a 
"him" as compared to "us"; an unchangeable fact. De-ethnicising his identity is not 
impossible, as discussed by Chandra (2012) above through the lens of constructivism, but 
as Chandra (2012) agrees, it may take a long time. However, there is another way to "de-
ethnicise" Obama and to shift the attention from his physical identity into his policies. 
Furthermore, this racial emotion may not be the main consideration when compared to his 
policies. The attention is then shifted from his racial identity to the policies he is 
promoting. Therefore, de-ethnicisation of politics could be pushed by other elements, 
such as hunger for reform against the ethnicity. This is one of the reasons why Malaysian 
"new politics" tends to focus less on ethnicity as the cleavage is slowly being taken over 




 Horowitz (1990) also argues that the formation of multi-ethnic parties could 
change the track of competition, from inter-ethnic competition to intra-ethnic competition 
and hence, cultivate a new cleavage (or a new political commitment) to substitute ethnic 
cleavage politics. When inter-ethnic competition takes place (as happened in ethnicisation 
of politics), the focus will be on the issue of ethnicity as that is the core principle of each 
ethnic party. Therefore, there is no incentive for ethnic parties not to campaign under 
ethnicity labels, especially the majority ethnic groups where the ethnic card may 
guarantee them a good win. This will not be the case for multi-ethnic or non-ethnic 
parties. The latter is quite straightforward since no ethnicity issue is involved. The former 
is a bit trickier. In a multi-ethnic party (including alliance parties consisting of multiple 
singular ethnic parties), an ethnic party could no longer employ the strategy of ethnic 
outbidding as intense championing of their own ethnic welfare would harm their 
counterparts from other ethnic groups. It is a zero-sum game.  Increase of one side means 
reduction of another. Therefore, rather than focusing on the ethnicity issue and running 
the risk of crossing the line, political parties tend to be encouraged to change their 
direction of politicking, shifting the previous ethnicity-based struggle to a more universal 
value-based struggle. With this, they can go all out without needing to be mindful of 
crossing a line they should adhere to. This is also agreed by Purdekova (2008), where she 
argues that the process of de-ethnicisation within a nation (in her focus field, Rwanda) 
would shift the loyalties from ethnic-based loyalty towards other sub-state loyalties. 
 
 The second dimension of the de-ethnicisation of politics is through the re-rooting 
of ethnic differences into similarities. For ethnicisation of politics to work well, it is 
crucial to create differences among a community. De-ethnicisation of politics could be 
done in a revert manner, where similarities are being highlighted instead of differences. 
Sussane (2006) suggests that to de-ethnicise a community, more commonalities within 
the group have to be emphasised. When the magnitude of commonality overtakes the 
magnitude of differences, they may no longer see themselves as different. With this, the 
security issue of one ethnic group fearing another as the basis of ethnicisation of politics 
may disappear. Without the feeling of fear or stereotyping towards one another (since 
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they are now seeing each other as being similar), then ethnic politics finds it tough to 
stand up in this situation. 
 
 Milikowski (2000) also suggests his “similarity strategy”, where similarities 
between different ethnic groups are being used as counter-ethnicity when issues relating 
to ethnicity arise. For example, when a crime issue is related to a particular ethnic group, 
the ethnicity-related element could be avoided by portraying the crime as one not only 
committed by that particular ethnicity, but that other ethnic groups also have criminal 
records. Another example is religious extremism that is linked to a particular religious 
group. Attention could be shifted by saying that extremism only exists in a small fraction 
of the religious community, and other religious communities do have similar extremist 
factions. By applying this kind of “similarity strategy”, it will be possible to negate the 
relatedness of ethnicity with the negative issue concerned, and at the same time convince 
the masses that ethnicity has nothing to do with the concerned issue. 
 
 These two dimensions of shifting ethnic cleavage to other non-ethnic cleavage 
and re-rooting for similarities may also be applied in the current Malaysian political 
landscape. Scholar such as Danieals (2005) suggests that, although opposition parties 
may have their own targeted ethnic group as their support base, such as the Malay 
community for PAS and Chinese community for DAP, by forming a political coalition 
among themselves, these parties no longer emphasise too much on the identity of the 
voters. This is an attempt by the opposition to shift their supporter’s inclinations away 
from the old politics of ethnicity to new politics which emphasise universal values (Chin 
& Wong 2009). Although the element of ethnicity cannot be eliminated completely, these 
parties are trying to shift the discussion to a more universally valued discourse, such as 
corruption, justice, good governance and so on (Weiss 2006). On the other hand, some of 
the ethnic-based parties within the ruling party have been trying to open their space too, 
instead of confining themselves towards the ethnicity discourse. This will be discussed in 




At the same time, political parties trying to move themselves away from ethnicity 
discourse do attempt to search for commonalities (the second dimension of re-rooting) 
among the voters. The opposition coalition tried to emphasise commonalities among them, 
such as their identity as Malaysians instead of as Malay and Chinese Indian, struggling 
for a more just and clean government instead of a government based on ethnicity (Wong 
& Chin 2009). This is because supporters of PAS (Malay) and DAP (Chinese) might still 
be sceptic towards their allies (Daniels 2005). The Malay supporters of PAS fear the 
DAP's secular agenda, while Chinese supporters of DAP fear the PAS for their Islamic 
State agenda. Although these agendas may not necessarily be true, the sceptic perceptions 
within the Malay and Chinese communities do exist. By applying this strategy, the 
opposition coalition could divert away from these agendas and ethnicity discourse into a 
more generally acceptable struggle and the similarities among these supporters to 
acknowledge themselves as possessing similarities instead of just seeing differences 
among them. 
 
From this section, we can see that de-ethnicisation is working on a two-
dimensional approach. Such approaches are applicable in the Malaysian political 
landscape and other societies as well. In Malaysian politics specifically, as the wave of 
change starts to take place in 'new politics', it is rampantly common that political parties 
do take a different approach to engage with the community instead of using the 'old 
politics' of ethnicity. Although the discussion above focuses on opposition coalition, the 
two-dimensional approach does not confine itself to opposition coalition only, but is 
applicable for ethnic-based parties within the ruling party, BN (which will be analysed in 
detail in later chapters). 
 
2.3.1 Bridging the Gap of Literatures 
According to Bourner (1996), one of the reasons for literature reviews to be done is to 
identify the strengths and weaknesses of currently available scholarships and fill in the 
gaps thereafter. Each scholarship may have their own focus towards their subject interest. 
With many subject interests researched by various scholars, there may be either a lack of 
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linkage between one subject of interest and another, or there could also be missing parts, 
elements or perspectives which are not within their subject of interest (Afolabi 1992). 
Newer research is conducted with the intention of filling in the gaps within this literature 
(Bourner 1996). 
 
 From the literature above, we can see the two generally used approaches in de-
ethnicising a society, namely shifting ethnic cleavage to other cleavages as suggested by 
Dunning & Harrison (2010), Wyatt (2010) and Redlawsk et.al (2010), or applying 
similarity strategies by Sussane (2006) and Milikowski (2000). Although these two 
approaches could be linked to the political scholarships principally, it hardly gives an 
insight on the mechanisms of applying these approaches. In the scope of a society which 
has already been ethnicised to begin with, as argued in the case of Lijphart (1977) and 
Horowitz (1985), political parties might be playing a more crucial role in executing these 
approaches. This is not to say that other subjects, such as government, mass, NGO and 
others, could not play their role, but comparatively, no matter how hard these subjects are 
attempting to de-ethnicise the political scenario of a society, it is the political parties that 
make the final call. The role of these other subject’s incline towards exerting pressure on 
political parties. Due to this, as the political parties are made the main unit of analysis, the 
above literature guides a direction for where political parties should be heading to. 
Shifting the cleavage and re-rooting of the society could be included as part of the party 
efforts in changing the traditional ethnic politics that have been practised by some 
political parties in Malaysia. For other non-ethnic-based political parties in Malaysia, this 
could also be a catalyst for them to reaffirm their direction towards de-ethnicisation. 
Therefore, technically, the discussion of the direction of a political party should be a 
scope to be covered in further analysing de-ethnicisation in Malaysia. 
 
 However, such a scope could be shaky without the basic support of a political 
party structure and, even if such scope were to be executed, the result of it could still not 
be ascertained. Therefore, I would apply a three-dimensional approach in filling up the 
gap between existing literature. Since the basis of a political party is their membership, as 
the overall membership has a say in the political party position itself (Puhle 2003), before 
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moving into the scope of party direction it is necessary to first look at the party 
membership and how maintaining or changing the membership structure could help to 
push towards de-ethnicisation. Only then, the discussion within the scope of party 
direction comes in. Party direction may be an outline of how the party intends to drive 
their ideas on to their intended path (Robertson 1995). Various ambitious ideas could gain 
new image and new hope for a political party. Even if these principles and ideas could 
gain the support from the masses, political parties need to walk their talk by applying it 
into the electoral politics to show that they are delivering what they promise, and the 
party direction remains as an 'ideological' ambition without putting it into political 
contestation (Mozaffar 2003). Therefore, the mechanism for pushing Malaysian politics 
towards de-ethnicisation should include these three technical components, namely, party 
membership, party direction and electoral politics. 
 
2.3.2 Party Membership 
In a democratic society, political parties form one of the basic pillars for the flourishing 
of a democratic system within society (Puhle 2003). For Huckshorn (1984), he defines a 
political party as "an autonomous group of citizens with the purpose of making 
nominations and contesting elections in hope of gaining control over governmental power 
through the captures of public offices and the organisation of a government", while Burke 
(1889) defines it as "a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavours the 
national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed". Going by 
these definitions, the foundation of a political party, first and foremost, is to have 
members before being able to execute any kind of actions or deliberations. This has 
shown the importance of political party members where they (refers to the leadership as 
well as they are elected representative of the other members) are the ones that decide the 
whole functionality of their party. 
 
 Becoming a member of a political party could be a two-way argument. It could be 
members who come together and form a political party due to the common belief that 
they all share. This could also be the formation of a political party based on the existence 
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of cleavages, and these cleavages would then attract memberships. For the former, Katz 
and Mair (1995) have mentioned about how mass parties are formed as a binding together 
of mass NGO movements into political parties. Parties such as the Labour Party in the 
UK are a form of mass party movement, where unions such as those representing 
worker’s groups are grouped together, as opposed to the older version of political parties 
which focus on elite leadership and dominance. As for the latter, Robertson (1995) put 
forth that when a cleavage takes place, such as ethnic cleavage, it encourages the 
formation of political parties. That is why there are so many types of cleavage-based 
political parties, ranging from identity (including ethnicity, race, religion, language, 
culture and so on), to economy-based (such as working class versus elite, protectionism 
versus capitalism, subsidy versus market-orientated and so on), to comparison-based 
(ruling capability, governance, transparency, justice and so on) and many other types of 
cleavage, which encourage the formation of political parties. Whatever the reasoning, it 
comes down to the point of contribution of memberships in which these members 
determine the direction of a political party. 
 
 Therefore, generally going by this principle of the importance of membership, 
such political parties should cater for the common values that these members uphold. For 
example, a political party that allows only a particular ethnic group to be amongst its 
members should generally act in favour of that particular ethnic group, which effectively 
makes it an ethnic party. Contrarily, Chandra (2005) offers that even if it is an ethnic 
party, although it is championing for their target audience this does not mean that they 
can only represent their own ethnic group. Horowitz (1985) shares a similar stance when 
he argues that an ethnic party can represent more than a single ethnic group. Such 
inclusionary thinking does not automatically make such an ethnic party "multi-ethnic" as 
according to him, a "multi-ethnic" party should span across ethnic groups in conflict. 
Although both of them agree that an ethnic-based party can be inclusionary to other 
ethnic groups as well, the core of the party will still be based on their own ethnicity as 
that is their core value, support base and ideology of their party. Therefore, if adhering to 
Chandra (2005) and Horowitz (1985) premises, an exclusive ethnic membership does not 
necessarily mean that such a political party will serve that particular ethnic group only. 
Due to this, it is not a necessary need to change the membership system of that particular 
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party in order to serve a non-exclusive ethnic group. Yet at the same time, if a party is 
dominated by an ethnic group only, it may be tough for such political parties not to be 
exclusive only to their own targeted group, because at the end of the day the membership 
structure of the political party may mean exclusivity. Otherwise, the membership 
structure will be inclusionary 
 
 The scenario above is also one of the reasons for the Bulgarian Constitution, 
Article 11(4) to ban the establishment of political parties based on ethnicity, race or 
religious grounds for their formation (Smilov 2016). The justification to impose such a 
restriction for a democratic society which ideally should grant freedom of association, is 
to limit the inflammation due to identity. This is because each political party will promote 
their party based on the core values that they hold. When a political party is formed based 
on identity, naturally, identity will be their main selling-point as their starting model for 
them to bring it to a higher stage. This is contrary to the research done by Cotts (2003) in 
Latin America, where there is evidence of a surge in political participation by indigenous 
people-based political parties. In countries, such as Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador and 
Venezuela, it is the changes of special indigenous constitutional rights and electoral law 
which lowered the entry requirement for these indigenous social movements to form 
political parties, unlike the Bulgaria base where tighter identity-based political parties are 
enforced. Hence, in the latter examples, it enhances the direct political participation for 
such groups of indigenous people. 
 
 Although the arguments above have shown the importance of membership within 
political parties, the membership numbers of political parties in European democracies 
are facing a decline (Katz et. al. 1992). Scarrow (2015) suggests that the changing of 
member’s political participation could be due to the weakening of cleavages. This is 
because, without much direct "conflict" or "competition" with other segments of the 
society, the need for political parties may be reduced. For Katz (1990), he argued that 
such a decline is due to the lesser 'supply' and 'demand' within the current political scene 
as compared to the old days when, during that time, party membership could be one of 
the indicators in measuring a party's strength, but this is not the case anymore as the 
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number of memberships no longer functions as an indicator (Biezen et. al. 2012). 
Although European democracies have shown such a drastic drop in terms of party 
membership, other continents such as Asia do not have much literature proving similar 
trends, especially in the developing Asian nations. 
 
 The importance of membership in old day politics could be seen where the 
membership structure had been altered in order to cater for the needs of a larger pool of 
the community, while at the same time expanding their influence into other communities 
as well, instead of being inclusive to a specific group of people. For instance, in England 
and Wales, through the passing of the Reform Act 1832, local Conservatives had been 
trying to engage more closely with the new middle-class and recruit them as members 
(Whiteley, Seyd & Richardson 2002). This is because membership at that time did matter 
and it could show up as one of the indicator of a party's strength. Furthermore, with a 
more inclusionary policy, a wider variety of members is possible as compared to a single, 
specific group of members. This is why Conservatives needed to recruit as many 
members as possible (Whiteley, Seyd & Richardson 2002). Such similar principles are 
shared by Krouwel (2006) when he argues that, during the old days a lot of the political 
parties were controlled by the elite only. However, with the extension of universal 
suffrage, the membership structure did follow suit and changed in order to accommodate 
for a larger pool of new eligible voters (Krouwel 2006). Such changing of membership 
structure has much to do with the society evolution as well (Ignazi, Farrell & Rommele 
2005). Previously, party membership was quite synonymous with one's identity as it 
could generally be said, although with some exceptional cases, that members from a 
particular party all came from the same segment of the society, be it the same religion, 
ethnicity, class or any other identity (Heidar 2006). For instance, a Catholic-raised family 
would generally live in a Catholic-dominated neighbourhood, attend Catholic school, 
read Catholic-related press, participate in Catholic-based organisations and at the end of 
the day, join Catholic parties (Beyme 1985). Such examples shown by Beyme (1985) 
above has characterised how rigid one's identity is towards their political affiliation. This 
could be one of the arguments for how a mass party functions, at least at the membership 
characteristic level. However, with the evolution of society as argued by Igniza, Farrell 
and Rommele (2005) above, in order for a mass party to expand their influence into other 
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segments of society, the core identity of the party, be it due to religion, class or ethnicity, 
has been diluted to cater for a wider scope of memberships (Puhle 2003). 
 
 Although mass parties could be seen as a further step towards reform, as 
compared to the older days of party membership structures which were dominated by the 
elite, such mass parties were highly linked to the civil societies such as NGO 
organisations and so on. Kirchheimer (1966) suggested the rise of catch-all parties, a type 
of party where all those ideologies are being diluted and they are being inclusive to any 
people within the society, including individuals with no organisation attached. 
Kirchheimer (1996) did re-emphasise again that political parties which transform 
themselves from a mass party to a catch-all party could attract more people towards it. 
This could be seen in the example of a Norwegian party, where programmes and debates 
of the party were becoming less ideologically-focused (Heidar & Svasand 2004). Even so, 
both of them do agree that although such dilution of ideological competition is taking 
place, the existence (or in a harsher term, 'importance') of left-right competition still could 
not be erased off absolutely (Heidar & Svasand 2004). Such argument has shown that, 
even with the evolution of society which leads to the evolution of political parties as well, 
cleavages or ideological competitions, although being compressed to a smaller magnitude 
of concern, at the same time this does not necessarily mean absolute abolition. Having 
similar thoughts, Puhle (2003) says that a catch-all party does not necessarily need to 
really reflect the overall composition of a society. Although it means to be as inclusive as 
possible, at the same time it is still likely to be influenced by its historical background 
and its traditions, such as identity inclination, ideological inclination and so on. At the 
end of the day, Sartori (1976) argues that it depends on the political parties as to which 
kind of alternatives they wish to provide the people with. Although there are pros and 
cons, with or without catch-all parties (or their principle of inclusionary), weighing the 
overall electoral support might be something of a concern to them. 
 
 Although catch-all parties are bland in terms of ideology (Krouwel 2003) and they 
seem to be able to cater for anybody without any restriction, Wolinetz (2002) suggests 
that these parties need to consider the gain and loss in terms of electoral support. This is 
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because the relationship between party heterogeneity and party-voters link (specific 
targeted party) is a negative relation (Krouwel 2006). This is due to the fact that, although 
a party is now able to be inclusive to anybody, at the same time it may or may not 
necessarily mean that old party members which were inclined towards a mass party could 
accept such a change. As May (1973) puts it, party members are comparatively more 
extreme than party office bearers. This is because, for party office bearers, they are not 
only required to fulfil the needs of their own party, but at the same time they are required 
to collaborate at a higher level, such as inter-party relationships, especially in a diverse 
society. Unlike party members, they could voice out their opinions, ideal thoughts, 
without needing to compromise much or consider the feasibility with non-own-party 
actors. At the same time, May (1973) also suggests that people that subscribe to party 
memberships are comparatively more radical than those who support the party but do not 
join it. This premise is supported by Scarrow & Gezgor (2010) when they argue that 
when party members are allowed to be elected as their highest office bearers, they tend to 
be more radical than ordinary party supporters. This again is supported by Widfeldt (1995) 
in his comparison of 39 political parties on a left-right scale. He found out that none of 
these cases shows that party members can be more moderate than party supporters. All 
these could be due to the authority that one has in determining who can lead the party 
(through their party vote). Therefore, for a party member to behave in such a manner or 
put such a hope onto the party leadership, it could be understandable. Furthermore, with 
the inclusion of other segments of the society, be it due to natural occurrence or "forced" 
adaptation to the political scenario at that time, inclusivity may be one of the options in 
countering, or at least lowering, the radicalism in facing their direct counterparts or to be 
in line with the latest political development, including the sentiments of the society. 
 
2.3.3 Party Stance 
A political party stance is generally based on the core value of the party. Such party 
stance sets the guidelines as to which direction the political party is heading in. Therefore, 
party stance forms the thoughts and mind of a political party. As discussed above, party 
membership generally reflects the kind of exclusivity or inclusivity a party wishes to 
adhere to. However, at the same time, such reflection does not necessarily ring true all the 
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time. Chandra (2005) argues that, even though a political party can be an ethnic party 
with a particular ethnicity as members only, this does not mean that the party will serve 
that particular ethnic group only. It depends on the stance that the party is taking, and 
such a stance is not necessarily rigid and is changeable according to the situation. 
Therefore, it means that even though a party subscribes to certain thoughts, and this 
thought is translated into membership criteria, it does not mean that the party would only 
serve a particularly exclusive group of people only. However, at the same time, since the 
particular group of people are forming the stronghold for that political party, the party is 
"forced" to adopt themselves exclusively to them only. Although it sounds contradictory, 
it does all depend on what kind of stance a political party wishes to take, and even if that 
party's stance is taken in the early days, pragmatism of politics and political parties could 
overturn the old stance and switch to a new stance if it can help the party. 
 
 As the party stance is generally dependent on the needs of their members and 
supporters, a change in the stance may happen if there is a change in the need of their 
party members, party supporters or external political scenario. Mair, Muller & Plasser 
(2004) argue that, when there is a change in the electoral, the party would need to make 
changes themselves internally in order for them to continue their relevance within 
mainstream politics. This is because the old core values or stance of the party may not be 
relevant to the latest development of the situation. For Robertson (1995), the formation of 
a political party is due to the cleavage that exists within the political scene. Therefore, 
unavoidably, such parties would have to rely on the cleavage factor in setting up their 
party's stance. However, with the development of the political scene, should this cleavage 
no longer be a salient cleavage, a party may not be able to hold support through this kind 
of cleavage. Webb (2004) gives an example on how the long-established class cleavage in 
the UK is being challenged by newer cleavage, such as the sectoral cleavage or centre-
periphery cleavage. If the new cleavage is due to inter-class appeal, the Labour party 
would have to break it down in order for it to remain in power (Esping-Andersen 1985). 
This is to retain the importance of the Labour party as a mediator or fighter for their 
targeted group of supporters. Not only relevant to the Labour party, if the significance of 
a political party is no longer viable due to political developments, such parties may need 
to consider whether to remain in status quo or start changing their party stance by 
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becoming more inclusive. This is one of the reasons too, why Kirchheimer’s (1996) idea 
of catch-all parties becomes a hotly discussed solution, being followed by Conservatives 
and the Labour party (Webb 2004). All this is based on the contention of whether 
depending on a current stance could survive them politically, or whether such an outdated 
stance may find it hard to garner support. 
 
 However, at the same time, even with the changes in the political scene, this may 
not necessarily trigger political parties to make changes. This is because political parties 
are sometimes reluctant to make changes, either because they are unaware of such change 
or they feel that such change is just a minor development, and not at the critical level to 
push for internal changes within the party (Mair, Muller & Plasser 2004). Katz & Mair 
(1995) suggest that strategically utilising the electoral rules, such as forming an alliance 
with another political party, could help to increase their chances of winning. With such 
strategies, a political party may not necessarily need to change their internal politics, if 
playing by the electoral rules could help them to win power. It depends on what kind of 
electoral rules the particular political system is practising. For example, in first-past-the-
post electoral rules, a candidate does not necessarily need to win more than half of the 
total votes cast, but only needs to be the top scorer overall. Should the total votes of a 
losing candidate be more than the top scorer, forming an alliance (which mean to 
nominate a single candidate only) could increase the chances of winning, putting aside 
the issue of how those allied parties are going to align their stances. This can be seen 
through Webb’s (2004) argument in the case of Britain where, during Tony Blair's era, 
there existed an alliance between Labour and the Liberal Democrats on Cabinet 
Committee on Constitutional Reform. This was believed to have helped them win in 
Wales and Scotland as their policy became more accommodative towards Scotland and 
Wales, such as by devolving more powers to them (Webb 2004). Changes not only 
happened to Labour and the Liberal Democrats; Conservatives also tried to adopt a more 
populist policy among the working class through a welfare and full employment 
programme (Webb 2004). Although the stronghold of the Conservatives does not lie in 
the working classes, such a change in party stance helped them to garner about a third of 
working class support (Webb 2004). This shows that, in order to remain in power, a 
political party needs to adopt a more flexible stance instead of holding on to the same 
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stance as in the early days of the party’s formation. Another example by Hazan (2005) in 
his studies on Israeli politics, he sees that their politics prior to the 1967 war were based 
on social-economic cleavage where political parties are divided by the left-right spectrum. 
However, after the war, the social-economic cleavage seemed to incline more towards 
conflict-peace cleavage. Therefore, the rhetoric and stance taken by political parties 
before the war may not be compatible with the struggle they should sell to the public. 
 
 Although Katz & Crotty (2006) argue that parties are actually frequently in the 
cycle of internal changes, Mair, Muller & Plasser (2004) believe that some parties do not 
wish to make changes to their stance, even though they appreciate political developments 
in the scene are because political parties believe they are able to absorb the effects of 
political environment change into their party. They may wish to react to the 
environmental changes only when it shows steady decline. This is because changes that 
happen at a particular period of time do not mean that such newer political scenarios can 
be sustained for a long time. The political scenario may return to the old environment, 
should these newer scenarios not survive continuously. However, in the argument of 
Franklin et.al. (1992), in their comparison studies, they argue that voting is not cleavage-
based anymore, but switches to being issue-based, where it is issue rather than identity 
attachment that influences their votes. This is supported by Hazan (2005), where he sees 
that the transition from cleavage-based politics to issues-based politics has a big 
difference in which the support that a party is getting from cleavage-based parties are 
largely fixed and stable, while for issue-based politics, the voters are generally movable 
depending on the issue and this creates a floating pool of voters.  Lane & Ersson (2005) 
agree by arguing that such decline is due to the reduction in party identification, where 
supporters no longer attached themselves loyally and blindly to a particular party. Such 
psychological detachment may or may not mean that they still support the party, but with 
such detachment, at the very least it means that these voters are no longer stable 
supporters. 
 
 Although it is not surprising to see a clearer shift from an established cleavage to 
a newer cleavage, there are also instances where such shifts, even though they are seen as 
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viable, can still "feel" the existence of the old cleavage within the political system. This is 
because such shift does not cut off totally from one cleavage to another. Kristjansson 
(2005) argues it nicely in his study in Iceland, although left-right cleavage seems to be 
dissolved and all the four main political parties do not embrace it anymore, openly or 
officially, the "feel" of the existence of the left-right spectrum is still there. This is 
because not all old cleavage, even though they do not seem relevant in the latest political 
development, can be fully wiped off. However, at the same time, promoting or selling 
such cleavage to the public may not gain much direct mileage. Hopkin & Paolucci (1999) 
argue it from another perspective when they see political parties no longer making 
ideology their goal, but transforming it into a business-like entity, where it is not an 
organisation that has attached itself to certain social objectives, but instead use the public 
goods being produced to lead to the objectives they wish to achieve. Should a cleavage no 
be longer feasible to be utilised as a main contention point, promoting such cleavage may 
be redundant but, ironically, leaving it aside could not totally dismiss existence of it, 
although it is not being mentioned by political parties or their opponents. 
 
 Besides the stance that is to be taken by political parties in forming the "mind" 
and "thought" of that political party, the execution of it and the delivery of its messages 
for public consumption is another different dimension where a political party is changing. 
The traditional methods of disseminating their party information may need to undergo 
changes too. As suggested by Dalton & Wattenberg (2000), they opine that it is now the 
world of technology politics and the execution of the party stance should be done using 
technology way, too. This is in line with the idea of rhetorical competition in which 
Krebs & Jackson (2007) argue that politics is typically marked by rhetorical competition. 
Since the stance taken by political parties are different from previous ones, the means of 
delivery may or may not be the same as before. This is because cleavage politics may 
gain a psychology attachment but issue-based politics may have a lesser degree of such 
attachment (Lane & Ersson 2005). Furthermore, the targeted group may be different as 
the idea of inclusivity and exclusivity may not be the same as in a previous stance. It 
means that the background of the new targeted group may not be the same as previous 
targeted groups. Therefore, internal changes within political parties are not limited to 
stance (thought) changes per se, but also to the extent of execution methods. 
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2.3.4 Electoral Strategy 
Party membership indicates the core group which the party generally represents, while 
the party stance provides a direction as to which way the political party should head. Both 
remain as an idea without the practice of it in elections (Mozaffar 2003). This is because 
electoral strategies will reflect how a party membership and stance are still relevant to the 
political scenario at that time. This is also one of the reasons why these three dimensions 
are selected for discussion. Politics, as mentioned at the beginning of the writing, argues 
that politics is a business of gaining power to capture government offices (Huckshorn 
1984). Due to this reason, the ideal dream of political parties needs to be converted into 
real political power before they are able to practically implement it. Party membership 
and party stance function as an "input" of ideas, while electoral strategies work as an 
"output" on how the political party should conduct themselves in electoral politics. 
 
 As electoral politics is about a kind of competition between different contestants, 
Riker (1962) brings up the idea that the more information we have about the opponents, 
the higher the chances for an individual to win the competition. Therefore, mutual 
expectation of candidates towards the result of an election is to what extent they gather 
enough information of voting trends (Mozaffar 2003). Such information is crucial as it 
could influence the type of strategies a candidate or a political party plans to use. In a 
society where ethnic polarisation is high, with very little ethnic cross-cutting, voting 
inclination tends to follow the ethnicity line. In such a scenario, ethnicity-based issues 
might work better. This is mostly true when there is no other bigger cleavage or issue 
which can overrule such ethnic bonding principles. However, across lots of society, 
ethnic bloc voting may not be the case at all times. This is because the identity of those 
involved may be overlapping or have fluid identity (Madrid 2008). At the same time, 
even with obvious boundaries between one identity group and another, should other 
consideration factors such as class, left-right ideology and patronage cleavages be able to 
overrule ethnicity cleavage, ethnic voting bloc may not occur as well. Therefore, 
especially in new democracies where predictions are harder to make, unexpected electoral 
outcomes are no longer a strange event (Moser 2001). Even if a new dimension of non-
ethnicity cleavage has occurred, from Mair, Muller & Plasser (2004) perspective, issue-
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competition between different political parties under a newer political environment has 
slightly influenced the type of scope political parties would wish to contend. Although 
issue-competition cleavage may be a substitute for secondary salience for political 
scenarios, the way that an issue is presented is about factors where the level of support by 
political parties are determined. Riker (1986) argues that the presentation of an issue to 
attract support no longer lies with an issue raised per se, but is about how an issue is 
being represented. He argues that, although not all issues raised can work for the 
advantage of a political party, even if an issue can give them leverage, such issues need to 
be presented in "artistic creativity of the highest level" (Riker 1986). As the linkage 
between political party and voter is not a "fixed deposit" bond between them (or at least 
at a lesser magnitude), political parties would need to attract their attention to gain their 
trust and support. Such principles could be applied to other cleavages as well, such as the 
departing (or lesser salience) of ethnicity cleavage. 
 
 As for Western democracies, party loyalty is facing a declining trend as well 
(Mair, Muller & Plasser 2004). This is because the political environment has changed as 
compared to the previous one. There seems to be a trend of social de-alignment for the 
community, although not all, but a significance amount. In the past, party loyalty was 
stronger because there was a bond between political party and party supporters (including 
members). Due to this, it is not surprising that political parties are often being tag-lined 
according to their political support group. However, with a change of political loyalty, 
such social de-alignment has caused setbacks for political parties. As shown by Mair, 
Muller & Plasser (2004), Christians no longer confirm their votes for Christian parties, 
while blue-collar workers do not necessarily vote for a social democratic or communist 
party. They have either turned their backs and now vote for their traditional opponent, or 
vote for a new party altogether. Furthermore, with the changes happening to the social 
environment, the political environment is less intense regarding identity separation, 
although identity salience, with its reduced significance, still plays a role in the political 
landscape. Therefore, the idea of catch-all parties is being implemented by exclusive 




Political parties would cooperate with other political parties in facing their head-
on competitors (Mair, Muller & Plasser 2004). Electoral alliance will remain stable if 
those political cleavages between political parties remain stable (Carmines 1991). Should 
the political environment have changed to a level where such political cooperation is no 
longer helpful in the sense of the cleavage direction, where the political environment is 
heading, such political alliance (or cooperation) may not give them leverage in facing 
their traditional opponents as they themselves (including their opponent) would have to 
change in order to cater to the needs of the environment at that time. 
 
 Although the above has been discussed on the principle level of how political 
parties should (or have) change, two leading scholars, namely Lijphart (1968, 1977) and 
Horowitz (2004, 2006, 2007) have opposite views on what could be a better solution for 
changing the electoral system, in reducing ethnicity outbidding and preserving cross-
identity peace within a divided society. With the scenario of electoral politics, where 
cross-cutting voting trends are in place, the magnitude of ethnicity in real politics may be 
secondary. However, in society where very few cross-cutting occurs, this is where the 
context of ethnicity is being exploited. Due to these reasons, scholars are trying to invent 
electoral systems that can deviate from extremism politics. Political parties, on the other 
hand, are trying to garner as much support as possible, especially in a "non-single-ethnic-
winning-society", they would have to re-strategise their party direction to be more 
inclusive of other segments of the society, or at least to gain their votes during elections. 
Moving to the election system suggested by Lijphart and Horowitz, Lijphart is a founder 
of his consociationalism democracy concept. In multi-ethnic societies, especially those 
which have very strong attachments to their own ethnic group, Lijphart suggests prudent 
leadership cross-cutting among these ethnic groups (Lijphart 1968). Each ethnic group 
may pledge their loyalty to their ethnic leader without needing any cross-cutting on their 
part. It is the role of ethnic leaders to cross-cut at the inter-ethnic leadership context. He 
recommends for the formation of a grand coalition party, where different ethnic groups 
are gathered together within the coalition. With this, apart from the coalition party 
managing to sustain the support through their ethnic-based (or segmental-based) 
component party, the grand coalition as a whole would also be able to represent the whole 
diverse community. With this, the extreme ethnicity tone could have been reduced.  
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 However, for Horowitz (2002, 2004, 2007), he is more keen for the Alternative 
Vote (AV) system rather than a First-Past-The Post (FPTP) election system. This is 
because, in the FPTP system, a candidate only needs to be secure among those contesting 
candidates, without necessarily needing to hit the simple majority rules. In seats where 
there are a majority percentage of a particular ethnicity, as long as the candidate is able to 
gain most of the votes from that particular ethnic group, he will be announced as the 
winner. Therefore, it intensifies ethnic outbidding as they do not even need the votes from 
other ethnic groups, as long as they can secure most of their own ethnic votes. Whereas in 
the AV, the candidates are forced to moderate their tones and the votes are transferable to 
other candidates. This means that candidates, even if they cannot be ranked as first choice 
by other ethnic voters, they also hope to rank second. Should the first rank candidate be 
eliminated, those votes will be transferred to the next candidate. Therefore, it will 
indirectly refrain candidates from being too extreme or negating any segment of the 
society, as every ranking of the votes means a lot to each candidate. Another scholar, 
Sartori (1986), in the discussion of the electoral system a country is practising, he opts for 
a proportionate representative system, where he sees such a system producing more new 
or small political parties. With the formation of such parties (assuming that they manage 
to win at least a single seat), this is going to bring impact towards existing political 
parties as their share of seats will be reduced due to the winning of new parties. Therefore, 
in order to gain back the voting inclination favours to their sides, they would need to re-
strategise their party direction. Voting inclination in a low polarisation or fluid identity 
society is very volatile. Swing votes are not a surprise event for such scenarios as "shared 
commonality" is no longer a fixed support for political parties. 
 
In summary, de-ethnicisation of politics explores how politics is being de-
ethnicised. From the discussion above, proponents of shifting ethnic cleavage to other 
cleavages include Redlawsk et.al (2010), Wyatt (2010), Dunning & Harrison (2010), 
amongst others; proponents in applying similarity strategy include Milikowski (2000) and 
Sussane (2006), both proponents providing a starting point for arguing the case of de-
ethnicisation of politics. Although both proponents are unable to explore deeper into how 
de-ethnicisation of politics can take place in a more technical term, especially in the 
Malaysian politics, three-dimensional de-ethnicisation of politics has been introduced. 
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These three dimensions, namely party membership, party stance and electoral strategy, 
could help to advance de-ethnicisation of politics in more specific terms, especially in 




Ethnic politics is generally seen as political, with an emphasis or existence of ethnicity 
elements within the discourse of its political system. Chandra (2012), Cotts (2002), 
Furnivall (1948) discussed how political environments work in a society where there are 
more than one ethnic groups in the contestation of political power. In such contestation, 
although there are differences according to the country or political environment a society 
is facing, the salience of ethnicity in such political practice is inevitable. Although a lot of 
scholars are suggesting that divided society may create a divided political environment, 
there are scholars such as Meighoo (2008) and Miguel (2004) who have researched in 
Trinidad and Tobago, and Tanzania and Kenya, respectively, showing that even in a 
divided society, they can still find common ground for them to deviate their differences 
and focus more on their similarities. Their arguments lead to the scope of de-ethnicisation 
of politics, where the discussion above suggests two main methods in de-ethnicising a 
society. Firstly, it is by shifting a contentious issue that is usually linked to ethnicity 
salience, to a non-ethnicity-related argument where such contentious issues are not due to 
ethnicity, it can happen within a non-ethnicity discourse as well. Secondly, it is to find a 
commonality between different ethnicity groups in a single society. It is very rare that 
different ethnic groups within a society have absolute differences only between them. 
Such commonality can be due to the usage of a single language, the sharing of similar 
historical backgrounds and so on. With such a channel for them to reduce the intensity of 
ethnic-based politics, it could lead to the reduction of ethnicity salience within the 
political system of a society. 
 
 Although the literature does argue about ethnic politics at large and a limited 
amount of de-ethnicisation in politics, it is even rarer to have literature discussion on the 
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methods in which such trends of de-ethnicisation of politics do (or could) occur in a 
narrower mechanism. Due to this, three dimensions of the mechanism in which de-
ethnicsation of politics is taking place (or can take place) is being discussed. Firstly, it is 
to have a look at the party membership structure of a political party. Scholars such as 
Chandra (2005), Cotts (2003), Horowitz (1985) and Robertson (1995) discussed how a 
political party can be considered as an ethnic-based party. Although they do have 
differences in their own definition, they do agree that a party with its membership coming 
from a particular identity group would emphasise their core values onto their supporters 
(although the magnitude of core values differs among them). Such membership, being 
either exclusive or inclusive, is an indicator of the readiness for a political party in de-
ethnicising their own party. This is because a political party that is interested and inclined 
towards becoming more inclusive in its membership has indicated its readiness in taking 
away (or reducing) the emphasis of ethnic politics. From this point of view, it leads to the 
second dimension of party stance, in verifying whether such political parties are only 
becoming inclusive on the membership level or whether it does in fact try to revamp its 
traditional stance and direction. 
 
 The second dimension of de-ethnicisation of politics is by looking at the stances 
taken by political parties. Mair, Muller & Plasser (2004) do agree that political parties 
have to rejuvenate within their political parties in order to cater to the needs of the 
political environment at that time. This is because political environments may change 
over time. Should the flow of the society have changed and traditional politics no longer 
become less viable, political parties would either need to reaffirm their traditional values 
and continue to push for the traditional values to be reinstated, or they could also follow 
the flow and make internal changes to suit the environment. Webb (2004) and Esping-
Andersen (1985) have shown that political parties in the UK could no longer remain with 
their traditional political practice, such as using the old cleavage (they could if necessary, 
but the challenge of remaining in traditional political practice might be tougher). They 
themselves have moved from one traditional cleavage, such as class cleavage, to a newer 
cleavage such as sectoral or centre-periphery cleavage. Even so, Kristjansson (2005) is 
right when he argues that, although there seems to be a shift in those cleavage 
contestations, such a shift is not absolute. In his case in Iceland, although political parties 
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rarely embrace left-right cleavage in the open, they do understand that such a shift is not 
absolute as left-right cleavage influence is still there and has to be taken into 
consideration as well in the political decision-making. Similarly, Hazan (2005) sees that 
politics nowadays is changing, but he is viewing it from the perspective of moving from 
cleavage-based politics to issue-based politics. Although the terminology and perspective 
mentioned might be different from other scholars, he does bring up the idea that political 
parties have started to embrace new forms of politics due to the pressure from political 
developments at that time. 
 
 The two dimensions above remain as idealistic discussion, without practically 
being put into action. Therefore, the third dimension of electoral strategies is to look at 
how the political parties walk their talk in the electoral competition as compared to their 
political rhetoric of both dimensions above. Mozaffar (2003) argues that the winning 
chances of a political party or a candidate depends on the level of information that they 
have gathered. Mair, Muller & Plasser (2004) acknowledge that old forms of political 
loyalty and bond may not work best for the current political environment; political parties 
may need to accept such premise and rejuvenate their party as mentioned in the party 
membership and party stance dimensions. Although the mechanism of how to place a 
candidate may be a bit too technical to be discussed, for generalisation each political 
system has their unique background and environment, it is inevitable that such electoral 
strategies, in principle, could serve as a guideline on which principles are the best for 
capturing support and votes. Although Lijphart (1968, 1977) and Horowitz (2004, 2006, 
2007) suggestions on the electoral system (more accurately the method of electoral 
contest) may not be short-term strategies in winning an election, the principle between 
both suggestions on how to garner more political support (votes in elections) could be a 
guideline as to whether political parties should act in a more extreme exclusivity direction, 











Methodology is the philosophy of explaining the occurrence of a particular phenomenon 
(Holden & Lynch 2004). It helps to explain issues such as why a particular phenomenon 
occurs, how it occurs, who causes it to occur and so on. For a single phenomenon, an 
explanation can come from various angles. At the same time, even when a particular 
scope of issues is raised, there can be different dimensions of perspective depending on 
the subjects that are focused on. Unlike natural sciences, where there are universal laws 
for affirming the research, social sciences do not possess such a law, and do not have the 
principle of reliability, validity, logical debate and so on, in supporting the research result 
(Porta & Keating 2008). For this reason, we are linked to two main types of research 
methods, namely qualitative and quantitative research. Each of these research methods 
has its own strengths and weaknesses. Although there is no absolute research method in 
determining the research design for a particular project, choosing one largely depends on 
what kind of research question that we intend to explore. 
 
 In this research, I have applied qualitative research methods for explaining the 
occurrence of my target phenomenon. This is because, for qualitative research, it is 
inclined towards 'a form of systematic empirical enquiry into meaning', as defined by 
Shank (2002). This means that with a set of available data, the data needs to be 
interpreted by a researcher before the intended message that is being put across can be 
understood. This fits with the main intention of addressing the phenomenon of de-
ethnicisation of politics that is happening in Malaysia. In this research, I intend to find out 
more about the "meaning" side of how and why such a phenomenon is occurring, rather 
than finding out how many of a particular people react or are affected (or from the 
perspective of numbering of the phenomenon). Such a premise is supported by Lincoln 
(2000), in which he argues that qualitative research emphasises the interpretation of a 
data resource and principle arguments without assigning values as in quantitative research. 
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Even though qualitative research is not based on the rigidity of fixed values and 
comparing the data collection with an exact same input resource, it is, however, more 
flexible for gaining an in-depth understanding of the issue (Conger 1998). Due to this 
flexibility, researchers will be prepared for handling ‘surprises’. For instance, in the event 
of the research obtaining unexpected input from a planned interview, the researcher is 
then able to alter the question design if the unexpected answer actually provides useful 
information (Jensen & Jankowski 1991). In quantitative research, most of the questions 
are fixed and the settings of the research design are more rigid compared with the 
qualitative method. The outcome of quantitative research may be too general or far from 
believability, because quantitative research requires a design in questioning that is 
repeatable, giving no space for unexpected answers. However, one of the hardest things 
to do in qualitative research is to make all the familiar things unfamiliar to you. For 
qualitative research, due to the interpretative approach that is being applied, nothing can 
be taken for granted as the researchers must be able to look beyond the usual 
understanding, even though the issue or incident looks familiar to you (Blumer 1976 , 
Berger 1966). 
 
 In line with the principle of selecting a qualitative research method for answering 
the research questions raised, the main collection of primary data is through interview 
with selected candidates. The candidates are selected based on their authority and 
capability in responding to the research questions asked (King 1994). Although interview 
is selected as the main method of data collection, it is useful to get secondary sources to 
strengthen the data obtained through primary sources (Mangal & Mangal 2013). The 
secondary sources can be provided by formal means, such as official documents and 
reports from newspaper election results, while examples of informal secondary sources 
include YouTube videos, commentary columns and informal explorative conversations. 
These secondary sources would be used as a catalyst in igniting a more in-depth 
discussion during the formal interview with candidates. 
 
 With all the aforementioned technical issues in obtaining the best available data, 
another issue that needs to be taken into consideration is the ethical issue (Kitchener & 
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Kitchener 2009). The ethical issues cover the complicated morality issues ranging from 
social, cultural and political contexts (King, Henderson & Stein 1999). The principle is 
largely tied to the Nuremberg Code, which outlines the integrity a researcher should 
uphold (Seidelman 1996). To a certain extent ethical issues may compromise the data 
obtained, such as an inability to obtain confidential data, the anonymity of the candidate 
and also on humanitarian grounds. However, such ethical practice needs to be adhered to. 
This is to protect the subjects in the interview, while at the same time obeying the legal 
aspect of the data obtained as well as the humanity aspect. According to Mero-Jaffe 
(2011), there is a need to create a balance of power in relations between the interviewers 
and interviewees. Although in this research interviewees are positioned at a weaker level, 
this does not exist in reality due to the political status they enjoy. However, at the same 
time, due to their political status, the level of sensitivity to those interviewed may be 
higher. Therefore, it is crucial to balance the power relations between these two parties in 
terms of the status they enjoy and the authority of delivering their messages in the 
research. 
 
 For this chapter, the discussion will be divided into four sections. The first section 
will discuss data sampling, and mainly focuses on how sampling is being conducted and 
why these samples are being selected. For the second section, the discussion will focus on 
how data is collected and why this data collection method is the most suitable means for 
obtaining the information needed. This is followed by the third section, which will 
explore data analysis. This is where the data obtained in section two will be processed 
and the gist of the information is extracted for meaningful analysis. The fourth section 
will discuss the ethical practice. In this section, the discussion will focus around the 
issues that are being practised and upheld while conducting the research, and the reasons 
why such ethical practice is needed. This final section will end with a conclusion section 






3.2 DATA SAMPLING 
The sample is the target group in which the research relies on for furthering the analysis. 
Depending on the type of research and the research questions that are being asked, it may 
lead to various kinds of sampling methods. However, these samples, in the end, must be 
justifiable in representing the whole population of the unit analysis (Babbie 2001). There 
are two types of sampling methods, namely probability sampling and non-probability 
sampling (Bryman 2009). Although there are many kinds of probability sampling 
methods, all of them confirm to the principle that the samples are selected without the 
interference of a third party. 
 
 In this research, I have applied the second sampling method, which is non-
probability sampling, when selecting the candidates. Unlike the probability sampling 
method, where all the population has an equal chance of being randomly selected 
(Tashakkori & Teddlie 2003), this research is concerned with party politics and the main 
focus of analysis is political parties, therefore, not everybody will have the authority to 
have an opinion that is representative of the party. Therefore, the pool from which 
candidates can be selected is small in number. Furthermore, I have had to make sure that 
each camp within a political party could have their say in this research. Due to that, those 
samples selected are capable enough to speak on behalf of their party, and at the same 
time represent different sections of a political party. I have employed purposive sampling 
for my sampling methods, which is in line with the definition by Maxwell (1997) that 
‘purposive sampling is to choose particular persons, settings or events with the aim that 
such selection could provide research with information that is required.’ 
 
 In this research, I have selected 18 candidates to be utilised, although the actual 
number of interviews that were conducted was 20. Although 18 may appear to be a small 
number, in fact it is a large percentage overall of the available pool. Patton (2002) argues 
that the sample size for purposive sampling is small, but it is selected carefully as an 
information provider, while at the same time providing in-depth information rather than 
surface or overview information per se. Furthermore, as the pool of political party elites is 
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small to begin with, 18 is not considered to be a small number, at least in terms of 
percentage from the total number of leadership which stands at double digits, depending 
on the leadership size of a political party. Although the sample size in qualitative research 
is much smaller compared to quantitative research, the researcher in qualitative research 
needs to be actively involved in the process of data collection (Wimmer & Dominick 
1997). Therefore, numbering may be a concern, but the representativeness and saturation 
of information should come first, and again, this is how a qualitative research method 
contributes to the data collection (Miles & Huberman 1994).  
 
 From the beginning of the fieldwork plan, 18 candidates were selected. This 
number was chosen in order to give a balanced representation of both benches of the 
political fronts. As Malaysia has two main political fronts (Weiss 2013), each of the 
political fronts consist of nine candidates each. For PR, there are three component parties 
within it. Therefore, each of the component parties had three candidates. There were no 
issues with the allocation of candidates for PR, with each party being equally allocated 
three candidates. However, for BN, due to the fact that it consists of more than three 
component parties, should each of the component parties require representation by three 
candidates, the balancing of the allocated numbers simply would not work. Furthermore, 
some of the component parties are much smaller in size (in terms of membership, number 
of elected representatives, political power and so on) compared to the other component 
parties (Amer Saifude 2009). It would create a huge imbalance between numbers of 
candidates and political power within BN. Apart from this, some of the political parties, 
especially in terms of ethnicity or the mode of struggle, may also overlap with one 
another (Lee 2007). This makes the data collected redundant as mentioned in the 
paragraph above, and a larger number does not necessarily mean better quality of data. In 
order to solve this problem of balancing numbers between BN and PR, while at the same 
time maintaining the representativeness of the whole BN, three component parties are 
selected. 
 
 The most senior parties, which are UMNO and MCA, were selected. The 
selection of UMNO is indisputable as, regardless of whether they are agreeable or 
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disagreeable in the political or academic world, UMNO is the backbone of BN (Lee, 
2007). The position of Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister are from UMNO (Case, 
2010), and 11 out of 13 Chief Ministers at the state level are also from UMNO. Similarly, 
the distribution of cabinet positions, the size of its membership and so on, all come from 
UMNO. Therefore, UMNO is selected as a component party and is allocated with three 
candidates. Similar principles were applied to MCA due to its seniority within BN and its 
size (Lee, 2007). Furthermore, it is a Chinese-based party and is the largest non-Malay 
political party within BN in Peninsular Malaysia. Therefore, it is justifiable to include 
MCA as the second party, with three candidates allocated in this research. To determine 
the third component party to be allocated with the final three candidates, I have created a 
"hybrid" component party for the purpose. This is due to, firstly, MIC and Gerakan both 
being quite balanced from one perspective to the other. By traditional arrangement, such 
as seating of BN and government leadership, MIC has often been in front of Gerakan, 
however, Gerakan did hold the position of Chief Minister in Penang when BN was in 
power, in which MIC did not lead in any of the states. Therefore, due to these small 
differences, if there is any, between MIC and Gerakan, it may not carry much meaning to 
argue their seniority and give privileges as the third component party in BN (for this 
research purpose). Secondly, in this research, the segregation of ethnicity inclines towards 
Malay versus non-Malay. Therefore, even though MIC is an Indian-based party, this 
factor does not make it compulsory to allocate the final three candidates to MIC. 
Furthermore, Gerakan, as a multi-ethnic based party, do have Indian leaders within their 
party. Thirdly, there was infighting within MIC at the time the fieldwork was being 
conducted, to the extent that the whole committee line up in MIC, including its President, 
was in question and the legitimacy of the office bearers were brought to the court. Both 
camps were claiming their leaders to be the legitimate one. Due to this reason, most of the 
top leaderships were unable to be reached and, even if they had been reached, they would 
not be willing to be a candidate to prevent extra fuss, with the case residing in court at the 
time. However, one of its top leadership members was successfully convinced following 
multiple requests to accept the interview. Due to these three reasons, it is justifiable and 
feasible to create a third component as a "hybrid" party, providing BN candidates 
consisting of UMNO, MCA and "hybrid" parties, with each having three candidates. 
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 As mentioned above, at the beginning of the fieldwork 18 candidates were in the 
original plan for conducting interviews. However, in the midst of conducting the 
interviews, two candidates seemed reluctant in giving their cooperation. One of the 
candidates declined to elaborate further or justify his ideas. For example, when asked 
about what "new politics" means to them, the response was "new politics means new 
politics lah (local accent)". The responses were more of a generic answer, rather than 
their willingness to further respond when questioned in-depth. In the case of the second 
candidate, they were willing to answer all the questions provided, however, their answers 
were very contradictory among themselves. For instance, when asked if Malaysia is 
moving towards de-ethnicisation, their response was positive. As a follow up for the 
question, when being asked about their opinion on what they think about their party 
colleagues (non-candidates) saying that Malaysia is moving towards ethnicisation of 
politics, their answer was positive as well. This is one of the many contradictory 
responses coming from them during the short interview. At the same time, they were also 
keen to give "no answer" when being posed with questions. For example, when being 
asked why some of their party leaders seem to be interested in championing ethnic 
politics, their response was just "macam itulah" (translated as "is like that"); short 
response that carry no meaningful information. Due to these reasons, these two 
candidates have been excluded and explains why 20 candidates were interviewed when 
the original plan was to interview 18 candidates. The final usage of all information is only 
from 18 candidates as well. 
 
 Out of these 18 candidates, three of them were party Presidents, two were Deputy 
Presidents, three were Vice Presidents, three were Secretary Generals, six had party 
leaderships (an Information Chief, a State Chairman, a Youth Chief, a Deputy Youth 
Chief, a director of their party research centre and a significant Member of Parliament) 
and one was a backroom adviser (political secretary to a top cabinet member of 
















Number 3 2 3 3 6 1 
Table 4. Party position of candidates. 
 
 The three candidates allocated to each political party were divided between 
different segments within their parties. In Malaysia, it is not uncommon that, within a 
single political party, there are different camps for different reasons (Malike Brahim, 
Mohd. Fo'ad Sakdan. Muzliza Mohamad, 2013). This may be due to: conservatives 
versus liberal, old guard versus newbies, different patronage leader, clerical versus 
secular and so on. Therefore, if a political party was divided into three camps, each camp 
would be allocated with a candidate. Should a political party consist of two camps, each 
camp would get at least one candidate, with the remaining one being allocated to a more 
necessary division. The main reason for such narrow stratification is to make sure that as 
wide a range as possible, if not all, of the voices within a political party can be heard. 
Therefore, the data collected at the end of the fieldwork was justifiable to represent the 
whole party in general. 
 
 Starting with UMNO, the allocation of one candidate was given to a more 
ethnicity-inclined leader, while another candidate was from a less ethnicity-inclined 
(inclined towards multi-ethnicity) candidate. As UMNO is the backbone party of BN, and 
also the government, a backroom adviser to a very senior cabinet member was chosen. 
This is because, with the UMNO to certain extent, they do not only represent themselves, 
but also represent BN and the government. Therefore, with the inclusion of such a 
backroom adviser, it could enhance the data from the perspective of a political party and 
also from the perspective of a government. 
 
 MCA, in their last party election, saw a clear division between two main camps: 
one led by the current President Liow Tiong Lai (with the support of former President 
Ong Ka Ting), and another camp led by former President Chua Soi Lek (although he did 
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not contest himself). The result showed that Liow's camp managed to win most of the 
positions in the central committee line up, with Chua's camp only managing to gain 
minority wins in the election. Therefore, in this research, two candidates were allocated to 
Liow's camp while another candidate was from Chua's camp. It is justifiable for such an 
arrangement as, apart from a larger number in the line-up coming from Liow's camp, the 
highest office bearers of MCA, such as the President and Deputy President, are also from 
Liow's camp. This shows that the majority of the policy-making within MCA needs to 
have agreement from Liow's camp. 
 
 For the third component party within BN included in the research, the "hybrid" 
party, two of the candidate quota were allocated to Gerakan, while another candidate was 
from MIC. As discussed in the above section, the significance of this third party is much 
lower when compared to other component parties. As explained above for the reason why 
such a third component party is needed, the allocation of the candidate quota should not 
be a large issue to contend. Furthermore, the intention of trying to include the third and 
fourth biggest component parties for BN in Peninsular Malaysia has been achieved. 
 
 For PR, DAP is the only party out of the six political parties that gained allocation 
for candidates, having the least division within a party. At the central (national) level, 
there is not much division between them. There are no two or more big camps within 
Central DAP. Even so, these three candidates did possess different physical identities 
among them. This physical difference could be gender, age, ethnicity, years of experience 
in politics, level of party position held, elected or non-elected representative, level of 
aggressiveness in delivering message and so on. Due to the ethical reasons, I could not 
specify which physical identity was being used to select the candidates. This is because, 
by mentioning the exact criteria, it could make the candidate’s identity more easily 
suspected (or at least easier). Nevertheless, the end selection of candidates for DAP was 




 The next party to be discussed is PKR. In PKR, the division is mainly due to 
patronage factors, similar factors as MCA. In PKR, the two patronages are generally 
known as Anwar's camp (de facto leader of PKR who is now in jail but still 
acknowledged as the highest leader of PKR), and Azmin's camp (the current Deputy 
President of PKR and Chief Minister of Selangor). Therefore, the allocation of candidate 
quota is one candidate for each camp. The third candidate was selected based on the idea 
that the person is the least extreme (in terms of 'camp-ism'), while at the same time has 
authority enough to speak on behalf of the party and could contribute information for the 
research. In PKR, the allocation of candidates through division within the party is not a 
significant issue. This is because the division within PKR inclines towards patronage, 
rather than policy stance. For instance, unlike UMNO, a leader who is inclined towards 
ethnic politics and a leader who is inclined towards non-ethnic politics could bring a 
difference in terms of the party stance. However, for PKR, they do not have such an 
issue. Even in an extreme example of interviewing only a particular camp from PKR, the 
issue of having anyone unable to represent PKR does not arise as the information 
collected will be similar in terms of party stance. Therefore, in this research, where effort 
has been made to cover different camps within PKR, although it may not be absolute 
necessary, it does strengthen the case that the data collected is representative enough for 
PKR. 
 
 Finally, for PAS, it is an obvious division between the clerical camp and the 
professional camp (or progressive, as it is also known. To standardise any further 
discussion, the term "professional camp" will be used). For PAS, the clerical camp holds 
a higher position, such as the position of President, while professional camp holds the 
Deputy President position. Even so, the PAS President has shown through their actions of 
veto that for certain decisions made by the central committee, he alone is given such 
authority to decide for the benefit of the party. As the PAS President has shown such a 
great power in his position, therefore, for this interview one informant quota is allocated 
to the clerical camp, while another two are allocated to the professional camp. This is 
because, with such a great power, the words of the President (or his camp's follower) may 




 In general, this research intend to "interview" political parties as political parties 
are the main focus in this research. Therefore, in order to be able to "interview" the 
political parties, informants must be somebody who is authority enough to speak on 
behalf of the party. From the table shown above, those informants that being interview 
are consisted of among the highest office bearers of a political parties. These leaders are 
among the most suitable candidate to be selected. Although the process of getting to them 
is never easy, such attempt is worth the time and effort for the kind of information being 
obtained through interview. 
  
 
3.3 DATA COLLECTION 
Interviewing is the main means of collecting data, with secondary sources being used to 
help in shaping the question session during the interview. As the method of interviewing 
in data collection is useful in terms of getting direct first-hand information from the 
candidates (Alshenqeeti 2014), it will, therefore, be my main method of data collection on 
the position and strategies of political parties regarding the latest political development in 
Malaysia. In general, research using the interview method is to search for factual and 
meaningful answers (Kvale 1996). It may be easy to obtain factual answers as they tend 
to be fixed, but it has never been easy to obtain meaningful answers. However, it is not all 
the time that meaningful answers are obtained, as mentioned in the data sampling section, 
where one of the candidates (who is removed from the useful data sampling) tends to 
provide answers with no "meaning". For the rest of the 18 candidates from whom 
information is being collected in this research, sometimes, when necessary, the researcher 
has to press further for meaningful answers to be elaborated, while at the same time, self-
interpreting the meaningful answers given, particularly in political fields, where 
candidates tend to give ‘good’ and ‘over-optimistic’ answers instead of ‘true’ answers. In 
this instance, it is important to build a good relationship with the candidates to explore 
their ‘real’ experience (Devine 2002). However, with the ethical issues in mind, the 
relationship should not be constructed as a manipulation of the relationship to gain the 
data. Candidates must be informed of the on-going project and give their consent 
beforehand. It has often been a dilemma as to whether the candidates should be fully 
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informed of the whole project, as the awareness of the candidates may change to more 
natural settings of the conversation. However, no matter how it changes the settings, the 
ethical issues remain an important element in the professionalism of the interview. 
 
 Apart from the principle argument on why an interview method is useful and how 
it is suitable for this research as discussed above, the technicality of conducting the 
interview is crucial too. In this research, the interview questions have been formulated in 
a semi-structured open-ended form, as this form of questioning will open up space for the 
candidates to roam more freely with the questions, but at the same time limiting it to the 
relevance of the research (Bryman 2004, Silverman 2001). Unlike most of the 
quantitative research methods, such as surveys and questionnaires, where the methods 
prefer a generalisation, qualitative interview methods especially, which are applied in this 
research, are keen to look deeper into the reasons behind it (Kvale 1996). The data 
collected may not have had similar responses, but this is also a positive aspect where a 
wider scope of information could not be obtained (Rubin & Rubin 1995). Principally, 
there is no restriction on the type of responses collected during the interview, as long as 
they are useful to the research. Should the candidate divert too far from the original 
research scope, only then is the candidate brought back to the focused scope. Generally, 
the questions asked will attempt to answer the issue of de-ethnicisation in Malaysia, in 
which a more narrowed down question would be asked. At the same time, a candidate 
may not be giving the kind of responses we would wish to get (for example,  ‘beating 
around the bush’ or being reluctant to reveal too much, having a thought that giving such 
answers might make them look bad, and many more reasons), and the researcher may 
pose some indirect questions to ease the emotion of candidates responding to it. There 
may be some questions that candidates might feel uncomfortable about giving direct 
answers to. Contrarily, a change of direction in questioning may give them comfort. 
Therefore, in this research, the comfort of the candidate is one of the issues to be 
considered in order to obtain optimum responses. 
 
 Apart from the verbal communication between the researcher and the candidate, 
another useful tip for obtaining better quality of data is through non-verbal 
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communication. Although non-verbal communication could not replace the importance of 
verbal communication, no doubt the former could help the latter in verifying certain facts 
and arguments from the candidates. Therefore, since this research is intended to be a face-
to-face interview with the candidates, the advantage of it is that the research will have a 
chance to observe the physical reaction of the candidates. Observation is another critical 
element in interviews, as the interpretation from the physical signals of the candidates 
may strengthen or cast doubts on the given answers (Harrison 2001, Gering 2007). 
Triangulation and cross-verification within the collected interview is another good way of 
‘forcing’ the answer from the candidates. For instance, the candidates who are from the 
same political party should have the same stance when they are answering on behalf of 
the party. Repetitive collection of data from candidates of the same party may strengthen 
the case if the answers are the same, and further investigation may be required if there is 
some contradiction between them. At the same time, the ‘open’, published information 
from the opposite party can be used to further pursue in-depth answers from the 
candidates. Again, ethical issues have to be in parallel with any actions taken for in-depth 
and triangulation of answers. Apart from the instant observation, it is also helpful to note 
down the conversation and physical action of the candidates too. This includes pauses 
during the interview, attempts to avoid questions, reaction towards questions and any 
other related natural reaction. As this natural reaction is unavoidable by an ordinary 
human (unless the candidate is very good at acting), it can help us in our interpretation of 
the interview source and certifies the trustworthiness of the answer in other resources 
through triangulation of all the data collected. 
 
Apart from the main data collection method of interviewing which is applied in 
this research, the second data collection method, which is also a supportive method, is 
documentary analysis. Documentary analysis in this research does not confine itself to the 
conventional inclination towards paper-based documents. In this research, it includes 
modern "documents", such as social media and information from the internet (regardless 
of genuine facts or distorted facts). These documents are utilised as a source of 
exploratory means of widening the discussion with the candidate. As the issue concerned 
will be brought up with the candidate, the trustworthy level of the information obtained, 
especially through the internet, may be secondary. The primary concern is to raise the 
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issue and further analyse it (if such issues are related to the research). Apart from that, 
documentary analysis is also useful as a source of ‘forcing’ out in-depth answers and it is 
important in providing a wider scope of information. However, as Scott (1990) argues, 
these documents must fulfil four criteria. Firstly, the document must be in its original 
format to avoid any attempts to alter the content. Secondly, the document must be free of 
error and the document should have authority within its publication. Thirdly, the 
documents must be representative enough to discuss the whole scenario. Unavoidably in 
the political field, certain documents might incline towards particular institutions or 
figures. It is acceptable as long as the document is valid and it will then be the 
researcher’s duty to interpret the document in relation to the author of the document. 
Lastly, the meaning within the document should be clear and comprehensive. 
 
To be more specific, this documentary analysis will consist of two main groups of 
sources. First there are written political documents. Election manifestos will be the main 
source of analysis, where the pledges of political parties are being compared in two ways: 
single party comparison, where the election manifestos of parties are being compared to 
the manifesto of the election before this, and, secondly, by comparing the manifestos of 
the two political coalitions within the same General Election. The second source of 
documentary analysis will be the oral source. The main focus of data collection will be 
their political speeches in the campaigning period during a General Election. As political 
speeches in this form may be too much in terms of volume, a selection system will be 
used as a guideline in selecting the particular speeches to be analysed. The significant 
political speeches, where all the heavyweights give their speeches on the same stage, will 
definitely be considered as these speeches carry the authority of each political party in 
terms of their stance, pledge and direction. Secondly, as this research is about the 
trajectory of ethnic politics compared to non-ethnic politics, therefore, political speeches 
with different crowds will be considered. For instance, the political speeches given by a 
political party in a Malay-dominated and non-Malay-dominated crowd will be used as a 
comparison, to see whether there is any contradiction within their speeches where 
different pledges are being promised to different ethnic crowds. This will also determine 
if they are using a similar political pledge regardless of the ethnicity of the crowd. Similar 
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to the direction of interviews being conducted, this type of documentary analysis could 
provide an insight of information for the research. 
 
Apart from this, another way of generating ideas when formulating questions for 
the interview session comes from informal communication with related stakeholders. 
Stakeholders in this scope is very wide, including but not limited to, activists, academics, 
political assistants (including those who work in political fields in various positions and 
titles), ordinary party members, political science (and any other related field) students and 
anybody else who have their opinion related (or slightly) related to this research. Such 
communications are held either in-plan (meaning they have an appointment and have in 
mind what to talk about) and impromptu (more towards leisure chit-chatting). Although 
the figure is not counted as this is just a mean of informal communication, the number 
could be around 50 or more. Although this way of generating ideas is less formal and not 
necessarily within the original plan, the contribution of this method could not be totally 
ignored. This is because such methods can often give unexpected but helpful information. 
For instance, during the private gathering session with former colleagues, some of the 
discussion could help to spark an idea on the formulation of interview questions. At the 
same time, as this is a private gathering, the conversation does not need to have legal 
repercussions for each statement. From there, the researcher could take the spirit of the 
issue and incorporate it into the interview session, either as a clarification of fact or as an 
example of popular opinion. 
 
 In short, in this research, the main method of data collection is through interview 
with the selected candidates. Such data collection methods are believed to be able to 
answer the research questions raised in the early part of this thesis. This is because, as this 
research intends to "interview" political parties as they are the main unit of analysis in 
this research, such "interviews" with them is then transferred to people who are able to 
speak on behalf of the party. The section on data sampling has explained which 
individuals are capable to do so. At the second level, due to the nature of this research, 
which focuses on qualitative in-depth responses, having interviews with candidates as 
explained above could achieve the objectives set. This is not to say that interview is the 
102 
 
only method, but it could be the best among all available options, including the issue of 
feasibility. For instance, conducting ethnography with the political community involved, 
or observation of participants with the leadership of political parties may also produce 
similar data. However, both have feasibility issues which are difficult to resolve. Firstly, 
getting directly involved with their leadership activities, such as meetings, discussions or 
even informal communication among them may be highly unlikely. This is because, in 
order to do so, personal connections with those leaders must be strong enough to enable 
them to provide such convenience to be part of them. Even assuming that a person has 
such strong connections with a political party (their leaders), it may not be possible for 
the same person to possess similar strengths at their competitor political parties. 
Secondly, logistics could be another issue that needs to be dealt with, especially with the 
time constraint. Therefore, by conducting interviews, researchers could communicate 
with both benches of the political front without (at least at a lower level) suspicion as a 
political spy, or candidates themselves feeling disheartened for contacting their opponent 
at the same time. Furthermore, by interviewing both benches of the political divide, it 
could strengthen the premise that the researcher himself is neutral and non-biased to any 
side, while at the same time obtaining in-depth data from both political coalitions. 
 
 
3.4 DATA ANALYSIS 
Data analysis is the method of reproducing the collected raw data into more meaningful 
data. This data will then be analysed further for its content and usefulness of the 
information before being incorporated into formal writing. Generally, as according to 
Spencer et.al (2014), qualitative research data collection involves the process of labelling, 
organising and interpreting the information obtained. The ultimate goal of data analysis is 
to understand "whys" for a pattern to take place or a reoccurrence of an event to happen 
(Miles & Huberman 1994). This is because, for qualitative research, its main aim is to 
have a deeper understanding of phenomenon and incidences, unlike quantitative research 
that has a greater emphasis on values and may or may not be interested in finding a 
reason for the "whys" scope. For Seale (1999), values may not be a big factor within 
qualitative research analysis, although many of the researchers are keen to emphasise the 
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numbers in the analysis, such as numbers of people answering in particular ways and so 
on, which is unnecessary. Seale (1999) argues that, although some qualitative research 
does need to rely on values, such as content analysis to compare how many times a 
particular word appears in a text, other kinds of qualitative researches that over-emphasis 
with figures unnecessarily, will defeat the purpose of the qualitative research principle, 
which is to focus on in-depth discussion of phenomenon. 
 
 Apart from the interpretation from qualitative research, this kind of research can 
also be used for descriptive insights. According to Elliott and Timulak (2005), qualitative 
research can be either descriptive or interpretive. Descriptive research generally deals 
with 'what' issues. Where the interpretive research deals with thick descriptions 
(ethnography) or theory development (grounded theory), descriptive research deals with a 
rich and straightforward description of an event (Neergaard et al., 2009). Other 
qualitative approaches might aim at developing a concept or intertwining with existing 
theory, but a descriptive approach aims to provide information as close to the data 
sources  as possible (for example, from the informant).  It inclines to describe the 
experience of the informants (Matua, Van Der Wal 2015), which is in line with 
Bhattacherjee (2012) when he suggests careful observation of an event and 
documentation of the details of a phenomenon.  
  
 In this research, upon collecting data from interview, such data is transferred as 
text through transcription. In this case, such transcription is done manually. This is 
because, as the interview is conducted in Malaysia and both the candidates and the 
researcher are Malaysian, the factor of local culture which influences the way an 
interview proceeded is unavoidable. As Brown and Levinson (1978) argue, different 
cultures may view different gestures differently. These non-verbal communications with 
candidates were jotted down for the interpretation of the messages intended to be 
delivered by the candidates, be it explicitly or implicitly. This is supported by Burgoon et. 
al. (1996), when they argue that these non-verbal communications could provide further 
information for the later stage interpretation and analysis. Therefore, manual transcription 
is more appropriate as more non-verbal information could be derived for more 
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information. Furthermore, as the interview is supposed to be conducted in a particular 
language, in practice there are likely to be other languages that slip in. This may not 
(sometimes may) be to do with the issue of mastery of a language by the candidate, but 
simply due to the everyday practice by local Malaysians in slipping in other languages in 
their conversation (some can be as little as one word, while others can be more).  
 
Although each language could have their own version of terminology for usage, 
sometimes borrowing certain terms from other languages can help to emphasise their 
ideas or delivery of their messages (Davidson 2009). As Gumperz (1982) puts forth, the 
linguistic phenomenon between the interviewers and interviewees could make both of 
them understand the actual meaning they are trying to deliver, instead of viewing the 
terminology used from a literal grammatical perspective. For instance, the word "rakyat" 
could simply be translated as "people" in the English language. However, the usage of 
"rakyat" and "people" might have different levels of concern and closeness. The word 
"rakyat" may sometimes make the candidate, or even the masses (which is why some 
politicians are keen to use it), feel more people-centric rather than the common term 
"people". Apart from that, due to the cultural background and identity of both candidate 
and researcher as mentioned above, candidates are keen to use language, slang and accent 
in delivering their ideas. Such terms may not have formal or standardised formulae, but 
they carry a commonly accepted position within Malaysian society. For instance, the 
terms "can lah" and "can loh" can simply mean "can" in proper English. However, with 
the locally used "lah" and "loh" following the word "can", it refers to a different level of 
"can" in the person's mind. Again, this has less to do with the language skill of a person. 
Due to the fact that interviews conducted are heavily influenced by local culture, manual 
transcription may be a better option in bringing out the message closer to the candidates' 
mind (delivering what they intend to mean rather than physical wordings). 
 
When the transcription step is complete, it is followed by a translation process. In 
this fieldwork, the two main languages being used are English and Malay. This step 
intends to translate the Malay version of transcription into an English version. Such a 
translation step is needed to maintain the originality of the candidate’s wording during the 
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interview (Poland 1995). This is because when quotations are being formed into the ideas 
brought forward by the candidate, such original wording is quoted in accompaniment 
with a translated version in English. Therefore, when translation is being conducted these 
wordings cannot be considered as the original wordings anymore. With such 
accompaniment, the meaning that is being brought out by the candidate could less be 
disputed. 
  
 The third step of data analysis is to extract the information from the raw material. 
Dey (1993) sees this as a not-in-subsequence puzzle, and the process of cutting and 
extracting pieces of a puzzle into a meaning puzzle in sequence is needed. Generally, 
from the transcription, analysis is conducted by firstly deleting any irrelevant 
information. Very often, during the interview with politicians, they often like to attack 
their opponent in their response. Although some of these attacks are good as it can bring 
the debate to a higher level, very often those attacks incline towards blank attack. At the 
same time, some politicians are also keen on diverting the discussion to a far-fetched 
scope which is not needed (or not relevant) for this research. The step of deleting this 
information will make the following step easier. After deleting the unnecessary data, the 
next step is to start coding those leftover responses into different themes. Coding is a 
process of organising different sets of information and grouping them according to 
themes (Campbell et. al. 2013). In this research, coding is done manually towards three 
main themes, namely party membership, party stance and electoral strategies. 
Classification according to these three themes eases the analysis process for later chapters 
on how these three main dimensions of data can flourish the argument in its advancement 
in de-ethnicisation of politics. As put forth by Charmaz (1983), coding can ease the 
analytical work by grouping together events, statements or observations into categories. 
Even so, there are times when some interesting data collected from candidates cannot be 
fitted accurately into these three themes, but could be useful for further steps of 
deliberation and linkage to the themes. Therefore, the transcript is also coded into some 
minor themes such as party future, opponent's weakness, party (and party leaders) hard 
work and so on. Although responses are labelled with a theme (major and/or minor 
theme), such coding is not rigid. This is because the same response may be utilised in 
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more than one theme of writing. These themes will then be combined into different 
sections for the usage of different chapters in the thesis writing. 
 
 As this thesis consists of three substantive chapters, which focus on party 
membership, party stance and electoral politics, the process of data analysis above could 
help to divide the raw material obtained through interview into meaningful data for thesis 
writing. Such three steps are needed as the ability to give quotation towards making 
claims by the researcher could help to strengthen the claim made. Furthermore, such 
quotation by candidates who represent their respective political parties could further 




3.5 ETHICAL PRACTICE 
When conducting research, obtaining the best data set that can produce a high quality of 
writing may be an aim. However, certain ethical practices need to be adhered to, be it due 
to the constraint of law (in which breaking it may means criminal offences) or due to a 
humanitarian ground (not breaking the rules and law, but are inviting trouble, discomfort 
or other kind of negative ramification towards any party within the research). Bryman 
(2012) does not see much change in the main elements of ethical practice over previous 
decades. The main principle of protecting those involved in the research is given attention. 
Webster, Lewis and Brown (2014) are suggesting five main elements which researchers 
should practice. This includes the point that researchers should not make unreasonable 
demands from their participants, participation must be based on informed choice, 
participants are free from pressure in participating in it, participants should be informed 
of the possible harm that could have caused them and, lastly, the participants anonymity 




 In this research, all the five ethical practices suggested above have been adhered 
to. Some of the suggestions have even been taken to a higher level, although it may not 
have been necessary. This is to give a higher sense of security for the candidate while the 
extra measures taken are worthy and feasible. In practice, during the fieldwork where 
interviews are being conducted, before the start of the interview candidates will be asked 
for permission to have the conversation recorded. Should there be, at any point during 
any part of the interview, any information that the candidate wishes to be ‘off the record’, 
such rights are respected. From all the interviews conducted, none of the candidates have 
actually demanded for that, except one. The mentioned candidate, although they did 
request our post-interview conversation to be ‘off the record’, such incidence may have 
lower connection with the thesis as a whole in terms of ethical practice. This is because, 
firstly, the post-interview conversation was not in recorded mode. Secondly, the issue 
discussed had less to do with the focus of the thesis. Therefore, this incident is less 
relevant, although such respect is still granted. 
 
 At the beginning of the interview recording, candidates will be verified with a 
question on whether they wish to participate in the interview voluntarily (Codi, Day & 
Backhouse 2000). All 20 candidates (including two whose interviews were not taken into 
the research for reasons explained previously) gave their positive response for voluntarily 
participating in the interview. Next, candidates were verbally presented with their three 
rights granted to them in the interview. Firstly, their identity will be protected through 
anonymity. For this right, none of the identities of the candidates will be exposed. Most 
of the interviews were conducted with only two persons present, which were the 
candidate and the researcher. In some instances, there was a third person present during 
the interview and this third person (of all third persons) is an assistant to the candidate. 
Secondly, candidates were granted the right to withdraw from the interview at any point. 
On this right, none of the candidates activated it and all the interviews were conducted 
smoothly through until the end with little trouble. The third right that was granted to them 
was that the conversation details would be protected at the highest level of confidentiality 
possible. For this right, the researcher even attempted to standardise the salutation of all 
candidates. According to protocol, candidates who have honorary titles such as 'Datuk', 
'Datuk Seri', 'YB' and many more (similar to the title of 'Sir' and 'Honourable') are 
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supposed to be addressed as such. However, in these interviews all the candidates were 
asked for permission to be greeted as 'YB' (which is used for members of Parliament) as a 
standardised salutation as a means for a higher level of confidentiality. Although this may 
not be necessarily required by ethical practice, the researcher believed in doing anything 
extra as long as it could protect the candidates better, however insignificantly. 
 
 From the entire step-by-step process, as explained above, it could be seen that the 
researcher is taking all necessary steps in adhering to the ethical practice, sometimes even 
more than required, in order to provide better protection for the candidates. As this 
research is a one that involves human subjects, serious attention is given to the ethical 
practice issue so that, while the researcher could freely conduct his research and obtain 
the data he requires, at the same time, nobody is harmed or being put in a less 




As discussed in the early part of this chapter, methodology is the philosophy of the 
conduct of a research. This is the part where the conduct of a research is being observed. 
Although this is not a substantive chapter to help answer those research questions raised, 
this is the chapter that formulates how the information that is being used in later 
substantive chapters are derived. Without proper planning of execution of research 
conduct, the validity and reliability of the research may be called into question. Therefore, 
this can be seen as the basis for building a deeper argumentation in later chapters. 
 
 In this chapter, four main issues have been addressed. Firstly, on the issue of 
sampling. Samples that are selected for any research will have a direct impact towards the 
kind of data obtained, and, thereafter, affect the conclusion of the research. The samples 
selected must possess the characteristics that are able to provide accurate answers for the 
research. For instance, in this research, the unit of analysis is focused on political parties. 
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Therefore, the selection of samples must be from individuals who are able to represent 
their party. Should the samples selected be ordinary members of a political party, they 
may provide what they think about their party, or even what the party is doing at the 
moment. However, they have no direct knowledge into a deeper level of information or 
what their party intends to do but is yet to execute. Worse still, these ordinary members 
have no direct leadership influence on the parties. Therefore, they are not suitable to 
speak on behalf of the party. This is an example of how the inaccurate selection of 
samples bring the direction of the research in the wrong direction. 
 
 Secondly, on the issue of data collection, it acts as a means of getting information. 
At this stage data is readily available. The question is how to harvest this data through a 
correct means without compromising the data. The process of data collation, which acts 
as an intermediary between readily data (candidate) and processed data (data analysis). 
Should the means of collecting data be inaccurate, the validity and reliability of the data 
may be contended. At the same time, during the process of data collection, should 
important data be missed during the process, the next steps of data analysis may not be 
able to function to the optimum. This is because the data obtained is limited. Should the 
data collected be a significant amount, it is not feasible or convenient as most of the data 
collected may be redundant or not useful. Therefore, for this step, it is crucial to make 
sure that the data collected is useful for its purpose in the next step. 
 
 The third issue concerns the data analysis step. After all the raw materials are 
collected, this raw material need to be converted into meaningful data. Such conversion 
could be done through extracting and interpreting the raw material obtained earlier. This 
is the step where all the processed data will be used for writing purposes. Should there be 
any blunder in this step, all the efforts done in step one (data sampling) and step two (data 
collection) will be redundant. As mentioned earlier, as this is the step where interpretation 
starts to take place, careful consideration and claims made must be supported by evidence 
from earlier parts. Without evidence to support them, such claim may become weak can 
be open to easier dispute. This will cause the whole research conclusion to collapse. 
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 The final issue in this chapter is in regard to ethical practice. Violation of ethical 
practice may not have a direct negative impact towards the quality of the writing (in 
terms of substantive arguments), however, such violation may mean that subjects in the 
research, whether human or non-human, are not granted with respect. Furthermore, such 
violation may also cause uneasiness towards any subject that is involved in the research. 
Therefore, although ethical practice may not have a direct impact towards the substantive 
arguments of the research, based on humanitarian and legal grounds a gentleman’s 
approach should be used while conducting the research. The end of any research does not 


























4.1 INTRODUCTION  
Party membership is the first-dimensional focus for the discussion on how Malaysian 
politics is being de-ethnicised. As discussed in the Introduction and Background chapters, 
the main political parties are either shaped as ethnic-based parties from the perspective of 
their admission eligibility or they are formed as non-ethnic-based parties which have 
failed to include significant inclusivity within themselves and are generally dominated by 
a single ethnic group. In both cases, to de-ethnicise the political landscape in Malaysia, it 
is good to begin by looking at party membership and review how these political parties 
deal with their party membership regarding de-ethnicisation, whether to maintain the 
status quo or re-ethnicise ethnic politics in Malaysia. 
 
Questions of party membership are not a prominent concern in the scholarship on ethnic 
politics, but there are some sources that discuss party membership in different ways.  
Membership structure of parties impact how parties present themselves to voters,   though 
party leadership of course still tries to influence how the parties 'should' present 
themselves.  Weiss’ (2013) study on party competition in an electoral contest explores 
various factions within political parties, such as UMNO Women's wing  with its 
responsibility for networking helping selected candidates to expand their connectivity 
with grassroots leaders and voters.  Similarly, PAS Women's wing accompanies 
candidates especially when they are doing house-to-house visits canvassing for votes.  
They believe that it will be easier for women to start a conversation with voters, whom 
might have less knowledge about the candidate. Apart from that, these women will also 
organise small prayers and discussion groups especially related to Islamic teaching 
enhance their existence within the community (Weiss 2014).  All the communication with 
voters from both UMNO or PAS is shaped by the members who deliver it, and influences 
whether ethnicity, universality or some other issue will take prominence.  This shows that 
the party membership structure will decide what kind of members a party incline to 
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receive and those members will contribute in a way which party wishes them to 
contribute.  Therefore, party membership is an important  human resource for political 
parties.   
 
 In another article (2014), Weiss explains that rates of party membership are one of the 
highest in Asia, where 20% of the population declare party membership, while another 
22% indicate they might join a party. Such a higher percentage, although not absolute, 
but it does indicate that having a bigger share in the membership market might give an 
easier path in garnering votes.  This is because with a high tendency of Malaysians 
interested in becoming a party member, failure to admit those people as members would 
mean that opponent parties might absorb them in.  In Malaysia, one of the crucial points 
of party membership is access to party media by law (Weiss 2014).  This is because party 
membership will give legal permission for those people to access to certain party sources.  
For example, PAS and DAP owned newspapers can only be circulated among their 
members (Weis 2014).  Therefore, in order to be able to get information from those party 
newspaper, becoming a party is the basic requirement by law.  Whilst the law is not 
always strictly enforced, it does limit the ability of parties to expand their influence to 
other segments of the population, as their newspapers might not be able to reach them 
legally.  Therefore, a less constraining membership structure may help them venture into 
other segments and in that way potentially give a hand in de-ethnicising their party.  This 
is because when the party membership structure becomes more inclusive, a diverse pool 
of members will form their membership structure.  With such diversity, it discourage the 
party discourse from concentrating on dominant segment of members only.  
 
High percentages for party membership are also explored by Kartini Aboo Talib Khalid 
(2014), who argues that one of the reasons for voter turnout in the Malaysian General 
Election (85% for 2013 General Election) is that more people have become members of 
political parties, thus encouraging them to participate in politics and vote in elections.  
Political parties such as PKR and DAP become more effective in championing 
themselves as 'multi-racial' (in her words) parties (Kartini Aboo Talib Khalid 2014).  
When parties exhibit more of a multi-ethnic or non-ethnic spirit informing their 
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membership structure, as discussed above, the mobilisation of their members will also be 
able to help their party move nearer de-ethnicisation. 
 
Kuhonta, Slater & Vu (2008) and Chin (2006) also (indirectly) consider party 
membership from the Muslim (Malay) and Chinese perspective.  For the former, they 
argue that political parties arose from salient religious and ethnicity cleavage (Kuhonta, 
Slater & Vu 2008).  When religion and ethnicity become contentious, the party would 
have to behave in a more religious (more 'Malay') way in order to get more support.  In 
doing so, how they admit people as their members reflects on how the party can be more 
'Malay' or more Islamic.  With this kind of membership, elected leaders within the party 
will have no other choice than appeasing their members.  Chin (2006) makes a similar 
argument with respect to party leadership in MCA.  As the MCA Constitution (which I 
will discuss in depth in a later section) limits their members to those with Chinese descent, 
to win their party office, they have no choice but to raise issues of their members’ interest.  
This can be seen where their party elections take up issues such as Chinese education, and 
even once debates whether MCA should or shouldn't buy control of a major Chinese 
press. 
 
The case studies above show that party membership structure, to an extent, can tie down 
the hand of party leaders in order to satisfy their base.  Another way party membership 
can shape the direction of the party is explored in the work of Low (2017).  Instead of the 
membership structure determining the "ethnicity level" of political parties, Low (2017) 
shows how the People's Action Party (PAP) intended to replace MCA as the nationwide 
Chinese representative party.  Prior to the establishment of Malaysia, MCA was seen as a 
Chinese representative party in Malaya.  The same goes for PAP in Singapore.  However, 
in the 1960s, PAP was trying to take over the role of MCA in Peninsular Malaysia to 
become the nationwide (Malaysia) Chinese representative political party.  One of the 
factors that supported this claim was their party membership composition, which justified 
their action.  Such an idea was also supported by Prasad (2016), whoargues that party 
membership describes the ethnic identity of the party.  When a party is attached to an 
ethnic identity, the nature of the party would be moulded based on that 'ethnicity'.  Looi 
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(2013) too sees that membership structure affects how political culture functions within a 
society, as the political system itself in Malaysia is built up mainly by the political parties. 
 
From here, we can see that the structures of party membership, especially in terms of 
eligibility and the extent to which parties diversify themselves,  can have an impact on the 
de-ethnicisation process of parties (or the other way around).  Therefore, in this chapter, I 
will focus on whether these parties can make themselves inclusive, especially in terms of 
membership composition.  More importantly, even if they are able to achieve this, can 
such a membership composition in political parties be taken as a measure of the success 
of de-ethnicisation?  I will begin with a discussion of coalition parties, but then the 
discussion will quickly be narrowed to individual political parties and how these parties 
are trying (or not) to de-ethnicise or reaffirm inclusivity within their parties. 
 
 
4.2 COALITION PARTY OF BARISAN NASIONAL AND PAKATAN 
RAKYAT 
According to Huckshorn (1984), a political party is defined as "an autonomous group of 
citizens having the purpose of making nominations and contesting elections, in the hope 
of gaining control over governmental power through the captures of public offices and 
the organisation of a government". With the hope of winning an election, different types 
of political party systems may affect the outcome of electoral results. Depending on the 
political landscape of a nation, it is common for political parties to operate on their own 
without political cooperation or alliance with any other political parties, yet are able to 
gain electoral success. This can be seen in the case of the United States, where 
Republicans and Democrats work independently in the two-party-system (Vile, 2007). 
Another contrasting example is found in Hong Kong, where there are multiple small 
political parties functioning and winning legislative seats. These small parties will 
generally identify themselves on two main fronts, namely the pro-Beijing camp and the 
anti-Beijing camp (Li, 2011). Another example can be found in Singapore, where 
multiple political parties exist but only one political party (the all-time ruling party, 
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People's Action Party) is formidable leaving the remaining parties barely able to succeed 
(Mauzy & Milne, 2002). In the United Kingdom and Australia, political parties generally 
work alone. However, when the need arises, especially when there is no single political 
party that achieves a simple majority in the House of Commons, a coalition government 
may be formed with other political parties. 
 In the case of Malaysia, the 'old politics' of Malaysia falls into a category similar 
to Singapore. Although there are many existing political parties in Malaysia (and quite a 
number of them are able to win legislative seats, although the number of seats may not be 
large), only one political party is strong enough to form a government on their own 
electoral success (Chin, 2011). Each of the opposition parties sometimes works on their 
own and sometimes in a coalition (or on a cooperation) basis. However, none of these 
really pose a threat to the ruling regime (with the exception of the 1969 General Election, 
prior to the formation of BN and still under the ruling of BN's predecessor, Parti 
Perikatan). This is because the coalitions are unable to convince people of their ability to 
serve as an alternative choice of government. Furthermore, the 'old politics' of ethnicity 
has a strong influence on the whole political system, making it difficult to negate the 
position of BN’s component parties, namely UMNO, MCA and MIC as the representative 
of Malays, Chinese and Indians, respectively. This is where ethnicity comes into play. 
Unlike the few examples above, Malaysian politics is not based purely on ability but also 
on their ability to convince people they are inclusive for all ethnic groups in Malaysia. As 
main political parties are generally ethnic-based or single-ethnic-dominated, in 'old 
politics', to show the inclusivity of their parties, a coalition party is the way to go. 
However, in 'new politics', most of the political parties seem to push for inclusivity on 
their own instead of relying fully on a coalition party formula. This is also an interest of 
this chapter, namely how these political parties de-ethnicised themselves without 
abandoning a coalition party system. 
  
 With the latest political developments, the coalition formed by the opposition 
seems to be more structured than before, at least with the formal cooperation of Pakatan 
Rakyat's government in certain states. This kind of political coalition is not uncommon. 
According to Riker (1962), pure rationalists are willing to enter into such coalition 
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arrangements to gain governmental office, provided the gain is higher than the cost that 
each individual political party has to pay for such a coalition. This is because in a 
coalition system each individual party may need to compromise some of their principles 
to make accommodation for the general good within the coalition. For instance, if a 
component party is too extreme in championing for their community’s rights or material 
goods, to the extent that they take the share of another community, the component party 
representing the side-lined segment might face political backlash from their community. 
This not only harms the image of the overall coalition party but also risks political 
rejection by other communities. This is how coalition parties work in Malaysia, making 
them appear inclusive while making it accommodating to all ethnic groups. The 
difference between coalition parties in Malaysia is to what extent their component parties 
differ from each other (Riker, 1962). Should the component parties have a very similar 
stance, the degree of compromise will be reduced and the loss caused by such a coalition 
to the individual party is minimal. Such scenarios may represent a good deal. However, 
there are also instances where, although component parties have a commonality among 
them, there are also many differences that exist at the same time. Worse still, these 
differences can be contradictory. In such scenarios, risk calculations will be based on 
whether the gain or loss is higher, and whether it is worth joining such a coalition that 
may affect its original core support. For Bartolini (2005), the coalition potential will link 
to the governmental potential and how the individual parties can work (in the perspective 
of leading or merely following) together. Therefore, apart from the calculation in the 
'process' of gaining office, the following actions of gaining office will also impact the 
individual party within the coalition. Due to this, it is not surprising that a coalition party 
can help an individual party gain more, but should the compromise be too large to the 
extent of losing its own ends, then it is a bad coalition for that particular coalition. Such 
scenarios used to occur in Malaysia, with one of the best examples happening to DAP 
during the 1999 General Election, where two DAP heavyweights, Karpal Singh and Lim 
Kit Siang, lost their respective parliamentary seats due to the cooperation with PAS at 
that time (during that time, PAS had not given up on the issue of forming an Islamic 
state). This is the first time that Lim Kit Siang had lost a parliamentary seat and what was 
worse was that it was in Penang, one of DAP’s strongholds. However, such scenarios 
changed drastically when a new coalition of Pakatan Rakyat was formed (with a similar 
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composition to the previous coalition party) and the results seemed to work well, at least 
for DAP, which has increased its winning seats dramatically. 
  
 Narrowing it down to Malaysian politics in coalition partnerships, at present, 
Malaysian politics is dominated by two main political coalitions, which are the coalition 
party of BN and the coalition party of PR, as mentioned above. I argue that both 
coalitions are considered the same, although there are some political arguments that these 
two are not the same due to technicalities. One of the clearest differences between these 
two parties is that BN is a coalition party registered with the Registrar of Society as per 
the Societies Act 1966, while PR is an informal coalition party declared on its own. 
Although this may seem to have nothing to do with ethnicity, which is the focus of this 
paper, official recognition and registration is important during an election, especially a 
by-election. This is because the Election Commission has disallowed the use of non-
contesting party's flags to fly (Bernama, 2010). Therefore, as BN is a registered coalition 
party, they will be using the BN banner during the election. PR, due to its position as a 
non-registered coalition party, will use its own party's banner to campaign during the by-
election. It means that should a by-election involve UMNO and PAS, UMNO and its 
component parties can use the BN logo without any issue as it is their official registration 
for electoral purposes. Unlike PAS and other opposition parties, they can only display 
PAS symbol because PAS is the contesting party. DAP and PKR are seen to be outsiders 
by officials and have nothing to do with such a by-election. Therefore, they have no right 
to display their own party symbols. In ‘old politics’, where the political scenario placed a 
heavy emphasis on ethnicity and the ‘identity’ of the party, this will harm the chances of 
PAS winning in Chinese areas. The same would happen to DAP in Malay areas should 
they contest. Furthermore, the affiliation level may be different for PR component parties 
as those supporters of a particular component party in PR may have to vote for another 
component party should their supporting party not contest rather than casting their vote 
directly for PR. Unlike BN, the supporters of UMNO, for instance, are voting directly for 




 The second difference between BN and PR is that BN is a coalition comprised of 
ethnic-based parties (Gomez, 2007) – I refer only to the main component parties in 
Peninsular Malaysia, which are UMNO, MCA and MIC, although other smaller 
component parties are technically a ‘multi-ethnic’ party –, while PR is a coalition of PKR, 
DAP and PAS (in which PKR is the most ‘genuine’ multi-ethnic party, while DAP and 
PAS are technically ‘multi-ethnic’ parties dominated by Chinese and Malays respectively) 
(Selway, 2015). The difference between an ethnic-based component party and a multi-
ethnic component party is that for an ethnic-based component party, the burden of 
shouldering the issues of other ethnic groups that are not their own is lesser than that of a 
multi-ethnic party. For instance, if Malay voters were to seek help with Malay-related 
issues from MCA, MCA could pass the issue to UMNO if it wished to do so as it is 
clearly a Chinese party (although the latter part of this thesis will touch on how MCA is 
beginning to engage with non-Chinese groups), but if the same issue were to happen to 
DAP, it would be unavoidable and they would have to engage with the issue directly as it 
is a multi-ethnic party. As per UMNO 2, the working mode within BN is such that each 
ethnic-based component party will take charge of their own community issues when 
asked how UMNO, as a Malay-based party, is going to win votes from the non-Malay 
community: 
  
 "We have to work with our partners. Because we based on the partnership... Inilah 
 falsafah dari dulu (translated as ‘this is our philosophy since before’)" (UMNO 2) 
 
 UMNO 1 and UMNO 3 are also supporting such a view when they see BN as a 
multi-ethnic party, even though its component parties are ethnic-based. 
 
 "Barisan Nasional, pelbagai kaum, walaupun parti setiap satu mewakili etnik, 
 tetapi  kita pergi ke pilihan raya atas nama Barisan Nasional yang mewakili 




 Translated as: 
 
"Barisan Nasional, multi-ethnic, although each party is representing an ethnicity, 
but we go to election under the name of Barisan Nasional, which represents multi-
ethnic within  it." (UMNO 1) 
 
"... Of course, the principle of the party is to fight for the Malays, for the Malay 
cause, for Islam, but all along it has been UMNO working with other component 
parties, Barisan Nasional, which also serves interest of other community as well." 
(UMNO 3) 
  
 Another point to be noted between BN and PR is the organisational structure of 
each coalition party. BN, as a registered coalition, must have a clear organisational 
structure for its coalition party. Although Article 8.3 in the constitution for BN states that 
the chairman and his deputy should be chosen by the members of Dewan Tertinggi (the 
Supreme Council, the highest body within BN), most of the positions are dominated by 
equivalent UMNO leaders, for instance, the position of chairman, deputy chairman, 
secretary general, treasurer general, youth chief, women’s chief and executive secretary. 
This is because UMNO is the core of BN. 
 
"Kerana ia merupakan tonggak kepada Barisan Nasional... Tetapi pada masa yang 
sama, Barisan Nasional terus dikuatkan kerana Pengerusi BN ialah  Presiden 
UMNO, Presiden UMNO ialah Pengerusi BN..." (UMNO 1) 
  




 "Because it is the core for Barisan Nasional... But at the same time, Barisan 
 Nasional continues to be strengthened because the chairman of BN is president of 
 UMNO, president of UMNO is chairman of BN..." (UMNO 1). 
  
 As PR is not a registered coalition party, they would not need to formally set up 
an official organisational structure, even though they do have a Pakatan Rakyat 
Presidential Council. As a result, as found from fieldwork interviews, most candidates are 
accusing their political rivals from a negative angle. PR leaders prefer to call UMNO, 
MCA and MIC ethnic-based parties rather than looking at the overall structure of BN, 
which is more multi-ethnic in the sense that combining component parties will result in a 
multi-ethnic membership. At the same time, the BN leader is keen to view PR component 
parties as ethnic-based parties too, looking at the dominant groups of each party instead 
of accepting that they are gradually changing. Most of the candidates prefer to see 
themselves through a ‘non-ethnicity’ lens, as the term ‘multi-ethnic’ or ‘non-ethnicity’ 
seem to have a more positive connotation, parallel to the usage of the term ‘democracy’ 
in some of the least democratic countries, such as the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea (North Korea) and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), where the 
term ‘democracy’ has a more positive connotation. 
 
However, I argue that such differences may not be large or have a significant 
impact, although I do not deny that some of these differences may cause problems. This 
is because that even though these differences may be obvious at a paperwork level, in 
practice it does not always hold true, for instance, the restriction placed on a party flying 
their own flag when their component partners are contesting in a by-election. Even when 
restricted, their flags can often be seen during nomination and campaign periods. One of 
the main purposes of flying these symbols and logos is to show that the party is 
supporting their partner. As previously discussed, the bond between the supporters of a 
political party and the party's symbol may inherit that affection. For example, people may 
be keen to call their party 'Rocket' (their symbol) rather than DAP. These symbols may 
ignite the emotion of their supporters to a higher level of support. Although it may be 
removed by the Election Commission during the campaign period, the intended messages 
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have already been delivered. The effect of these physical symbols may not be very useful 
anymore. Apart from this, although PR does not have as structured an organisation as BN, 
they do have a de facto leader in Anwar Ibrahim. Should they win federal power, Anwar 
Ibrahim will be the prime minister. From here, we can see that one of the most important 
figures in an organisation is the highest leader. As there has been a consensus among PR 
component parties on this, there should not be any problem. Due to these reasons, I argue 
that BN and PR can be considered as the 'same' coalition party without many practical 
differences in that regard. 
This writing will further explore individual component parties, namely UMNO, 
MCA, PKR, DAP and PAS, on a more specific level of their party membership, 
organisational structure and internal politics, and whether such discussion reflects on the 
ethnicity issue within the party. 
  
 
4.3 INDIVIDUAL POLITICAL PARTIES 
Each individual party has their own constitution and membership forming the prerequisite 
for a political party. Modern political parties are keen to have a large pool of membership 
for various reasons, including the dissemination of their party propaganda to a wider 
scope of people (Scarrow, 1991). With a large group of members, any problems regarding 
manpower is eased. As a political party, aside from the issue of manpower, parties also 
hope that their members can help to run and finance the party, recruit new members, have 
their voices heard within the party (and governmental policies) and have them anchored 
within civil society (Ware, 1996). This is because not all parties have self-generated 
income and so support from its members is crucial. However, having a large membership 
does not automatically translate into votes. For example, the Free Democratic Party in 
Germany does not have a large membership but it does have a significant share of the 
vote during election, and at the same time, it also has influence in national and land 
government (Poguntke & Boll, 1992). Although such examples can nullify the above 
premise, most of the political parties are still keen to have more members due to the 
benefits that overwhelm the negatives. Another example from a Dutch political party is 
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the Dutch Labour Party, with 80 per cent of its operational costs coming from its 
membership fees. This has shown how important it is to some political parties, if not all. 
 
In Malaysia, the generic argument on what a political party is and how a political 
party should perform do still stand. However, there is one element which is crucial and 
requires attention: ethnicity. Although the role of ethnicity in 'new politics' does not seem 
to be as important as in 'old politics', since the formation of a substantive number of 
political parties were formed during the 'old politics' era, the element of ethnicity cannot 
be erased. There are political parties which explicitly portray the core struggle of their 
parties. These can be referred to as UMNO, MCA and PAS. These three parties are 
generally acceptable as ethnic-based parties (except for PAS; some will call it an Islamic 
party but due to the nature of its Malaysian background most of the Muslim are Malays). 
These can be viewed through their party constitution, party memberships and party office 
bearer. Even the name of the party gives the nature of the party. For this type of political 
party, not a great deal of ambiguity arises. 
 
Another type of political party is the non-ethnic-based (multi-ethnic) party. Such 
parties are interesting in Malaysia. Parties such as PKR, which declares itself as a non-
ethnic party and indeed, the party composition in terms of membership and office bearer 
are mixed, include multi-ethnic groups within the party. This does not cause many 
contentious issues. But for other parties, such as DAP, PGRM (Malaysian People's 
Movement Party, briefly discussed in an earlier chapter) and PPP (People's Progressive 
Party due to their small size, not previously discussed), these parties claim to be multi-
ethnic and state as much in their party constitution. However, these parties are dominated 
by a particular ethnic group, i.e. DAP and PGRM are dominated by the Chinese while 
PPP is dominated by Indians. 
 
With the above examples, we can see that in the discussion of the nature of a 
political party, especially in terms of the party membership, it is crucial to examine two 
things. First is to look at their constitution. Their constitution defines who is eligible to be 
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a member and thereby determines the party characteristic in terms of being ethnic-based 
or non-ethnic based. Even if a party’s constitution mentions that it should perform as a 
multi-ethnic party, in reality, it is not always necessarily so. This leads on to the second 
issue to be explored, namely the actual composition of the party. These two elements of 
constitution and actual composition will be discussed in depth below for each political 
party. 
 
However, the characteristic of a political party in Malaysia, whether it be ethnic-
based or non-ethnic based, does not stop there; it carries some symbolic sentiments within 
it. As discussed in the Background chapter, at the time when 'old politics' flourished, the 
ethnicity of the political party and the politicians meant a great deal to voters. The 
ethnicity of a candidate and the ‘ethnicity’ of the political parties can either attract or 
reject voters. For example, in the past when DAP was not working with PAS, Chinese 
supporters of DAP were sceptical about PAS while PAS Malay supporters had a 'fear 
feeling' towards DAP. Such a scenario has been discussed in the Background chapter and 
is not uncommon. However, in the era of 'new politics', this phenomenon has seemingly 
changed. In the opposition coalition of PR, Malay and Chinese voters feel less insecure 
with DAP and PAS respectively. Aside from the factor of them working together, these 
parties did make changes to their parties, which will be discussed in depth below. 
Likewise, for other parties such as UMNO and MCA, changes have been made or are 
trying to be made to reposition themselves in the wave of de-ethnicisation. Therefore, in 
this chapter, I will explore what these political parties do to face the trend of de-
ethnicisation of politics in Malaysia in terms of their membership structure. This section 
explores how each political party deals with their membership structure, whether it flows 
with de-ethnicisation or remains with ethnic-based politics. 
 
4.3.1 UMNO 
UMNO is regarded as a Malay-based party due to its restriction of memberships. 
According to Clause 4.2 in UMNO’s constitution, "Ahli Biasa ialah warganegara 
Malaysia yang berbangsa Melayu atau Bumiputera yang berusia 18 tahun keatas" which 
124 
 
is translated as, "An Ordinary Member is a Malaysian citizen of Malay descent or Son of 
the Soil, who is aged 18 and above". ‘Son of the Soil’ refers to the aborigines of Malaysia. 
Although Malaysia is a multi-ethnic country, aborigines in Malaysia are enjoying certain 
special privileges over other ethnicities (Syed Husin Ali, 2008). Malay is one of the 
ethnic groups defined as aborigines (mainly in the Peninsular of Malaysia, the 
geographical research location), while the remainder are mainly other ethnic groups in 
Sabah and Sarawak (Syed Husin Ali, 2008). Even for the ethnic groups of Malay, Article 
160 of the federal constitution defines what constitutes a Malay. There are four criteria 
that must be met, of which the first three are: a person must be a Muslim, they must speak 
the Malay language and they must practise the Malay culture. For the fourth criteria, there 
are two options: first, they must be a person who is born during independence in the 
Federation or in Singapore, or they must be a person who is born before independence, 
with his father or mother born in the Federation or in Singapore, or in Independence Day 
domiciles in the Federation or in Singapore. The second option for this criterion is being 
an offspring of such a person. Therefore, all members of UMNO must be Malays per 
UMNO constitution and have such characteristics as defined in the Federation 
constitution of Malaysia. 
  
 The above has explained how to qualify as an Ordinary Member for UMNO. A 
second type of membership for UMNO is by becoming an Associate Member. Clause 4.3 
of UMNO’s constitution explains what an Associate Member should be: 
  
 "sebuah pertubuhan politik yang bersetuju berkerjasama dengan UMNO dan 
 menerima syarat-syarat yang ditetapkan oleh Majlis Tertinggi." 
  
 Translated as: 
  
 "a political body which agrees to cooperate with UMNO and accept conditions set 




 This clause, however, is silent on the ethnicity of the members of the political 
body (Associate Member). For example, KIMMA (Parti Kongres India Muslim Malaysia 
or Malaysian Indian Muslim Congress) has been admitted as an Associate Member of 
UMNO in 2010 (UMNO Online, 2010). Its name shows the identity of the membership 
should consist of Indian Muslims. However, Muslims by birth (from a non-Malay ethnic 
group) or converted Muslims in Malaysia may be facing slight identity dilemmas as this 
group are often seen as Malay, although technically they are not. Such technicality is 
important procedurally as the definition of a person’s identity could determine whether he 
or she can be admitted as an Ordinary Member and thereby hold a position within the 
party. However, in reality, such an identity definition for an Indian Muslim does not 
cause much trouble to UMNO as a whole. This is because firstly, it has been the norm 
that a small number of persons with such identities can be admitted, just as any other 
Malays. Secondly, there is not much noise on the issue and so does not require further 
clarification. Therefore, it is not surprising that a small number of people can assimilate 
themselves into another ethnic group and be admitted into UMNO. Even so, due to the 
small number of such persons, this research does not intend to discuss it in depth. 
 
 As UMNO is a Malay-based party, all office bearers will consist of Malays only. 
Even the slightly controversial Associate Member of KIMMA are only invited as 
observers and not decision-makers, nor do they have voting rights. Like it or not, 
candidates who contest in UMNO elections will have to face fully Malay voters. Winning 
in the party election is crucial to being appointed to a government office. Although this is 
not a must, and it used to be that a losing candidate was appointed to the government 
while a winning candidate was left out, an appointment to government was the 
prerogative of the prime minister. But those elected to the Supreme Council will certainly 
have the upper hand compared to those who are not on an equal playing field. 
Conventionally, the president of UMNO assumes the office of chairman of BN and 




 "... Pengerusi BN ialah Presiden UMNO. Presiden UMNO ialah Pengerusi BN..." 
 (UMNO 1) 
 
 Translated as: 
 
 "... Chairman of BN is President of UMNO. President of UMNO is Chairman of 
 BN". (UMNO 1) 
 
 Therefore, within UMNO itself, it is not surprising that ethnic issues, especially 
those favourable to Malays, are often being played up. The ethnic tone has been kept low-
key in recent years due to the negative effect on BN, especially during an election. This is 
because when UMNO overplayed the ethnicity card, its component partners found it 
difficult to prove to their respective voters that they were of equal status to UMNO, 
thereby causing non-UMNO component parties to lose and lose badly. In short, UMNO is 
ruled by Malays alone. Anything related to other ethnic groups will enter this paper when 
we talk about BN’s level as described above. The response by UMNO 3 above 
summarises the position of UMNO as an ethnic-based party, but attention should also be 
paid to the fact that BN is a multi-ethnic coalition. Moderation is the way to go: 
 
"... It is an ethnic-based party, yes, it is favourable, it is solidarity, ethnic solidarity 
is still there, and we can deliver votes, but not to the extreme. You have to 
manage. You have to see Barisan Nasional as a multi-ethnic coalition. If this 
ethnic sentiment become too strong, whether it is Malayness, or Chinese, 
whatever, it is not good." (UMNO 3) 
 
4.3.2 MCA 
MCA is the second most senior member within BN in the Peninsular of Malaysia, in 
terms of the formation date of the political cooperation with UMNO, leading to the 
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formation of an alliance party (predecessor to BN) and BN, the size of membership, the 
number of seats contested, the number of government offices and so on. Similarly to 
UMNO, by its very name, MCA can be understood to be a Chinese-based party. Its 
membership is only open to Chinese ethnic groups as stated in MCA constitution, Part III, 
Clause 9.1, which states that for a person to qualify as a member of MCA, "He is a 
Malaysian citizen of Chinese descent". Although technically, Clause 7 states the three 
types of membership for MCA, namely Ordinary Member, Life Member and Honorary 
Member, these are quite similar to one another when discussed with an ethnicity 
perspective. The only difference between an Ordinary Member and a Life Member is the 
membership fee, with an Honorary Member being essentially an Ordinary or Life 
Member appreciated for his/her contribution. The real difference comes with an Affiliate 
Member, which is just a suggestion and has not been formally executed. The deputy 
president of MCA sees that although it is a Chinese-based party, it is also crucial to 
engage with other communities to balance views within the party: 
 
 "In time to come, we may have to consider affiliate members, associate members 
 to engage with non-Chinese group so that we have a balanced view within the 
 party." (MCA 1) 
  
 If the proposal of affiliate members could be executed, MCA could expand its 
outreach in line with the trend of including all communities instead of only the Chinese. 
However, at this time, we may or may not see MCA as serving all the communities of 
Malaysia, which is going to be discussed in the next chapter, but in terms of membership 
per se, membership in MCA is even more exclusive than in UMNO, as UMNO has its 
associate members. For MCA 3, MCA is not a party that serves only the Chinese 
community but all communities in Malaysia. MCA membership is as such by default 
rather than by design due to historical events: 
  
 "First of all, you have to understand MCA party's constitution. Except the 
 membership is only open for Chinese, all the other political struggles are for all 
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 Malaysians. The party membership for Chinese is historical events, that is cannot 
 changed, not that we cannot change in the future, but it has been there because of 
 historical events." (MCA 3) 
  
 In terms of the organisational structure of MCA, its argument is very similar to 
that of UMNO. MCA, as a wholly Chinese members’ party, will have a wholly Chinese 
leadership as well. This means that in an MCA party election, in order to win, a 
candidate's target group will be Chinese (members) voters. Winning in such an election is 
crucial in obtaining appointment to government offices. Again, it is not absolute as only 
the prime minister has absolute power, but traditionally, those in the top positions 
definitely have a better chance of being appointed. However, the ethnicity card is not 
being played as strongly in MCA as in UMNO. One quote from UMNO 2 on DAP fits in 
nicely here as well: 
  
 "Sebab for Chinese, apa yang dia nak pertahankan racist? Dia fight for equality..." 
 (UMNO 2) 
  
 Translated as: 
 
"Because for Chinese, why does he want to protect racists? He fights for 
equality." (UMNO 2) 
  
 UMNO 2 are trying to say there are differences between Malays and Chinese. 
Unlike Malays and UMNO, the Chinese can fight for their privileged position. Therefore, 
to fight for their special privileges accorded to them by the constitution, UMNO plays a 
role as it is a Malay-based party. Sometimes, due to the nature of the subject, UMNO 
would have to take an ethnically inclined route, but it will be a different case for the 
Chinese. As the Chinese do not have special privileges to begin with, there is no reason 
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for them to protect the racist Chinese, as becoming more racist would not help the 
Chinese community to gain. The Chinese would fight for equality to be on a par with the 
Malays. In other words, what the Malays are getting, the Chinese should get too. It 
indirectly implies the abolition of special privileges for Malays or that special privileges 
be accorded to all. Although the quotation above may not be understandable by the words 
alone, that is how the role of observation and interpretation works, as discussed in the 
Methods chapter. UMNO 2 is trying to describe the differences between UMNO and 
MCA in his own understanding. 
 
However, this does not mean that MCA candidates or members could not fight for 
better Chinese welfare, playing more ethnic outbidding, playing the ethnicity card and so 
on. However, this is not the case in recent years where focus has been on universal values 
rather than tied to ethnicity. This is evident in the presidential speech given during the 
MCA General Assembly where no part of the speech touched on Chinese ethnicity. 
Therefore, the ethnicity card does not seem to work within the Chinese community. If the 
ethnicity card is so useful, then the Chinese community would not vote against MCA and 
leave a weak MCA with UMNO: 
  
 "I am talking about, when Chinese are angry towards UMNO, Barisan Nasional, 
 what they can do is to vote out Barisan Nasional, but not UMNO,because majority 
 of them do not vote in UMNO's seat. They can only vote in MCA areas." (MCA 3) 
  
 Therefore, in summary, for MCA, technically everything begins with membership, 
leadership and organisational structure being wholly in the hands of the Chinese. 
Nevertheless, the next chapter will discuss how MCA has repositioned itself and reached 







Among all the main political parties in Malaysia, PKR is one of the most ‘genuine’ multi-
ethnic or non-ethnic political parties. Comparatively, it has the most diverse membership 
and leadership compared to other political parties which are dominated by a particular 
ethnic group, be it an ethnic-based party or a multi-ethnic-based party, a fact that is 
scarcely denied as these arguments can easily be substantiated by statistics. Unlike most 
of the main competitive political parties in Malaysia, PKR is a relatively new party, aged 
only about 16 years: "Keadilan has been for 16 years promoting multiracial politics." 
(PKR 3) 
  
 One of the most interesting issues is that the figure who sparked the formation of 
PKN and the development of PKR, Anwar Ibrahim, has never taken part in a PKR 
internal election. Officially, he has no legal position within PKR. However, people from 
all walks of life, be they politicians from both fronts, the media, civil society and so on, 
especially within the party itself, regard him as the de facto leader, the supreme leader or 
adviser for PKR, to name just a few of the usual titles accorded him. He was the 
opposition leader in Parliament, a position legally recognised, before being jailed on 
charges of sodomy, an incident that is being disputed by various organisations, groups 
and individuals. Another interesting fact regarding PKR is that in the 2013 General 
Election, it was the only party in Malaysia to have at least one elected representative, be 
that either a Member of Parliament or a State Assemblyman, in every state in Malaysia 
(Keadilan Rakat, 2015). 
  
 As a multi-ethnic or non-ethnic party, as claimed by some of its leaders (for the 
moment, I will use the general term ‘multi-ethnic’ to refer to PKR while the in-depth 
discussion on the actual terms will be explored in the next chapter), PKR has a diverse 
membership. This is due to no restrictions being placed on a person becoming a member 




 "Mana-mana warganegara Malaysia yang berusia lapan belas (18) tahun ke atas 
 adalah layak menjadi Anggota Biasa." 
  
 Translated as: 
  
 "Any Malaysian citizen aged 18 and above is qualified to be an ordinary 
 member." 
  
 Due to this, approximate membership statistics provided by both PKR 1 and PKR 
2 are as follows: 
  
 "Malay constitutes about 50% Indian is the next largest which is 26%, 20 lah 20% 
 (local accent). Then Chinese is about 18% and the balance is basically Sabah 
 and Sarawak" (PKR 1), 
 
 "PKR only have 55% Malays. I don't count Sabah Sarawak as Malays... Chinese 
is small, about 10%, but we have a lot of Sabah Sarawak, we have a lot of Indians, we 
have about 20% Indians. But it is not a problem, we don't care about the ethnic 
background of anyone. The whole point about non-racial politics are those things  are 
irrelevant..." (PKR 2). 
 
 Although there is some mismatch between both sets of data, it is not a major 
problem. As ethnicity is never an issue within PKR, less attention is paid towards these 
specific statistics. However, both leaders agree that Malays represent the largest 
percentage of membership (over 50 per cent), followed by Indians and lastly, Chinese, 
excluding those from Sabah and Sarawak. The actual ranking for the Malaysian 
population has Malay as the majority ethnic group, followed by Chinese and lastly, 
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Indians (referring to the Peninsular of Malaysia only as the research is limited to that 
area). 
Unlike UMNO and MCA, where their leadership line-up is only by a single ethnic 
group due to their membership restriction, the leadership’s position in PKR regarding 
ethnicity is flexible, because as a diverse party, anyone from any ethnic group has the 
possibility of occupying any position. Following the 2014 party election, the positions of 
president (won uncontested) and deputy president (contested only by Malay candidates) 
are held by Malay leaders. For the four slots of the vice-presidency, which is contested by 
14 candidates, three are Malays while the fourth is Chinese. The positions of chief and 
deputy chief for both the youth and women’s wings are also from the Malay ethnic group. 
However, for the 20 Central Committee seats, the composition is rather more balanced 
with the elected members consisting of Malays, Indians, Chinese and those from East 
Malaysia. Although at first glance, the leadership seems to favour Malays, a few of the 
informants do not regard that as an issue with ethnicity: 
 
 "... There is no ethnic issue. If there is ethnic issue, we must well put Chinese, 
 three out of six must be Chinese... If you cannot win, cannot win la... As I said, 
 election has nothing to do with ethnicity. Even if there is no Chinese in the top, so 
 what, it doesn't say anything..." (PKR 2), 
  
 "PKR has never had anything to do with ethnicity" (PKR 1). 
  
 At the same time, the appointed members, such as for the position of another three 
vice-president, secretary general, treasurer general, information chief and chief 
coordinating secretary are coming from various ethnicities, including those from East 
Malaysia. In summary, although PKR seems to have more Malay leaders in its 
organisational structure than any other ethnic group, firstly, this could not be viewed 
directly through an ethnicity lens as explained by the two leaders above and secondly, 
even if people wanted to view it in such a way, PKR has also managed to show that non-
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Malays are capable of being elected to the central committee, especially in the 20 Central 
Committee Members’ seats. 
  
4.3.4 DAP 
DAP is technically a multi-ethnic party, as defined by its constitution in Clause III(2): 
"Any person of not less than 17 years of age and is a federal citizen who subscribes to the 
conditions of membership and is not a member of any political party or organisation 
ancillary or subsidiary thereto, whose aims and policies are incompatible with the aims 
and policies of the party, may become a member of the party". However, this technical 
eligibility does not translate into proportionate diverse membership as the party is heavily 
dominated by the Chinese ethnic group, be it as an ordinary member or as an organisation 
leader. This is mostly due to the historical background of DAP itself, as portrayed by two 
of the informants below: 
  
 "DAP is a party that opens membership to everyone. But, of course, we have a 
 situation of, maybe about 80 over percent being of ethnic Chinese. That is by 
 design rather than by default. This is due to the history of DAP" (DAP 3). 
 
"Your background, you start from Chinese-based, or on urban based, and of 
course along the way you contest in urban areas, Chinese majority areas. It is very 
natural that your membership, your leadership and all that will be Chinese-based 
or non-Malay based. (DAP 2) 
  
 Previously, while BN still holds hegemonic influence, it is not easy for people to 
vote for opposition parties, let alone the Chinese. Therefore, DAP could barely survive, 
but at least have a better chance of survival, in the urban Chinese seats. Therefore, DAP 2 
above is correct in his opinion on the nature of Chinese-based membership, even though 




 However, the scenario after the 2008 General Election was different because 
opposition parties managed to break through and break a few records, something which 
had never been achieved by opposition parties before, i.e. having such a ‘huge’ 
(comparatively) victory. DAP would also be able to attract Malays to their cause; 
although this is not easy, it is no longer impossible. Efforts have been made to expand the 
membership, especially towards the less dominant group in DAP, the Malays. Although 
at the branch level a few are comprised of a Malay majority, including pure Malays, 
branches managed to be set up, but unfortunately, this does not last long due to the 
quality and intention of joining DAP. 
 
“... I still remember after 2008, they were... my colleague, YB Teresa Kok, who 
formed a couple of all Malay branches. She was so happy, so excited, but the two 
branches disbanded quite soon, for the simple reason that she cannot meet their 
demand. They used to be UMNO people. Every time, from early of the year to 
end of the year, asking for money, all kind of things la.” (DAP 1) 
 
"...We actually have Malay branch... Malay members, some pure Malay members 
branch, but we also try not to encourage that much... They keep asking you for 
money... We will but we don't want to end up like PKR. Whenever come to 
election and by-election time, all these branches announce that they pull out and 
join BN, join UMNO. That is why we are a bit cautious, a bit slow, in forming 
pure Malay branches...” (DAP 2) 
  
 Such descriptions as provided by the two leaders above have shown they have 
recruited the wrong group, as the quality of these kinds of members are not truly 
subscribed to their political struggle but to monetary gain instead, an issue which DAP 
can hardly satisfy due to the low monetary facilities within the party itself. This has fitted 
nicely into the response below, where it is claimed that quality should always supersede 
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quantity. New members recruited should be the ones who are subscribed to the political 
ideology of the party instead of recruiting members just for the sake of increasing 
statistics. 
  
 “... So you don't want to attract the wrong member as well in the sense that they 
 join because they get kicked out from other party or they really hate the party or 
 whatever. We want those that really subscribe to your ideas that is why we also 
 have this training session called Sekolah Demokrasi, specifically targeted to 
 Malay speaking youth. And it is a political introduction programme where we 
 explain to them what democracy is, is not so much about party but we explain 
 what democracy is, what are the different political ideologies, and if they find that, 
 after explaining, they can understand social democracy as an ideology, they can 
 understand what DAP is trying to do and if they are genuinely interested in the 
 party and they join, that is what we want” (DAP 3). 
  
 As for the leadership, the voting system in DAP is slightly different from the other 
parties. Central committee members for other political parties are voted by the delegates 
at the division level, which means that to be eligible to vote, a member must first get 
elected at the branch level as delegate to the division level, and at division level, he/she 
again needs to be elected as delegate to the central level before he/she can vote. This 
means that to be eligible to vote for a Central Committee member, members from other 
political parties would need to be elected twice: once at branch level and another at 
division level. However, for DAP, as all Ordinary Members are eligible to attend branch 
level elections, a member only needs to win enough support at the branch level to be 
promoted as Central Committee delegates. This shows that if a branch is comprised of 
pure Malays, there will definitely be Malay delegates at the central level. 
  
 Such a system demonstrates that the ethnicity of central level delegates can be 
diverse by default, but the Malay Member of Parliament from DAP would prefer not to 
analyse it in that dimension. He argues that ethnicity does not play a role there; it is 
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mainly due to the profile of the candidate himself. The issue is due to the unknown figure 
of newcomers. 
 
"At the same abut 60-70 candidates for 20 posts. But only how many Malays? 
Even those how many Malays, they are not very well known. The problem 
actually is not so much about race, but the problem is that, you have only 20 seats 
for election. And out of the 20, you can easily count 10-15 who you will say are 
permanent one, in the sense that they are well known, they are established, so you 
know that definitely, people are going to vote for them. So, in actual fact, the 
really slots up for grab, is only about 5-8. So it is difficult for newcomers, actually 
the problem is difficult for newcomers to get in, more than it is difficult because 
of ethnic group." (DAP Malay Member of Parliament)   
  
  In summary, for DAP, the technical understanding of DAP may be different from 
the practical side. Technically, they are a multi-ethnic party, but the reality shows it to be 
otherwise. However, at the same time, such a composition of DAP may not be due to 
ethnicity itself but rather the reluctance of the non-dominant group in DAP, particularly 
Malays, to join the party, even though their political ideology is moving towards non-
ethnicised (which will be elaborated upon in depth in the next chapter). 
 
4.3.5 PAS 
PAS is the second largest party in the Peninsular of Malaysia in terms of party 
membership, standing at 1.008 million members. 
 "PAS sudah capai ahli 1 juta 8 ribu orang di seluruh negara...” (PAS 1) 
 




 "PAS has achieved membership of one million and eight thousand for the whole 
 nation...” (PAS 1) 
 
 PAS is not an ethnicity-driven party but a religion-based party. The interesting 
aspect regarding the relationship between Malay and Islam in Malaysia is that Malays 
must profess to be of the Islamic religion. Therefore, a Malay ethnic group is a subset for 
the Islamic religion in Malaysia. As PAS is a religion-based party, it is not surprising that 
they will set a restriction on membership. According to clauses 11(1)&(2)&(3) in the 
PAS constitution, a member must be a warganegara Malaysian (Malaysian citizens), 
Beragama Islam (profess Islamic religion) and Aqil Baligh menurut Hukum Syara 
(puberty according to Islamic Law). Its membership does not touch upon ethnicity at all, 
as PAS does not see ethnicity as an issue. To take this a step further, its president believes 
they have, in fact, broken down the wall that separates different ethnic groups and 
religions. This too has helped the party gain support from the non-Muslim community. 
To date, PAS Supporters' Club now has 20,000 members. 
 
 "Kita berjaya memecahkan tembok yang memisahkan kaum dan agama... Bukan 
 Islam yang menjadi penyokong PAS dan bersedia menjadi ahli PAS, kita 
 menubuhkan  sayap Dewan Perhimpunan Penyokong. "(PAS 1) 
 
 Translated as: 
 
 "We managed to break the wall which separates ethnic and religion... Non-
 Muslim who used to be PAS supporters are ready to be PAS member, we form 
 PAS Supporters' Club." (PAS 1) 
 
"Kita telah berjaya mendapat sokongan daripada orang bukan Islam, Dewan 
Himpunan yang bersedia menerima undang-undang Hudud... Lebih kurang 20,000 
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ahli Dewan Himpunan. 20,000 mewakili semua kaum, Cina, India Kadazan, Iban. 
Mereka berada di tiap-tiap wilayah, tiap-tiap negeri dan daerah.” (PAS 1) 
  
 Translated as: 
  
 "We managed to get support from the non-Muslim, PAS Supporter's Club ready 
 to accept the Hudud Law... About 20, 000 members of PAS Supporters' Club. 
 This 20,000 represent all ethnic groups, Chinese, Indians, Kadazan, Iban. They 
 are all  over in every territory, state and district.” (PAS 1) 
 
 Similarly to UMNO and MCA in the sense of party leadership, PAS leadership 
positions are filled entirely by Malay Muslims. Even though the restriction is only limited 
to Muslims, regardless of ethnicity (unlike UMNO and MCA which put a full brake on it), 
in reality, the non-Malay community in the Peninsular of Malaysia is not big and is 
estimated to be approximately 25 per cent Chinese and 10 per cent Indian. From this not-
so-big number of non-Malays, the percentage of this group of people to convert to Islam 
is tiny. From this tiny number, we would need to narrow down again to those who wish to 
join PAS. Therefore, even without data from PAS itself, there is a general understanding 
that such a group of people is small. The only one considered to have a slightly better 
profile in PAS is Annuar Tan Abdullah, a Chinese Muslim who is the Kelantan State 
Executive Councillor (akin to a cabinet minister at state level). Therefore, it is 
understandable that the line-up for PAS leadership is as such. Although PAS do not mind 
about the issue of ethnicity in Islamic teaching, similar to the political direction of PKR 
and DAP who intend to push for de-ethnicisation, PAS could not do much in technical 
terms, although its ideological principles are moving away from an ethnicity discourse, an 
issue that is irrelevant to them. 
  
 "We try to champion for all. That is why we try to introduce like Negara 




 The PAS Supporters' Club, as briefly explained above, can be considered as PAS 
members but they do not have the right to vote. Their rights within the party are still very 
restricted. Interestingly, at the same time, PAS is putting up non-Muslims from the club 
to contest in the 2013 General Election (which will be discussed further in the third 
chapter). Therefore, in summary, PAS is a non-ethnic-based party that wishes to move 
away from ethnic politics, but at the same time and due to the nature of Islam being a 
core value of the party, it is a party comprised of near-to-total Malay members only. 
 
 
4.4 DISCUSSSION AND COMPARISON 
The coalition party system, which has been in place since the independence era (1957), 
seems to work well in Malaysia, not only for the ruling party, but for opposition parties 
who are following suit in forming a political alliance as an alternative for the people to 
choose as the government of the day. Marsh & Mitchell (1999) suggest that veto power 
among the members of a coalition can help to minimise the impact on a party. This is true 
but is not being implemented in either current coalition in Malaysia. BN is practising a 
'compromising' principle in getting a solution which many do not agree with. BN is being 
seen as over-dominant within the BN coalition itself. It can be seen through various 
aspects including, but not limited to, the number of Parliamentary seats it has won, the 
number of ministerships it holds, the number of party members and so on. PR, on the 
other hand, although they do not have the veto concept, are practising an 'agree to 
disagree' principle. This means that the component parties within PR do not necessarily 
need to alter their own party’s direction to achieve a single stance. Each party can have 
their own say, especially when it links to their own party's core value. On the one hand, 
such arrangements are good, but on the other, is akin to sweeping it under the carpet, such 




 On the issue of MCA party membership, it is not easy, although not impossible, to 
amend their own party’s constitution; MCA is taking practical steps to try and expand 
their affiliation to non-Chinese people through associate membership. With that, apart 
from being able to hear voices other than just the Chinese, MCA can play a more 
wholesome role for the general Malaysian community. Similarly to MCA, PAS is having 
problems with its supporters club, consisting of non-Muslims, being unable to become 
full members. This move is seen to be as expanding their base from a wholly Muslim 
community to be inclusive of everyone in Malaysia. For DAP, it might be slightly 
different. DAP’s constitution is founded on the basis of multi-ethnicity. There is no 
constitutional restriction that forbids DAP from recruiting other ethnicities as their 
members. However, in practical terms, DAP is still being viewed as a Chinese-based 
party due to the dominance of the Chinese within the party, including the extremely high 
percentage of Chinese members and Chinese party leaders. Therefore, they are trying to 
rectify the situation by recruiting more Malays into their party, in which Malay members 
make up a very small percentage. 
 
 The three examples given above have shown that although the size of membership 
may not absolutely translate into votes, power or support, political parties are 
nevertheless keen to expand their grassroots base to a wider scope. Furthermore, these 
parties are trying to come out of their comfort zones and expand their influence into other 
ethnic groups in a 'catch-all-party’ strategy. During the 'old politics' era, ethnicity was set 
as a pre-defined sector of society which each political party was trying to capture. 
However, with the 'catch-all- party’ strategy forming part of the effort of the political 
parties in 'new politics' in Malaysia, Kirchheimer (1996) argues that a 'catch-all-party' 
may challenge the notion of political parties as being the representative of a pre-defined 
sector of society. With such an arrangement, individual parties can no longer declare 
themselves as being exclusively for a certain segment of society. They will need a more 
moderate policy to maintain such a stance. As Katz & Mair (1995) put it, such political 
parties are shifting the focus, focusing less on the issue of segmental representation while 
shifting the focus to the effectiveness of public policies. This may be a good move for 
political parties who intend to change their party’s direction from a pre-defined segment 
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of the society which it intends to represent to become a party that represents all segments 
based on universal values, regardless of identity. 
 
 Making such big changes may result in being able to recruit more members, but as 
mentioned above, more members do not necessarily mean more votes. However, the 
ability to galvanise members for more political activism could give them a stronger bond 
with the respective party. This is because if membership registration could not be used as 
an indicator to show that such registration is a show of support (giving votes) but rather 
political activism for that party can show the support for the party. This is because if the 
members are merely sleeping members and are uninterested in involving themselves with 
political activism, the level of support for their party is in doubt. This is because a person 
may not go to that extent of political activism without having some kind of affection for 
the party (or at worst, the person does not have a hatred for the party) with the exemption 
of the benefits involved. This political activism, even when being performed by its 
members, should not be based on a benefit-cost principle but rather on the affection and 
loyalty that members have towards their own party (Whiteley & Seyd, 2002). 
 
 In general, a political party is led by a small group of leaders who may decide on 
the policies and direction of the party. Even so, party members, as stakeholders of the 
party, have the right to voice their opinions and even have a certain degree of influence 
towards those making policies (Katz & Mair, 1992). This appreciation, to a certain extent, 
acknowledges members as part of the leadership. Such a scenario may groom the 
affection of its members towards the party; at least, the party can be of a higher degree of 
confirmation that these members will vote for the party during the election. Even for a 
mass party, according to Beer (1969), apart from the idea that political parties are a 
prerequisite for democracy, he also argues the main purpose of such a political party is 
electoral success. Should the membership size of a political party be huge, the party could 
guarantee a high level of confirmation in which their own members will cast their votes 
for them. In a worst-case scenario, this means the party can get the biggest number of 
votes which will later translate into legislative power. It is not surprising to see that in 
Malaysia, especially in UMNO constituency where UMNO has a large membership 
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within that constituency, lost the seat. This is due to sabotage and protest votes coming 




Are political parties able to make their parties more inclusive? The answer is Yes. From 
the discussion above, we can see the efforts taken by these political parties to make their 
membership more inclusive. In their effort of expanding their membership base to a wider 
segment of the society in Malaysia, the coalition party formed by the opposition may well 
serve as an alternative to the current government. The intention of the premise above is 
not to compare which coalition party can work better in terms of policy-making, but 
rather examine the ethnicity issue. As I argued before, although Malaysian politics is 
moving towards de-ethnicisation, ethnicity is still an important issue to deal with, 
although a lot of political actors, including political parties and politicians, are dodging it. 
As mentioned earlier, a drastic change may cause more harm than good. Therefore, with 
the formation of PR, a coalition that can represent all communities is Malaysia. On the 
more ethnicity-driven perspective, DAP may be seen as a Chinese-based party and PAS 
as a Malay-based party. But when these two parties combine with PKR, it will have a 
balanced ethnicity composition of Malays, Chinese and Indians (as PKR has quite a 
number of Indian members, even higher than the Chinese, while DAP itself also has quite 
a number of Indian members). On the lesser ethnicity-driven perspective, these three 
parties may be seen without an ethnicity lens (or with a multi-ethnicity lens) where 
ethnicity is not (and cannot) be an issue to be played with as it will affect the whole 
coalition. Therefore, ethnicity within PR could never be played as an issue due to firstly, 
the nature of their party's direction and stance in 'new politics' and secondly, the 
practically political effect where one ethnic gain can cause an ethnic loss. 
 
 Even for BN, MCA has shown their readiness for and, in fact, is moving towards 
the direction of de-ethnicisation where a lot of the programmes and activities are no 
longer exclusively for the Chinese. MCA have realised the importance of not relating 
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themselves exclusively to the Chinese community to the extent that they suggested direct 
membership into BN, which is different from now where people have to be a member of 
a component party within BN before being admitted as a member of BN. Assuming we 
are talking about the main component parties within BN only, it means a person must 
choose to admit into their own ethnicity party before they can be a member of the BN. 
This is the part where MCA feels that people nowadays may want to support BN, but not 
as a member of an ethnic-based party. UMNO is the less de-ethnicisation-driven party 
when compared to the other four (MCA, PKR, DAP and PAS). However, some UMNO 
members are shifting away from ethnic politics, at least at the official and public level. 
Although such a trend has been anticipated due to the strong command of support gained 
by UMNO, it is not surprising for them to react in such a way. However, this is not 
impossible as even the president of UMNO, cum prime minister of Malaysia, has 
launched his own version of 1Malaysia, which refers to the inclusivity of the Malaysian 
race instead of different ethnic groups. 
 
 Although it is argued that political parties can be considered as successfully 
making amendments to their party to make them more inclusive, does it mean that it can 
lead to de-ethnicisation of Malaysian politics? For this overall question, the answer is also 
positive. As we could not expect a drastic change overnight, especially in a politically 
conservative nation like Malaysia, extreme changes may not necessarily work better than 
taking one step at a time. There are many other factors that could drive or halt Malaysian 
politics from being de-ethnicised, such as party stance and electoral strategies, which are 
to be discussed in later chapters. In the party membership dimension specifically, we can 
see that political parties have made attempts to distance themselves from ethnic-based 
politics. We can see that as these political parties decline to offer more ethnic-based 
politics, they may encourage people to come together and push for de-ethnicisation. 
Although it is debatable whether it is the people who force political parties to change or 
that political parties make changes they force the people to accept, such issues are of 
lesser importance. This is due to the fact that de-ethnicisation is currently taking place 
and, in the dimension of party membership, is ably explored above on how most of the 








Party Membership, as discussed in the previous chapter, explores how political parties 
deal with their membership in the current flow of de-ethnicisation of politics.  As party 
membership could form a foundation for distancing themselves from ethnic politics, it 
will be redundant if the direction of those political parties remains the same apart from 
getting more non-dominant new members.  A new outlook for political parties is needed 
if they wish to distance themselves from the 'old politics' of politicking.  Therefore, in this 
chapter, discussion surrounds the idea of how parties position their stance in dealing with 
the current political landscape.  This new party stance could enhance the efforts of 
political parties in de-ethnicising politics even more. 
 
 There is a small but relevant scholarship on party stances on the Malaysian case.  
This scholarship takes a number of different approaches.  Although they may not 
explicitly focus on party stances, their arguments do touch on whether the direction of 
political parties remains or changes through their party stances.  These stances explain on 
how de-ethnicisation takes place in Malaysian politics.  Rodan (2014) in his studies on 
political parties in Malaysia, sees that political parties in Malaysia have started to shift 
from ethnic politics to a more universal value based political discourse emphasising 
issues of economic development, rising material inequalities, abuse of power and so on.  
These findings are echoed by Loh (2007), who argues that the Malaysian political scene 
is placing greater emphasis on development than old school ethnic politics in Malaysia.  
He finds that developmentalism is taking the place of ethnicity in Malaysian politics.  
Although Loh (2013) stops short of labelling this de-ethnicisation, ideas concerning 
developmentalism are largely devoid of ethnic dimensions, and in this sense is dissimilar 
from Rodan’s (2014) focus on good governance.  Khoo (2012) thus argues that UMNO's 
grip on the Malay community has started to loosen.  This is because the social world of 
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the Malay community has changed following four decades of urbanisation in Malaysia.  
Identity is no longer the first priority for part of Malay community when it comes to 
political discourse.  Material development has closed the socio-cultural gap between 
Malays and non-Malay communities.  Furthermore, when Malaysia has experienced 
economy crises, popular tolerance for political patronage reaches new lows(Case 2004).  
Therefore, this also reduces the relevance of ethnicity as patronage in Malaysia is closely 
tied to ethnicity, although cross-ethnic patronage does take some cases. 
 
 At the same time,  Rodan (2014) also argues that even UMNO itself is trying to 
dilute its UMNO dominance image within BN by giving more leeway to other coalition 
parties.  Hari Singh (1991) echoes this view with respect to the position of UMNO within 
BN.  Although Hari Singh’s research was published much earlier (1991), he saw even 
then that whilst ethnicity was contested between different parties, UMNO tried to take a 
more central position within BN while at the same time defending the rights of the Malay.  
This in fact has always been the principled approach of BN, but it has often been 
challenged in practical terms.  Even DAP, which claims to be a multi-ethnic party, still 
devotes significant attention to Chinese related issues.  This can be seen in Muhamad 
Fuzi Omar’s (2008) research on the behaviour of DAP MPs where most of the issues they 
raised in the 1980s and into the 1990s surround ideas of Chinese education, university 
fairness in Malaysian university admission (where Chinese experience difficulty in 
admissions compared to their Malay counterparts with equal examination results).  
However, this has not been the case for 10
th
 session of Parliament (1999) where DAP’s 
focus (measured as in questions they raised in Parliament) has had far less emphasis on 
Chinese issues.  From here, we can argue that not only UMNO is trying to moderate itself, 
DAP is also moving in a similar direction.  Furthermore, the imprisonment of former 
Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim also intensified cross-ethnic cooperation (Abbott 
2009).  Muslim NGOs and DAP (predominantly Chinese and being viewed as the 
Chinese party by the Muslim community) began to work together.  This is echoed by 
Chandra Muzaffar (1998) where he argues that most NGOs in Malaysia do not have 
widespread membership, and the Anwar Ibrahim incident became the catalyst in uniting 




 Although the political landscape seems to increasingly favour multi-ethnicity (or 
non-ethnicity), it can still be questioned that following the Anwar Ibrahim incident, it 
would have been  reasonable to expect a change of government as well.  Abbott ‘s(2009) 
response is that the incident is the result of the authoritarian practices of the ruling regime 
is to remain in power.  Failing to overthrow BN does not mean that ethnicity still 
functions perfectly, but rather that the political system doesn’t reflect the actual 
significance of ethnicity.  In this vein, Rosyidah Muhamad (2015) argues that even 
though the internet is one of the factors which led to the success of opposition parties 
('success' in the conventional Malaysian understanding as breaking the norm of electoral 
results such as winning more seats in Parliament or forming more state government, 
rather than directly assuming federal governmental power as the latter is too ambitious), 
but such success has largely due to the new stance taken by the opposition parties, 
distancing themselves from ethnic politics. 
 
 The scholars above have shown that political parties have shifted their party 
stance from ethnic-based discourse to a more universalistic direction.  Basically, these 
arguments may be grouped into two main approaches, namely, 'shifting to a new 
cleavage' and 're-rooting for similarities' as largely discussed in previous chapters.  By 
looking at their new party direction, it is justifiable to argue that political parties in 
Malaysia are moving towards de-ethnicisation of politics by de-ethnicising their party 
direction through their party stance. 
 
 Therefore, out of five political parties, some are inclined towards making self-
alteration in order to remain in the political mainstream, while some feel that there is 
nothing wrong with their current political position and prefer to remain in the status quo.  
Political parties which are inclined towards de-ethnicisation of politics such as MCA, 
PKR, DAP and PAS are inclined towards making their party stance more inclusive, 
similar to the way they handle their membership, driving their party position away from 
ethnic politics.  These can be seen through various events and efforts aiming for overall 
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Malaysians, rather than exclusively for a particular segment of the society and only 
propagating them intensively.  However, for UMNO, some of its leaders feel that they are 
too are inclusive for overall Malaysians, rather than confining themselves to the Malay 
community only.  In fact, they have been doing it all the time.  Other UMNO leaders feel 
that under the BN system, each of the component parties are delegated with different 
communities, leading to the specialisation of work, this enables and provides overall 
coverage and representation for the whole of Malaysia. 
 
 In this chapter, I would look at two issues.  The first issue to be explored is 
whether these political parties are moving towards a new direction post-2008 General 
Election.  As the wave of 'new politics' is occurring, I am interested to see what kind of 
changes have political parties made.  On the second issue, I would like to look at whether 
the stance taken by these political parties is inclined towards the de-ethnicisation of 
politics, or whether their party stance still remains with the 'old politics'. 
 
 
5.2 DE-ETHNICISING MALAYSIAN POLITICS THROUGH PARTY 
 ACTION AND DIRECTION 
In order to move Malaysian politics towards the direction of de-ethnicisation, a political 
party is one of the crucial elements in determining the success or failure of it.  This is 
because political parties are the ones that offer themselves for the people as an option to 
govern the nation.  From that offer, voters will then have to choose on which positions 
taken by the various political parties is more favourable to them.  In the Malaysian 
political scene, although there can be multiple clashes of positions between political 
parties, the main focus in this chapter and thesis surrounds the idea of either remaining 
with the ethnic politics or moving towards a new direction of the de-ethnicisation of 
politics. 
 According to Rabushka & Shepsle (1972), the moderation of ethnic issues can 
only be successful if ethnicity is not salient.  They further their argument by stating that 
148 
 
should ethnicity become salient within a society, everything that happen will be defined 
in an ethnicity lens, making it harder to reduce the magnitude of ethnicity in such a 
society.  These premises are good in looking at the latest developments of Malaysian 
politics, as if the former premise is occurring in Malaysia, this means that Malaysia has 
started to make a point in moving away from ethnic politics regardless of whether the 
magnitude is high or the process itself is just a very gradual move.  This is because the 
intention of the writing is on whether Malaysian politics is moving away from ethnic 
politics rather than whether it has already successfully detached from ethnic politics.  
However, if the latter premise of ethnicity salience works in Malaysia, it may then remain 
that Malaysian politics is in the 'old politics' of ethnic politics.  Should that happen, we 
should be able to see inflammatory and polarising rhetoric coming out of Malaysia 
(Horowitz 1985).  There may be arguments of how ordinary people may react differently 
with political parties, such as having rally’s based on ethnicity issues, re-looking at 
everything through the lens of ethnicity or even worse would be having ethnicity 
extremists (or extremism thinking) in the political scene.  However, this would not be the 
interest of this writing.  This is because such a group is unable to represent the whole of 
the population, unless their number is big enough to be considered as representative of 
Malaysia.  Secondly, in a democratic society, political parties are the institutions in 
representing the people in governmental affairs.  The one that forms the government is 
the political party and the one that determines who should be allowed to form the 
government is the people through the election.  Therefore, the chain of delegation of 
power is from the people, through the election, to the political parties (through the 
candidates).  Unless the role played by political parties in terms of political and 
government power is reduced drastically to the extent that civil movements may 
supersede them including winning an election, otherwise, at the moment, the focus will 
be on the actions taken by the political parties and these action be constructed as the will 
of whether to remain or move away from ethnic politics. 
 
 According to Mitchell, Evans & O'Leary (2009), they suggested two ways in 
looking at whether a 'majority-minority' structure is rigid or fluid.  They argue firstly that 
this depends on the level of cross-cutting within the society itself.  Should 
multidimensional cleavages be strong enough to divert ethnicity as the sole parameter in 
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pledging support, polarisation due to ethnicity may be reduced.  This is because party 
loyalty is no longer based on blanket ethnic loyalty, but it may have shifted to other 
dimensions of party loyalty such as class loyalty, Left-Right loyalty and so on.  Even if 
other cross-cutting cleavages do not exist or exist but are not strong enough to challenge 
the ethnicity cleavage, Mitchell, Evans & O'Leary (2009) second approach is to have a 
power sharing concept by different institutions.  These over-arching cooperation, 
although may be ethnic-based to begin with, but with such over-arching relationship, the 
overall ethnic relationship will be closer as there would exist a working relationship 
between different ethnic groups.  These two premises nicely fit into Malaysian politics.  
Starting with the second premise, this is the model that is being practised by the 
Malaysian incumbent party, BN (and its predecessor) since independence.  Each ethnic 
group is represented and led by their own ethnic leaders.  These leaders, through prudent 
leadership as suggested by Lijphart (1975), work together at the high levels of leaderships.  
Negotiation and bargaining happens in that level and the result is being brought to their 
own people through a top-down approach.  Such a method seems to have worked well for 
decades until before the 2008 General Election.  The failure of the BN in 2008 General 
Election and thereafter does not necessarily means that such a concept is not applicable 
anymore.  It may mean so (such concept is not applicable) but at the same time, the 
failure of the BN can also be due to the application of such a concept rather than the fault 
of the concept itself.  Anyway, the successful adoption of such a concept for decades 
could not deny the workable side of such a concept.  Going back to the first premise of 
Mitchell, Evans & O'Leary (2009) who argue for multi-dimensional cleavage, such 
approach is the one being used successfully by the opposition bench.  They managed to 
shift the cleavage of ethnicity to a non-ethnic cleavage of universal values such as justice, 
transparency, freedom and so on.  The 2008 and 2013 General Election shows that 
ethnicity, although still remains as an element within the political system, the magnitude 
of importance of it has been reduced drastically.  The position of ethnicity as the only and 
main contention in Malaysian politics does not hold water anymore.  From here, we can 
see that although both suggestions by Mitchell, Evans and O'Leary (2009) have (had) 
been applied in Malaysian politics, the first premise of shifting to other cleavages seems 





 However, caution should be taken as to whether inter-ethnic cooperation works 
well for an ethnic-based party.  Horowitz (1985) questions on "how many parties an 
ethnic can afford without weakening its own itself in ethnic conflict".  His questioning 
does have a point.  In a cooperating relationship, including participation in an institution, 
each individual member would have to compromise in order to achieve overall goals.  For 
instance, in a global institution such as the United Nations, European Union and so on, 
although each member states may receive benefits due to such participation, but at the 
same time, part of their 'sovereignty' may need to compromised in order to achieve the 
overall goals.  If each member states could be firm on their own sovereignty without 
giving up anything, it may mean that the organisation is not strong enough to implement 
policies onto their member states.  Such a loose working relationship may not sound good 
overall.  On the other hand, if such a working relationship is good and tight, all member 
states would be willing to obey the organisations orders, meaning that such member states 
would need to compromise in a certain sense.  Therefore, Horowitz (1985) does raise an 
interesting point.  However, from another perspective, the questioning may not be an 
issue to begin with.  Should ethnicity not be salient anymore (or much less), and the 
attention is shifted to other dimensions or cleavage, ethnicity does not pose an issue to 
begin with.  This is because people no longer see themselves as 'you' and 'me' anymore, 
but rather as 'us'.  If the discussion focuses on privilege issues held by certain ethnic 
groups, then ethnicity may be an issue.  For instance, in Malaysia, Malays are accorded to 
certain rights and privileges due to the status as 'son of the soil' (refers to as the 'original' 
people of the place).  These rights and privileges are crucial for them to be helped in 
certain manners such as quota allocation, financial support and so on.  However, if 
without such handicaps, Malays, on their merits are able to achieve what they wish to 
achieve and be on the same par as other ethnic groups, such handicaps may be 
meaningless.  Thus, negating the issue of ethnicity in Malaysian society.  In the current 
political scene which pushes forward for de-ethnicisation, especially by the PR, they trust 
in the development of Malays and do not think that ethnicity should be a barrier in 
separating Malays from other ethnic groups.  A similar scenario happened to BN, 
although at the same time, both of them were reluctant to suggest for such an abolishment.  
This is because such an issue is still considered as 'sensitive' in Malaysian society.  Even 
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if they, such as the BN government, in a certain sense agree with abolishing the quota 
system, they are inclined towards introducing meritocracy as a new approach rather than 
suggesting for such an abolishment.  Although the end results are very similar, but the 
usage of words remain a 'sensitive' issue in Malaysia.  Therefore, it is the actions and 
directions taken by political parties that determines whether Malaysia is willing (or 
already) moving towards de-ethnicisation. 
 
 Although political parties have a large role to play with the process of de-
ethnicisation of Malaysian politics, the questions that arise are whether political parties, 
especially truly ethnic-based parties are willing to adapt themselves to the new playing 
field.  Ezrow et.al (2011), through their empirical analyses argue that in Western 
European democracies, the mainstream political parties have started to shift their position 
between Left and Right to accommodate the public opinion although a smaller number of 
political parties are still firmly holding to their party ideology.  This is not surprising as 
the contestation between these mainstream political parties do need to rely on the support 
of the masses and public opinion is a good indicator in telling them what the public does 
not need at that particular time.  Adam et.al (2009) further suggest that out of the two 
types of political parties, namely activist-dominated and leaders-dominated political 
parties, the former tends to adhere to what their support wishes to have, while the latter 
prefers to follow the wishes of the overall society.  Even though these two types of 
political parties are shifting their party ideology and direction according to different 
segments of people, but the fact is that the ideology and direction of the parties are 
changeable even to the extent of becoming far away from their original ideology and 
direction if there happens to be the demand for their preferred-listened people.  This has 
set a parallel for the case of ethnic-based parties in Malaysia.  Although a political party 
may be founded on certain ideology, values, direction, beliefs and so on, these do not 
mean that such a foundation is fixed and not changeable.  Politics, to a certain extent, is a 
game of dynamism where blanket obeying to fixed rules may land them in trouble if the 
political scenario requires them to make changes.  Following on with the two scholars 
arguments above, although political parties are the ones that have the bigger role in 
determining how the Malaysian political scene should be shaped, but at the same time, 
the mass (voters) do have influence on political parties regarding their actions and 
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directions.  Referring back to the same example of Malay special privileges as above, 
political parties do not dare to suggest for the abolishment because they adhere to the 
choice of the people, failing may cause them the loss of considerable support.  Such a 
direction is inclined towards bottom-up.  However, if there is a time when political parties 
feel that the 'sensitivity' and 'firmness' of the people regarding that issue is not that strong 
anymore, political parties may take the first step of suggesting it to be abolished.  This 
approach is inclined towards top-down.  At the current moment, de-ethnicisation of 
politics seems to be inclined towards top-down, especially after the 2008 General 
Election and this time with the support of the masses as well.  Such premise is supported 
by Budge (1994) when he argues that political parties may shift political direction due to 
the past elections results.  No doubt, results of the 2008 General Election does have a big 
impact towards the overall Malaysian political arrangement.  Actually, such an approach 
had been tried by PKR predecessor (PKN) during the late 1990s (Reformasi (translated as 
'reformarion') era) but it was not that successful. 
 
 Although the arguments above seem to favour more towards de-ethnicisation and 
fluidity of ethnicity within the Malaysian political society at this moment, there is another 
side of the story in negating fluidity of ethnicity, although this might not be the case in 
Malaysia.  Paul Mitchell, Geoffrey Evans & Brendan O’Leary (2009) raise an example of 
Northern Ireland where fluidity of ethnicity is extremely low. 
 
 "the 2003 Northern Ireland Assembly election study (survey evidence) shows that 
only 1.4 per cent and zero per cent, respectively, of UUP and DUP voters were Catholic. 
In the nationalist party system, one per cent of Sinn Féin voters and 1.7 percent of SDLP 
voters were Protestant. Because very little ‘normal’ inter-bloc competition occurs, parties 
instead try to out mobilise each other rather than genuinely appeal for cross-community 
votes" (Paul Mitchell, Geoffrey Evans & Brendan O’Leary 2009). 
 Caspersen (2012) does agree that in a scenario where competition happens 
between political parties, there may be cases where floating voters are almost near to zero, 
fully depending on mobilising loyalty of supporters instead of venturing into other 
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segments of the society.  Such a political scenario in Northern Ireland no doubt will 
encourage extreme ethnic outbidding due to the nature of it.  Although such a scenario 
may seem to be the extreme opposite if compared to the current Malaysian political 
scenario, but such a scenario is not totally absent from the Malaysian political scene.  
During the time of 'old politics', it does make it difficult, although not impossible, for 
opposition parties to win mixed seats due to the nature of the lack of inter-ethnic support.  
Stigmatisation does exist against certain parties such as the Malay community towards 
DAP and the Chinese community towards PAS.  However, with the latest political 
scenario, it shows that the rigidity and fluidity of ethnic cross-cutting is dynamic. 
 
                From the above discussion, we can see that political parties do play a major role 
in determining the direction of their respective parties.  However, this shifting of 
direction would need a medium to be disseminated to its people. Generally, political actor 
disseminate their ideas through political speech; be it in the form of conventional 
speeches in rally and campaign or in the modernised form in social media and cyber 
world.  Apart from the oral dissemination of information, manifesto is another way to 
disseminate their election pledge.  However, for manifesto, the interesting part of it is the 
usefulness of its pledge.  In some places especially mature democracy, manifesto pledge 
does carry weight and such misinformed or inability to fulfill might cause backfired.  
However, for developing democracy such as Malaysia, manifesto is a must during 
campaign period in telling voters what they intend to do should they win.  However, in 
the events of failure to fulfil the manifesto pledges, it seems to be a common trend.  
Although political opponents might raise up  such issue, but the impact could not be 
proven to be effective.  Such occurrence do not only happen to the ruling party but also to 
the opposition coalition who won governmental rights in state level.  
 
 
5.3 NEW POLITICAL PARTIES DIRECTION AND STANCE 
The discussion above has shown that Malaysian politics, in general, inclines towards de-
ethnicisation and a lot of its general actions and directions are showing that there is less 
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interest for ethnic politics.  However, not all the individual parties are having the same 
direction, especially magnitude wise and due to the nature of technical constraints.  For 
this part, five of the main political parties, namely UMNO, MCA, PKR, DAP and PAS 
will be discussed.  For the opposition side, all the three component parties are being 
discussed as each of them have distinct characteristics from one another.  For BN, 
UMNO is being picked due to the seniority of it within BN and acting as the backbone of 
BN.  The reason for only MCA to be chosen is because firstly, it is the second most 
senior partner in Peninsular (in terms of seniority, memberships, Parliamentary seats and 
so on) and secondly, it is because the issues faced by the non-Malay community are 
similar to one another and the whole thesis prefers to discuss ethnicity in principle as 
'Malay' versus 'non-Malay'. 
 
 Such trend of shifting their party stance is not a hot issue to be debated up to the 
point in 2008 General Election where opposition parties manage to break the dominant of 
BN in Malaysia politics.  Although such magnitude of success may not be considered a 
success in matured democracies, but in developing democracies, breaking through the 
dominance of ruling party may be considered a success.  Due to the political parties 
started to re-position themselves and many of them have started to steer the direction of 
the party.  According to (CMS6), opposition parties, ever since they have started to work 
together with one another, each of them especially DAP and PAS has lessen their slogan 
of secular state or Islamic state as compared to before.  Due to that reason, the middle 
ground for them to bind themselves together is by using universal value issues, such as 
justice, clean, good governance and so on.  The stance by these opposition parties have 
moved away together a non-ethnicity discourse along their campaigns.  On the other hand, 
for ruling party BN, most of the component members especially MCA, as the most senior 
non-Malay party, have started to steer their direction towards accommodating for  wider 
segment of the society instead of their own Chinese community.  (CMS7) sees such trend 
of shifting their direction as one of the effort to de-ethnicising Malaysian politics by 
putting ethnicity discourse below the priority list.  Unlike before, most of the issues raised 
up and actions taken are likely to be linked to ethnicity directly or indirectly.  (CMS8) 
does agree that one of the factor that can push Malaysian politics towards the direction of 
de-ethnicisation is by shifting their party stance because such move needs political will 
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from the party.  Therefore, on this particular issue of party stance, most of the main 
political parties seem to be moving away from ethnic politics, be it due to their own 
willingness, or being 'forced' to depart from ethnicity discourse which is becoming less 




UMNO, as discussed in Background Chapter, is one of the oldest political parties in 
Malaysia. Apart from its age, UMNO has often being viewed as a dominant party within 
its coalition, BN (CMS1).  Due to the structure of UMNO, UMNO is being viewed as an 
Malay-ethnic party (CMS 2).  This premise is strengthen by is party Constitution Clause 
3 which states that "UMNO is a political party which fight to carry the national ambition 
of the Malay in order to maintain the honour and dignity of the race, religion and nation". 
 
 "UMNO adalah sebuah parti politik yang berjuang mendukung cita-cita 
 kebangsaan  Melayu demi mengekalkan maruh dan martabat bangsa, agama dan 
 negara" (UMNO Constitution original version). 
 
 Although the UMNO Constitution technically moulds UMNO in such a Malay-
based party shape, as discussed above by Ezrow et.al (2011) and Adam et.al (2009), such 
a definition is not rigid and interchangeable.  From the beginning of the Malaysian 
electoral system being implemented even before independence, UMNO had formed an 
alliance with other political parties, with MCA as the first partner.  With such alliance 
and later on as a coalition party, UMNO claims that they are actually functioning as a 
multi-ethnic party through BN structure.  Due to this, an over-emphasis of the Malay 
agenda may parallel with the UMNO but definitely not a wish from BN.  A balanced 
position between UMNO and BN is crucial in maintaining its influence within its own 
party and at the same time, not affecting its relationship with its component party.  This is 
the concern of Horowitz (1985) as discussed above on whether an ethnic party which 
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converts to inter-ethnic cooperation can actually bring harm to itself.  However, as a 
safeguard towards the coalition, component parties cannot and should not be over 
extreme in the struggle for their own community.  In fact, BN should act as a multi-ethnic 
party and collaborate with one another through prudent leadership as suggested by 
Lijphart (1975). 
 
 "You have to see Barisan Nasional as a multi-ethnic coalition. If this ethnic 
 sentiment become too strong, whether it is Malayness, or Chinese, whatever, 
 it is not good." (UMNO 3) 
 
 This is because if any one of the parties becomes too extreme in its process of 
upholding the welfare of their own community, such a working relationship between 
different ethnic-based component parties could not work. 
 
 "Doesn't work that way... If UMNO becomes too racist, if MCA becomes too 
 racist, if MIC becomes too racist, we cannot work together." (UMNO 3) 
  
 In moderation politics for a diverse society as in Malaysia, extremist politics will 
bring terrible harms to the overall society.  This is supported by (CMS3) who suggest that 
UMNO is a moderate party.  This is due to the nature of BN as a coalition of a multi 
ethnic-based party.  Although at times, leaders of UMNO might behave in a more 
extreme way in demanding for the rights of the Malays community, but such demand has 
a limit within it. As UMNO leaders do realise that even if they manage to win big support 
from Malay community, they will still need support from other community as well due to 
the nature of BN arrangement.  Otherwise, even if UMNO can win handsomely but its 
component parties lose terribly, BN as a whole would not get much advantage from that. 
Furthermore, for a nation with diverse composition, the sensitivity level on certain issues 
might be higher as compared to homogenous nations.  Not only that even at the practical 
level of electoral support, an extreme ethnic position taken may not favour the electorate 
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support as well.  In Malaysia, there are a significant number of seats which we considered 
as "mixed seat", meaning the voters ethnicity composition comprises of a substantial 
amount of voters from various ethnic groups. In such situations, extreme positions taken 
may sway voters from other ethnic groups away from their party. 
 
 "We have to make things certain level of moderation, otherwise, ok you can be so 
 racist... but you still have to maintain certain level of support, for example, 20% 
 of Chinese support, you are gone... The threshold is very low... especially mixed 
 seat. So that's why, UMNO has been very careful, even though we say, we put the 
 Malays, yes, but doesn't mean that we abandon the other community, serving the 
 legitimate interest."  (UMNO 3) 
 
 That is why, the highest leader of UMNO, who is also BN chairman and 
eventually Prime Minister of Malaysia, introduce the concept of 1Malaysia.  It is a 
concept where all Malaysian should be seen as one instead of as Malay, Chinese, Indian 
and others.  Therefore, in most of his speeches (which is practised by other BN leaders as 
well), they emphasis the concept of 1Malaysia a lot.  Garnering support from multi 
segments of the society is important and therefore, political actor has to balance 
themselves between fighting for the well beings of its community while at the same time, 
looking after other communities.  Cross-ethnic voting is much possible should the 
candidate is able to convince other communities of their ability to take care of all. 
 
 This is the opposite from the example of Mitchell, Evans & O'Leary (2009) on the 
Northern Ireland Assembly election where ethnic fluidity can be near to zero.  But that is 
not the case for Malaysia.  It might have to do with the single member constituency 
electoral system too where it is very common that voters would have to choose one of the 
candidates (as the candidates are from the same ethnic group) whom are from the 
different ethnic groups than the voters.  Unless a particular party can win almost all the 
votes by their own ethnic community; let's say in a Malay majority seat, UMNO can win 
almost all the Malay votes, then without the support from the non-Malay community, 
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UMNO is still going to win such seat.  However, in reality, this is not the case.  In most 
of the seats it contested, it face challenges from other political parties such as PAS and 
PKR and these parties are going to sway away some of the Malay votes even though they 
might not be able to win more Malay votes compared to UMNO.  This is when the 
significance of non-Malay votes comes into play.  Therefore, as argued above, UMNO 
could not cross the line of being too extreme, unless it is willing to go all out on its own 
and leave its component partners behind.  
 
 By not taking an extreme stance in their own component party, it does not mean 
that its party is no longer an ethnic-based party.  Although none of the three informants 
denied that UMNO is a Malay-based party, but they denied that UMNO will serve for the 
Malays only.  To them, UMNO did in fact serve other communities but each of them 
have different views on how UMNO serves other communities directly or indirectly.  For 
the UMNO 2, the mode of operation in BN is that each component party works within 
their core community and the next step is for these component parties to work among 
themselves.  This is similar to the concept raised by Arend Lijphart, where a component 
party works within their own base and the leadership of each component party cooperate 
overarching through prudent leadership in achieving the objectives of serving the overall 
communities. 
 
 "We have to work with our partners. Because we based on the partnership... Inilah 
 falsafah dari dulu (translated as "This is our philosophy since last time"). (UMNO 
 2) 
 
 UMNO 3 also argues that although UMNO is serving the Malay community, but 
this does not mean that UMNO is neglecting the interests of other communities or not 
serving other communities as the way to serve the Malay community.  He is right on this 
by Chandra’s (2012) definition on an ethnic party.  An ethnic party does not necessarily 
mean that it only serves their own ethnic community (Chandra 2012).  Due to this, 
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UMNO works within the framework of BN in which the BN framework guarantees a 
service to all communities in Malaysia. 
 
 "... Of course the principle of the party is to fight for the Malays, for the Malay 
 course, for Islam. but it has been all along UMNO works with other component 
 party, Barisan Nasional which also serves interest of other community as well. 
 When you talk about UMNO as a Malay-based party, it cannot be seen as the 
 tactical to serving legitimate interests and rights of that community because 
 UMNO works within the framework of Barisan Nasional. (UMNO 3) 
 
 UMNO 1, too, believes that the masses prefer to be served by their own 
community's leader.  In practical terms, such a modus operandi is more feasible where 
each ethnic is having their own group and these groups will then be united together.  As 
suggested by Geertz (1973), people from the same ethnic group share certain connections, 
kinship and feel singularity among them.  Due to this, UMNO 1 sees that such a method 
is more practical as compared to the ideal idea of opposition parties where at the end, 
their ideal idea falls back to the similar approach taken by BN. 
 
 "Etnik yang tertentu tentunya inginkan berkumpulan, itu yang dibuat dalam BN, 
 kemudian kumpulan, kumpulan, kumpulan, kita satukan, ia lebih praktikal 
 daripada apa yang cuba dibuat oleh pembangkang. Secara ideanya hebat, tetapi 
 secara  praktikalnya, masih mengikut corak yang sama." (UMNO 1) 
 
 Translated as 
 
 "Certain ethnic groups prefer to be in their group, this is what we do in BN, from 
 group, group, group, we combine then. This is more practical than what the 
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 opposition is trying to do.  Their ideal is great, but in terms of practicality, they 
 are still following the same mould." (UMNO1) 
 
 However, at the same time, he tends to use work "rakyat" (translated as people) 
rather than in the domain of ethnicity in the working operation of the government.  He 
believes that the struggle of the Prime Minister in his leadership is for the wellbeing of 
the people rather than bringing ethnicity into the picture.   
 
 " Saya beranggapan, selagi kita berpaksi kepada rakyat, bukan bangsa, kita tidak 
salah. Perdana Menteri kini berjaya meletakkan rakyat sebagai  paksi perjuangan... 
Perkataan yang sesuai sekarang ialah rakyat". (UMNO 1) 
 
 Translated as 
 
 "I believe that as long as we put people as priority and not race, we are not wrong. 
 Prime Minister did successfully priorities people as the main struggle... The word 
 suitable to use now is people" (UMNO 1) 
 
 Informants such as the UMNO 2 and UMNO 3 see that BN is more multi-ethnic 
than the opposition parties.  They prefer to discuss about BN rather than UMNO alone as 
they believe that BN is a coalition which can cover the interests of all communities, 
making it a multi-ethnic party. 
 
 "Barisan Nasional, pelbagai kaum, walaupun parti setiap satu mewakili etnik, 
 tetapi  kita pergi ke pilihan raya atas nama Barisan Nasional yang mewakili 
 pelbagai kaum di dalam. Dan saya kira Barisan Nasional lebih etnik daripada tiga 




 Translated as 
 
 "Barisan Nasional, multi ethnicities, although each party represent an ethnic group, 
 but we  go into election under the name of Barisan Nasional which represent  all 
 ethnic groups within it. And I believe Barisan Nasional has more ethnics than 
 three opposition parties." (UMNO 2)  
 
 "Because to certain extent, you can see the, new interest in the so call politics 
 which is more multi-racial, so called multi racial, even though you have to define 
 multi-racial as Barisan Nasional has been multi-racial from the very beginning. So 
 there is nothing new with that (UMNO 3) 
 
 The sharing of power by the component parties of different ethnic groups as 
suggested by Mitchell, Evans & O'Leary (2009) seems to work over here in BN.  UMNO 
1 substantiates that legislators and executives are formed by BN and not UMNO when we 
look into the composition of the executive cabinet which consists of all ethnic groups; the 
composition of Members of Parliament where all ethnic groups are involved under the 
name of BN.  Such a manifestation shows that BN is in fact championing all ethnic 
groups. 
 
 " Komposisi kabinet pelbagai kaum, komposisi Ahli Parlimen BN pun pelbagai 
 kaum... Ini manifestasi kita berjuang untuk semua kaum." (UMNO 1) 
 
 Translated as 
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 "Composition for cabinet is multi ethnics, composition for BN Member of 
 Parliament is also  multi ethnics... We fight this manifestation for all ethnic 
 group". (UMNO 1) 
 
 Similarly, for the UMNO 3, BN has been practising multi-ethnicity for a long 
while since this model has already been in the Malaysian political system.  The newer 
concept of 1Malaysia, which the current Prime Minister introduced, has shown that BN is 
in fact more towards multi-ethnicities than an "already-multi-ethnicities" BN. 
 
 "... 1Malaysia concept,  to show that we are more multi-racial than before, even 
 though previously BN is the model for multi-racial politics in this country..." 
 (UMNO 3) 
 
5.3.2 MCA 
MCA, similar to UMNO, is a Chinese-based party by virtue of their party Constitution.  
This is because its Constitution states that for a person to be eligible to be a member, the 
person must be of Chinese descent.  During the independence era up to pre-2008 General 
Election with a few exceptions in the middle, MCA was generally considered as a 
representative party for the Chinese.  However, it may or may not be the case that the 
MCA only serves for the interests of the Chinese community.  MCA prefers the 
moderation way as suggested by Rabushka & Shepsle (1972) where extreme or 
exclusionary stances are not part of MCA ways in practice.  For instance, MCA 1 argues 
that even though technically they are a Chinese-based party, that does not mean that they 
only serve for the Chinese community. 
 
 "Since when MCA becomes racist or ethnic-based? Ya, we are ethnic based. We 
 are communal-based. But communal based does not means that we only serve for 
 our community. From day  one, we only have 11% Chinese voters when we 
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 collaborated with UMNO to go for the election. At that time, we contested in 
 29% of the total seat.  Which means, from day one, MCA has been labelled as a 
 party that has to serve beyond your party." (MCA 1) 
 
 At the same time MCA 1 does agree that the practical services provided by them 
is slightly different from their Constitution.  They serve any other communities as well 
apart from their core Chinese community.  Although this is not entirely surprising as 
Ezrow et.al (2011) suggest that the stance or direction taken by a party during the 
formation time does not necessarily mean that it would be fully followed in the future.  
Amendments made towards the old direction are not uncommon.  Furthermore, from 
what we can see in their party Presidential speeches in these few years, the emphasis of 
'Chinese' is lesser as compared to 'old politics' era.  In their 2016 Annual General 
Assembly, the Presidential speech did not mentioned above 'Chinese'.  Instead his 
speeches is full of 'Malaysian' instead.  This premise is supported by MCA 3 when he 
suggests that although MCA is exclusive for Chinese, but the struggles that they have 
gone through are for all Malaysians. 
 
 "First of all, you have to understand MCA party's Constitution. Except the 
 membership is only open for Chinese, all the other political struggles are for all 
 Malaysians." (MCA 3). 
 
 Furthermore, MCA is inclined towards all issues rather than looking at them from 
the lens of ethnicity.  Salience or not of ethnicity is not the main consideration of the 
MCA.  They prefer to look at issues from other dimensions of commonality (which 
Mitchell, Evans & O'Leary 2009 describe as multi-dimensional cleavages) such as having 
the same interest in Chinese vernacular education.  For instance, when education issues 
arise, they will defend and help all Malaysians regardless of their ethnicity.  This can be 





 "So, MCA can protect and fight for everyone, not only the Chinese. For instance,   
 the while when we talking about education issue, we are not limited to help 
 Chinese only. We receive application appear from Malays, from Indians,  from 
 Sabah and Sarawak. So, it doesn't limit to one race." (MCA 3) 
 
 The responses from these two top leaders who are capable of representing MCA 
as a whole (MCA 1) and MCA youth communities (MCA 3) by virtue of their position 
have shown that MCA acknowledges the written Constitution which requires them to 
remain as a Chinese-based party but at the same time, their services are opened to all 
Malaysians.  This kind of situation is not that difficult to be accepted as apart from the 
explanation by both leaders above, the MCA Constitution (Aims and Objects) also does 
not emphasise on "Chineseness" in each and every of their "Aims and Objects", unlike 
UMNO where most, if not all, of their "Principles and Objectives" (originally written as 
"Asas dan Tujuan") are highly related to "Malayness". 
 
 Another critical issue within the Chinese community is their Chinese education.  
For this, although the MCA is doing its best to preserve such vernacular education, but 
the leaders do not feel that by doing so, it can or should be interpreted as defending the 
"Chinese people" education (on this issue, I differentiate between "Chinese people" 
education which mean education that is for Chinese only and "Chinese medium" 
education, as to avoid confusion).  They believe that by defending "Chinese medium" 
education, such education could not only be utilised by the "Chinese people" but also by 
non-Chinese ethnicity students. 
 
 "The Chinese education is not for Chinese alone. We have 15% non-Chinese. 
 Some  school  we have 99% non-Chinese. You cannot call them as Chinese 
 education only for Chinese. Anyone can learn Chinese from Malaysia system. 
 And in our primary schools, vernacular schools, there is no reasons that we 
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 stop these people from learning Chinese or Mandarin. So, in this regards,MCA 
 is very vocal. We want to make sure that Chinese vernacular school is here to 
 stay. That is the core value for MCA to behave." (MCA 1) 
 
 Such a view is supported by MCA 3 where it is suggested that they see education 
as part of the universal value.  Access to education is one of the universal values in which 
it is blind-folded on skin colours.  Furthermore, it states that as "Chinese people" are part 
of the "rakyat" (means people in Malay).  Therefore, defending the rights to access to 
"Chinese medium" education is actually defending Malaysian "rakyat". 
 
 " When we talk about securing the rights of the Chinese, be it in politics, social or 
 economy, it is always protecting the rights of the rakyat (means people or citizens 
 in Malay) as Chinese is part of the rakyat. So, nothing wrong when we fight 
 for the  recognition UEC, protecting the Chinese school. It is part of the right of 
 the people. Not that we protecting the rights of the the Chinese, we become the 
 racist party. I do not acknowledge that."  (MCA 3) 
 
 UEC or Unified Examination Certificate is another type of education system in 
Malaysia where the medium of teaching is in Mandarin.  Although UEC is a recognised 
qualification for a lot of the world elite universities including Harvard for instance, but 
the government is reluctant to recognise its qualification into the government system such 
as admission into public university, admission into civil service and so on.  
 
 "We think wise for the government to recognise UEC to harvest all the talents that 
 we have produce. It is not so much on racial issue.  A Malay can enter into 
 independent  school and get UEC. There are Malay student, Indian students 




 The response above once again strengthens the premise by MCA leaders that 
MCA is fighting for "Chinese medium" education and not "Chinese people" education.  
Even if Chinese are the ones that are keen on "Chinese medium" education, MCA 1 sees 
nothing wrong with it as it is part of the universal values which suggest the need for 
access to education. 
 
 "Let me tell you. Access to education universal value. If I want to let the Chinese  
  to learn the mother tongue, what's wrong with that. Nothing. MCA until today, 
 we treat this as our responsibility".  (MCA 1) 
 
 From here, we can see that MCA is a Chinese-based party, but that does not mean 
that the MCA will only defend Chinese related issues. Although those issues are 
somehow related to the Chinese community.  This is parallel to the definition of an ethnic 
party by Chandra (2012) where an ethnic party does not necessarily mean that the party is 
inclusive to certain segment of the society only.  As long as an issue is based on universal 
values then that should be granted to the people, MCA will defend such an issue.  MCA 1, 
also gives an example on how by defending the party's core value, they faced criticisms 
from UMNO, their component partner. 
 
 "Even UMNO, our component party, they say how can you gang up with DAP 
 and whack us on racist remarks. I say, whether you say it or whoever say it, our 
 reaction will be the same. I don't care, I cannot say because you are UMNO, I 
 spare you, don't whack you. We have to do the same because we believe in 
 universal value. So, I think that is the core value of MCA now." (MCA 1). 
 
 This opinion is supported by MCA 3 too when he agrees with MCA 1 that the 
political landscape nowadays has already been moving towards universal values, rather 




 "When I define new politics, it means something that is more common across race 
 and religion. For instance, more for the common interest, protecting the 
 environment, freedom of speech, human right, which cut across not only race and 
 religion, but also gender. This very much different from the old politics of 
 Malaysia which more focus  on development and distribution among race. And 
 of course on religion matters.". (MCA 3). 
 
 In fact, BN is actually implementing a catch-all strategy as suggested by 
Kirchheimer (1996), where an ethnic party becomes inclusionary and intends to cover all 
other segments of the society as well including their non-core community.  He believes 
that BN actually has those core values of taking care of all Malaysians.  The problem is 
those core values, such as the ones discussed are not adopted practically and are being 
distorted.  Therefore, apart from needing to have MCA revert back to its core values, BN 
as a whole would also have to take the same course of action, not propagating based on 
primordialism or identity per say, if it wishes to gain back support. 
 
 "We already have a set of very good political ideology. What MCA need to do is 
 to go back to the core value. The core value of looking after all Malaysians. And 
 we should use the good platform of Barisan Nasional as part of the ruling party to 
 get UMNO to come back to the core value of Barisan Nasional, of taking care of 
 everybody. If we can do that, then the formulae of Barisan Nasional can review 
 and preview, then we will get back the support. (MCA 3). 
 
 Instead, he suggests that BN as a whole, could take similar steps to MCA as 
discussed in the previous chapter, on opening up membership (in BN case, direct 
membership into BN instead of having to be a member of a component party).  By doing 
so, having a single multi-ethnic party could lessen ethnicity-based issues rather than each 




 " We actually, we have the trump card with us, which is still the Barisan Nasional, 
 comprises of all ethnicity, multi-racial, multi-religion and multi-region, including 
 Sabah and Sarawak. It already, Barisan Nasional already representing and 
 represented all walks of lives. Is just that now we are doing the political works 
 individually...  hardly discuss sensitive issues which we should... decide based on 
 Barisan Nasional spirit. To meet up with new trend of lesser racial politics, the 
 Barisan Nasional should as combine and form a Barisan Nasional party... a 
 good solution for this country if we can form a political party of multi racial 
 called Barisan Nasional." (MCA 3) 
 
 From the discussion above, we can see that MCA, in their latest development, 
prefer to steer their direction towards multi-ethnic instead of confining themselves to their 
own ethnic groups (Chinese only).  This evident when (CMS 3) argues that MCA 
nowadays may not be the same as MCA previously, in terms of the working scope.  
Although previously, MCA may seem to serve Chinese community more, but after 2008 
General Election, MCA seems to move towards the direction of serving all.  This is 
agreeable by (CMS4) who argues that although MCA may not fully ready the amend their 
Constitution, but they have started to take steps, making their party stance, direction and 
service cater to a wider range of communities.  
 
5.3.3 DAP 
DAP, unlike UMNO and MCA, is a multi-ethnic party by definition of their Constitution.  
However, this technical definition does not seem to work well with many people due to 
the composition of the party as discussed in the earlier chapter.  This has much to do with 
the historical background in DAP where their main core supporters have been Chinese 
and in Chinese areas only.  Due to that historical background, therefore it is not surprising 
for DAP to be constructed in such a manner in practical terms.  Furthermore, during that 
time, there have been no alternatives except for mainstream media and these are 
controlled by BN.  Due to that reason, DAP is forced to champion only fringe issues 
instead of centre stage issues.  These fringe issues, which affect only a particular segment 
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of the population, ends up with DAP appealing to this segment of the population as this 
segment is their supporting group.  With such a trend continuing for a long period of time, 
eventually, and over time DAP has become to be portrayed as a Chinese-based party.  
 
 "...the fact that in the old days especially, you have no access to main stream 
 media,  no access to main stream information, and you will basically push to the 
 fringe. You  being pushed to the fringe and you end up championing fringe 
 issues and then you, of course, appeal to certain segment of population lah, 
 so, because of that, that is what DAP has ended up like that. But I think there has 
 been now, in the last 8 years also, 8 to 10 years, a big push  for    DAP to 
 mainstream itself."  (DAP 3) 
 
 This premise is supported by DAP 2 where she argues due to the starting point of 
DAP which is Chinese and urban areas, naturally the party will be structured as such.  It 
is not that such structure is to be maintained rigidly, but it takes time to change the party 
structure into something like the original core values of the party.  Such a premise is 
parallel to the arguments of Adam et.al (2009) where he opines that a political party may 
shift their political direction or stance should their supporters require them to do so.  Due 
to the constraints above and most of their supporters being Chinese in Chinese 
constituencies, it is not surprising that DAP during that time has shifted their attention to 
the Chinese community as influenced by their supporters.  
 
 "What choice do you have. Your background, you start from Chinese based, or on 
 urban  based, and of course along the way you contest in urban areas, Chinese 
 majority areas. Is very natural that your membership, your leadership and all that 
 will be Chinese based or non Malay based. It takes time to enter into other areas 




 Besides the two leaders above, DAP 1, also opines that DAP is a multi-racial 
party to begin with.  However, due to political repression and demonisation through the 
media by BN using politics of race, DAP is often seen as a Chinese chauvinist party.  Due 
to that reason, fluidity in ethnicity becomes lower than as other segments of the society, 
especially the Malays, feel fear of DAP.  Although they do not apply the heavy 
inflammatory and polarisation rhetoric in their strategy as suggested by Horowitz (1985), 
their position of being demonised has much to do with the 'fear' factor.  Actually, by 
comparing the statement of this leader and from those MCA leaders above, there are a lot 
of similarities where they are fighting for universal value issues regardless of who it 
affects.  However, due to the media control, DAP is often characterised as a Chinese 
based party whenever it brings up issues affecting the Chinese community (even though 
those issues are non-ethnic based issues and may affect other communities as well at the 
same time).  
 
 "DAP, we formed in 1966 with multi racial framework and as you are aware, my 
 party has been promoting multiracialism all these years, but the politics of race 
 has been promoted in this country by the ruling elites and also by the main stream 
 media controlled by Barisan Nasional. DAP, we have been fighting for every 
 race, but we have always been blamed for being Chinese chauvinist. Because we... 
 raised a lot of  issues affecting the Chinese community because the Chinese 
 community is facing a lot of discriminatory policies, especially in education, 
 culture, and also economy and civil services and so on. Of course, we also, have 
 been championing for Malay interests, for Indian interests, but the problem is that, 
 they have been, we were not  able to highlight most of this issues because of the 
 deterrence or the blocks... We have  never been able to disseminate our messages 
 effectively, efficiently and widely."   (DAP 1) 
 
 He says that they always cite the case of Lim Guan Eng, where he was jailed for 
defending an underage Malay girl, suspected of being raped by a then Chief Minister of 
Malacca state. This shows that DAP is not a Chinese-based party per say.  If DAP is a 
Chinese-based party, its leader would not have defended that young girl to that extent of 
171 
 
sacrificing themselves.  This comes from the idea of rhetoric competition as suggested by 
(Krebs & Jackson 2007) where DAP failed to convince people to accept their sayings 
rather than the statements by their opponents.  As rhetoric is an art of convincing people, 
failure to master such a skill will put a political party in a disadvantageous position.  DAP 
1 furthers his arguments by saying that they are having  good relationships with Malay 
Unionist leaders as their party elected representative.  This shows that DAP is in fact not 
a Chinese chauvinist party, but nevertheless has been portrayed as such by the media. 
 
 "We have been championing, that's why we always cite the example of Lim Guan 
 Eng, victimised, because she was fighting for a Malay girl who was raped by, you 
 know what happen la... In fact we have our, we have good relationship with some 
 of the Malay Unionists, that's why we have our former Member of Parliament, 
 Ahmad Nor, who is from the Cuepacs, government, civil servant union President 
 as our member as well as Member of Parliament and so on. As I said la, I 
 admitted that,  DAP has been demonised for too long  by BN that we are a part of 
 a Chinese chauvinist... (DAP 1) 
 
 However, such historical background does not seem to have a lesser weight in the 
post-2008 General Election era.  They are more acceptable by the Malay community as 
compared to the old days, although the level of acceptance is still not that high.  Such a 
scenario is totally different from UMNO and MCA by Chandra (2012) definition.  
Chandra’s (2012) argument that an ethnic party does not necessarily serve only their own 
core segment of the society, fits nicely into explaining why it is justifiable for UMNO and 
MCA to call themselves an ethnic party but at the same time be inclusionary.  However, 
for DAP which is a multi-ethnic party technically, it should be easier to apply 
inclusionary practices as compared to UMNO and MCA, but things happen the other way.  
 
 "We are better today and we are more acceptable to the Malay community 
 nowadays because of the social media, because of our alliance with PAS and PKR, 




 At the same time, much work has to be done in order to move DAP forward, in 
order to fulfil the goal of becoming a real multi-ethnic party.  DAP is trying to show to 
the public, especially the Malays about their capability and at the same time, reach out to 
them.  They tried to apply Kirchheimer’s (1996) concept of the catch-all strategy and 
practically able to be inclusionary to other segments of the society as well apart from 
their core Chinese supporters. 
 
 "UMNO, PKR and PAS, why should I join DAP. We have to do more 
 constructive work lo, including to play a more active role in Parliament and State 
 Assembly, to produce more political materials, reading materials, activate... we 
 have this RocketKini, Malay version..." (DAP 1). 
 
 Reaching out to them would also mean the dissemination of information to the 
people.  As discussed above, one of the reasons why DAP can hardly get support from the 
Malay community is due to the blockage of information to the Malay mass.  In the new 
political scenario, information dissemination becomes easier and hence, provides them a 
chance to explain to the masses about the rationale behind their actions. 
 
 "A lot of the occasion, in Parliament, in State Assembly, like in civil service, we 
 told the government because of unfair policy, because of unfair promotional 
 system, many non-Malays are not interest... We have been on the forefront like 
 APs, we have  always been on the forefront. I don't think Malays doesn't like the 
 way we spoke  against this because they are also (victim), only UMNO-Puteras 
 and those cronies are  benefiting, ordinary Malays are not benefiting. They know. 
 That's why with wider dissemination of all these knowledge, it will change their 




 At the same time, DAP 1 also suggests that apart from that, mindset change is 
crucial in re-correcting the distorted image of DAP.  According to Gramsci (2011), 
hegemony is an apparatus to shape the mind of the people to the mould that the ruling 
regime wishes to have.  Hegemony is not easy to be formed.  Once the bond is formed, it 
is not easy to break.  The principle is applied over here where DAP is trying to change the 
mindset of the people, but they should bear in mind that such mindset change is not a 
policy or action that can see results instantly.  Mentality construction might need quite a 
long time.  Even so, this mindset change is necessary if the old mindset of Chinese 
fearing PAS and Malays fearing DAP regardless of issues and based merely on stereotype 
and  emotion is still occurring. Such a view is supported by DAP 3 where he agrees that a 
political party should not only act on what people want them to do, but instead offer 
better solutions and suggestions, in which he calls as pushing the boundary.  Politicians 
have the responsibility of telling people what are the right things to do and convince them 
on moving towards that direction. 
 
 "I would term it as public education. Is also the mindset, we want to bring our 
 ground to mindset change, meaning that, in our election campaign, we, even DAP 
 win, doesn't win much. We have to ensure that PAS will win, PAS will get the 
 Chinese support, Indian support, and PKR will win also, our ground support. Our 
 DAP's  ground will be Chinese in urban area, mainly Chinese, so we have to 
 persuade them to support PAS. How to support them to support PAS Malay 
 candidate, unless we lead them to mindset change, two coalition system, de-
 ethnicisation or whatever you call  it. This is something that we are pushing the 
 country towards the direction." (DAP 2) 
 
 "I think as a party, as a political movement, as a political party, we have to keep 
 pushing the boundary. You cannot say what would people accept (continue the 
 sentence immediately), ya on one hand, you need to know what people can accept, 
 but you must also always be pushing the limit of what the people can accept and 
 telling  and educating the people and saying this is what you need to accept 
 because we need to make change, we need to bring the country forward, we need 
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 to be progressive, I know this is a bit of a strange idea for you but you should 
 consider it (you refers to the  voters). As our responsibility as leaders, to push 
 new ideas..." (DAP 3) 
 
 As these views show on how DAP is trying to bring back their original core value 
of multiculturalism and universal values, the DAP 3 is right when he suggests that apart 
from their ideological ambition, there is a necessity to show to the public, especially the 
Malay community that they too, can offer Malay leaders to the public.  Even though the 
intention has less to do with ethnicity, but showing such an image which is important in 
order to portray a new image of DAP.  This is because politics is not only about facts but 
also about convincing people about the genuine facts.  This is parallel to the ideas 
suggested by Snow and Benford (1988) that rhetoric is how the leaders of the people wish 
to deliver their messages so that it can be accepted easily by the targeted group of people.  
This is where the idea of perception comes in.  In the judiciary system, one of the famous 
mottos is that "not only must justice be done, it must also be seen to be done".  A similar 
principle applies in the current matter.  DAP must give the perception that DAP is an 
inclusionary party in addition to the practical work of inclusion.  
 
 "...at the end of the day I think what we need to show, there must be Malay 
 leadership as well. Because at the end of the day you will see, you say only, you 
 got no Malays, cannot also. As must as you know... perception is everything is 
 politics, you know that. Perception is everything. As much as whatever we want 
 to do, we also need to  put up the perception to show the perception, we do have 
 Malay leaders. And Malay  leaders have a future for example. That is 
 important... "(DAP 3) 
  
5.3.4 PKR 
Out of all the currently active political parties in Malaysia, comparatively, PKR is the  
most "genuine" multi-ethnic party at the moment. Although the term "multi-ethnic" and 
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"non-ethnic" does present a huge difference academically, however, in Malaysian politics, 
both are synonyms to each other.  This is because when a politician talks about "multi-
ethnic", he is also expected to be able view issues colour-blind instead of making his 
position inclusionary of all colours.  At the same time, when a politician discusses "non-
ethnic", a reasonable balance of ethnicity composition is also expected as it is hardly 
acceptable when an ethnic group over dominate a particular issue,  even though colour-
blindly (which academics might also not see as a problem with that kind of scenario), the 
perception at the moment might not give that "correct" expression. 
 
 The PKR 1 and PKR 2 insists that their party is not an ethnic party, nor a multi-
ethnic party.  It has nothing to do with ethnicity.  In any decision that they make, they do 
not put ethnicity into consideration.  Their intention inclines towards building a non-
ethnic kind of politics.  Everybody stands an equal chance regardless of their identity.  
With that premise in hand, PKR is trying to adopt the concept of shifting to other 
dimensions of cleavage as suggested by Mitchell, Evans & O'Leary (2009).  For other 
politicians, they might try not to be single-ethnic, but for PKR, according to him (PKR 1), 
he is trying to take PKR totally out from the ethnicity lens.  
 
 "PKR has never has anything to do with ethnicity." (PKR 1) 
 
 " ...The voters can be racist. That is a separate issue but what we are doing is, to 
 select candidate, move away from the ethnic concern... to the extent, we may not 
 be, thinking 100% only winning is the only consideration. The consideration is to 
 ensure  we can build a non-ethnic politics." (PKR 2) 
 
 The focus of a decision made within PKR will be on the capability.  If a person is 
not from a particular segment of the community then they can perform a better job than a 
person coming from the same segment of the community, the former gets the job.  If at 
the moment, a leader from the same targeted community can provide a better consultation 
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as compared to leaders coming from outside the community, he gets the job.  However, if 
there were to be a better consultant coming from outside the community, but yet able to 
provide better services than those coming from within the targeted community, the favour 
would fall into the outsider.  This is because PKR would never want to use identity as the 
parameter in making a decision.  Capability triumphs over identity (including identity). 
 
 ..."in the future, let's say, if all the East Malaysians and West Malaysians are very 
 sensitive about Sarawak, Sabah, then we may not need that. So you put whoever, 
 if all our Malays, understand about Indian problem and Chinese problems, we 
 may not need even a Chinese Vice President... We will just talk about issues. We 
 are not concern about representation. We are concern about making sure whoever 
 in power makes policies that are acceptable to everybody. That is whole 
 philosophy of non racial politics." (PKR 2) 
 
 The statement especially by the PKR 2 reflects that apart from power gaining, 
PKR is also considering issues on the principle basis, which is to build a non-ethnic 
politics in Malaysia.  Although it is not an easy job and it will not be overnight, but that 
principle forms the basis of PKR foundation.  The PKR 2 also suggest an idea of how a 
diverse and heavily influenced by ethnic politics country like Malaysia can move into 
non-ethnic politics.  The reason for Malaysian politics being stuck within the ethnicity 
parameter is because the political system itself is having an ethnic-based party (UMNO, 
MCA, MIC) even though the leaders of these parties are seeing themselves as multi-
ethnic under BN instead of single-ethnic.  By dismantling such a political system and 
bringing a non-ethnic politics into the system to fill in the vacuum, with time this will 
help in changing the social attitudes of the masses, it is possible that such an ethnicity-
influenced political system can turn into a non-ethnicity related political system.  Such an 
extreme stance towards non-ethnicity is even a level higher than the suggestion of 
Mitchell, Evans & O'Leary (2009), both as a form of shifting to other dimension of 
cleavage to avoid ethnicity cleavage and also to perform power sharing concept in the 




 Such an ideal concept by the PKR 1 sounds good theoretically.  However, as 
social attitude which is a mindset shift may not take a short period of time, and it may 
even take a generation as the DAP 3 mentioned on 13 May 1969 racial hostility baggage.  
Therefore, PKR 2 is suggesting for a first step physical change, which is the dismantling 
of the political structure on ethnicity (and I see it as winning election and making BN as 
weak as possible to a stage where they could no longer insulate ethnic politics easily into 
the system).  
 
 "It is the progressive multi-ethnic party at the moment unless someone else comes 
 out. But realistically, that is as far as Malaysian politics can go at the moment. We 
 have move carefully until we achieve the target. Then, when, if Barisan Nasional 
 is dismantled, it also means that racial political party is dismantled. Racial 
 political party dismantled, will lead to institution racial politics to dismantled. 
 Then you come to the  social attitude, will come to a longer time. Like what, you 
 see the steps, first, you have the system which is like America, the slavery, the 
 Blacks are slaves. First, You  dismantle the slavery, you make it a system which 
 is non racial. Then from there, want to move to a non racial society, it takes a 
 longer time, Obama takes another, 100 over years to achieve , to be accepted as 
 President. The first step dismantling the political structure based on ethnicity, 
 ethnic politics has to be done first.  (PKR 2). 
 
 Such a view on putting principle above winning consideration is shared by the 
party's PKR 3 where he believes there is a long term report card.  Each and every action 
will be accounted for in the future.  Therefore, if winning an election but neglecting a 
principle is to be done, the surviving period for the winning election might be for that 
particular election only, or perhaps can be longer, but without assurance.  However, vice 
versa, defending a principle can last for a very long period of time as the action of 




 "Politics is not, to me la, is not a sprint run, is a marathon. Ever step that you is 
 counted for future steps. You can sprint and win Teluk Intan easily, probably by 
 putting a Chinese candidate, but is a matter of principle whether what kind of 
 investment you are going to put. Every move that you are going to do is a 
 calculated move and an investment for the near future. .. We should have that kind 
 of (principle),  even when PAS initially started of putting a woman candidate, the 
 very first time of putting woman to contest, you see now how many woman are 
 there is Parliament under PAS ticket. So I think these are the things that, barriers 
 that we have to break in order to bring change. If you ask me, is all political 
 calculation, is all matter of gaining more in the future... (PKR 3). 
 
 This is agreed by PKR 2 where he believes that it is their job to educate the public 
and face the challenges, even though their principled decisions might cost them heavily.  
As a formed party, the main agenda should not be winning elections only, but should also 
be about bringing their ideology and convincing people to accept it.  From this point, we 
can see that PKR is a party that does not fulfil the criteria put forth by Adam et.al (2009) 
where a political party’s direction is based on the wishes of their supporters or general 
public.  Instead, PKR is taking a high level top-down approach in 'forcing' down their 
idea.  'Forcing' down an idea in a democratic society, especially in a society where 
political awareness is not low, may not be a good idea.  This form of top-down approach 
is inclined towards autocratic forms of ruling.  However, due to the intelligence 
delivering down their idea, which is positive to begin with, and with the great rhetorical 
skills, it does not seem to face extreme opposition from the masses,  This is in line with 
Krebs & Jackson (2007) suggestion that politics is a rhetorical competition.  The ability 
to deliver a party's propaganda, even though it may be fresh and a new idea, alienating 
the conventional propaganda, would reduce chances of success as shown by PKR. 
 
 "Then that's our job to educate them. We don't want to take then simple way out...  
 We also take the difficult path because our job is to reform, not just to win seat. If 
 our job  is just to win seat, we go along with what the public think is right..." 




Out of all the parties that have being discussed above, PAS is an interesting party for the 
reason that the full membership is not based on ethnicity, but on religion.  Even so, it too 
admits non-Muslims into one of their wings (which has been discussed in earlier chapters) 
at the same time. Although PAS is one of the oldest political parties in Malaysia, one of 
its obvious shifts in terms of values was in 2008 as mentioned by the PAS 3.  Previously, 
PAS had strong ties with "conservative" Islam in the hope of building an Islamic State in 
Malaysia.  Its propaganda mostly surrounded the idea of Islamic agenda.  However, in 
2008, there could be seen a clear trajectory from the older direction that they were taking 
to a newer direction of universal values within Islam which were more universally 
recognised values being pushed forward.  According to the PAS 3, in fact, those values 
such as good governance, against corruption, accountability, transparency and so on are 
within the teachings of Islam.  It is just that those values seldom are contextualised in the 
Islamic way.  From here, we can also see the shift from Islamic state agenda to a 
benevolent state (sometimes in Malaysia also referred to as welfare state).  This is not 
uncommon as Budge (1994) did suggest that a political party may shift their political 
direction by looking at the past election results.  It is these past results that give political 
parties a clue on whether their actions in the past during the elections can bring favours or 
harms to them.  In the past, PAS could hardly get the support from the non-Muslim 
community. 
 
 "What I am saying is, it is only in 2008... PAS cautiously broke away from its 
 Islamic agenda per say and evolving into what we call serious transformation 
 ending in us presenting in 2008 an agenda and better... a tagline called PAS For 
 All and almost like relinquishing Islamic state into a benevolent state. That's how 
 we transform ourselves to enlarge our support based from merely Muslim, who 
 are the hardcore, Malay Muslim, now extending and enlarging our support base   
 to embrace others and that's where PAS For All comes... Not only universal value, 
 we champion good governance, against corruption, accountability, transparency 
 all these universal... Of course that is very much Islamic, people don't realise that. 
 These are actually very Islamic issue, is just not universal...in 2008, that renewal, 
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 I wouldn't say repackaging, I would say is a  clear shift in political messaging , a 
 transformation of ideas, seeing Islam.. (PAS 3) 
  
 Apart from that, the PAS trajectory can also be seen clearly when they started to 
confront taboo issues which previously they were trying to avoid.  It is no longer a rural 
based or regional based party but has taken a more national centric stage, capturing seats 
all around Malaysia and in both rural and urban (including mixed seats). 
 
 "PAS is able to contextualise and reposition itself as a more national centric party. 
 That is significant, as an Islamic party, that is really significant. I would see, or 
 rather I would hope that it will truly evolve in time and PAS would really become 
 a kind of I would say as modern Islamic party, that is the right word...  What does 
 that mean is that PAS, as an Islamic party, bona fide from its inception is able to 
 now able to come face to face with challenges which were once upon a time like a 
 taboo to them. Right  now as you could see, PAS Supporters Club, 100% non-
 Malay, non-Muslim...". (PAS 3) 
 
 Although PAS, similar to DAP, it often being portrayed negatively by BN-
controlled media, PAS 1 says in fact, the party policy does not cover or benefit Muslims 
only, but all Malaysians.  He gives examples on non-Muslims being given equal 
treatment as the Muslim community including in the issue of giving out land to non-
Muslims, education scholarships and so on during their rule in Kelantan and Terengganu. 
This is because in Islamic teaching, even in a diverse society, no repression or unequal 
treatment should be accorded to the non-Muslim community.  However, as argued by 
Gramsci (2011), hegemony in the way of mindset controlling does not really differentiate 
between truth and perception.  Furthermore, in politics, once a perception is formed, such 
a perception is not easy to be overturned.  Similar to the DAP case, PAS was facing the 




 "Kita telah berjaya memerintah Kelantan sebanyak dua kali... Semasa 
 pemerintahan  kita di  Terengganu... kita berjaya menunjukkan adil untuk semua, 
 termasuklah minoriti bukan Islam di Terengganu, diberi tanah, diberi hak 
 pendidikan dan seumpamanya.  Di Kelantan, sebagai contoh, seorang pemimpin 
 MCA membuat kenyataan dia dapat biasiswa daripada kenyataan Kelantan 




 "We managed to rule Kelantan twice... During our rule in Terengganu... We 
 successfully shown fairness to all, including non-Muslim minority in Terengganu, 
 given land, given education right and alike. In Kelantan, for example, one MCA 
 leader made a statement that he received scholarship from Kelantan although he is 
 a Chinese..." (PAS 1) 
  
 Such a view is shared by its PAS 2 when he says that PAS nowadays is trying to 
champion for all Malaysians by introducing taglines such as "Benevolent state", "PAS for 
all", "Islam Mercy" and so on.  PAS, similar to other political parties, is trying to come 
out from their comfort zone and turn themselves into an inclusionary party as suggested 
by Kirchheimer (1996) in the catch-all concept.  Due to that, all those taglines above are 
to show that although PAS is adopting Islamic teachings, but at the same time it does not 
side-line the non-Muslim community.  These propaganda are introduced to reduce the 
fear of the non-Muslim community towards PAS due to the media influx of negative 
perception towards PAS. 
 
 "We try to champion for all. That is why we try to introduce Negara Kebajikan, 




 Although some might argue that all these changes are very minimal as PAS is still 
attached with Islam.  Simply, even the word Islam is existing all over, be it during their 
campaign rally, their propaganda, and speeches and so on.  However, one needs to 
acknowledge that nevertheless it is still an Islamic party to begin with.  Furthermore, as 
the PAS 3 puts it, for an ideological-based party to take such a step in shifting from their 
core conservative approach to a modernised (or liberal) approach, such a small step is in 
fact a huge trajectory for PAS.  Furthermore, PAS is gradually letting go its grip on the 
notion of an Islamic State and pushing further for a benevolent state, which is crucial in 
expanding its base to non-Muslims. 
 
 " For an ideological party to break away from doctrines and so called principles 
 and ethosand to the extent of dogmas is rather difficult. You can have more liberal, 
 pragmatic parties doing all sort of things without much consideration, shifting... is 
 easier for them to do such those kind of things. But for ideological party like PAS, 
 particularly religious-based party, it is in fact really unprecedented, and it has 
 taken a lot... for them to come to that kind of position. You may think it is a small 
 step, but is a small to a very big change in embracing a new what I call as plural 
 politics, ability to embrace national demands and challenges that once upon a time 
 we just sort of  steer away from it.  In this sense, I think it is significant. " (PAS 3) 
  
 PAS 1 has also agreed that it is important to bring now the message of Islam to a 
wider mass as they have the responsibility of disseminating the concept of Islam and 
fairness towards all as mentioned within the al-Quran. 
 
 "Kita mempunyai tanggungjawab untuk menyampaikan mesej Islam rahmat untuk 
 semua dan adil untuk semua. kerana Al-Quran mengajar kita kita perlu..." (PAS 1) 
 
 From here, we can see that both the camps within PAS, the cleric and the 
professionals are working hand-in-hand in presenting a new outlook for PAS. Also, 
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similar to DAP and PKR who push for universal values and educating the public through 
confronting with sensitive issues, PAS is also playing its part in educating people for a 
cleaner government.  Those who are poor should be given assistance while those welfare 
benefits or opportunities should not be misused under the name of "Malay".  Previously, 
questioning UMNO action of awarding contracts to Malays was a taboo and sensitive 
issue to confront with.  However, PAS is also stepping further in educating the public on 
those issues on how those contracts are awarded to UMNO Putera (it is a term to refer to 
Malay’s who have ties with UMNO, particularly to those who get benefits from UMNO) 
instead of ordinary Malay’s. 
 
 "...to support the Malays because they are still poor, they are still left behind in 
 business, yes, we  have to support.  But at the same time, like now we call 
 UMNOPutera, all the contract they give to UMNO, although they not run the 




From the beginning of this chapter, there were two main questions to be addressed, in this 
chapter the questions to answer were whether political parties are moving towards a new 
direction post-2008 General Election.  Secondly, whether Malaysian politics, from this 
party direction, stance and perception is moving towards de-ethnicisation. 
 
 For the first question, the answer is positive.  At least four and a half of the 
political parties above, if not the total of five agree that their political party is shifting 
towards a new direction.  For MCA, even though they are a Chinese-based party, but they 
are getting more inclusionary nowadays.  For DAP, from practically being seen as a 
Chinese party, it is getting more active in portraying their image as a 'multi-ethnic' party, 
while a similar case is with that of PAS where it is trying to impress more non-Muslims 
into their fold.  For PKR, they do not only practise non-ethnic politics, but in fact, this has 
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been the case since its inception.  For UMNO, part of the informants feel that UMNO 
itself might need a change as it is a better idea if they can reform themselves into a more 
inclusionary party while another part of the informants do not feel that it is necessary as 
the model of BN is to have inter-arching interaction at the leadership level instead of 
covering the whole community by an individual ethnic based-party.  With 4.5 out of 5 
political parties being inclined towards de-ethnicisation of politics, thus, it is justifiable to 
argue that political parties in Malaysia are making changes to their parties to 
accommodate with the new political flow since the latest political landscape. 
 
 On the second issue, the answer is positive as well.  Malaysian politics as a whole, 
led by political parties in the construction of political system is moving towards the 
direction of de-ethnicisation.  It is a rather one way process than a two-way process.  All 
the four political parties, namely MCA, PKR, DAP and PAS agree that Malaysian politics 
nowadays is moving away from ethnic politics.  The practice of 'old politics' is less viable 
with the latest development.  For this reason too, that is why they are keen to reform their 
own party and shift their political party direction wherever is necessary.  A slightly 
isolated party is UMNO, their members are split in terms of whether to agree or disagree 
with de-ethnicisation of Malaysian politics at the moment.  The reason I argue that it is a 
one-way process instead of a two-way process is because, part of the UMNO members 
agree to the trend of de-ethnicisation of Malaysian politics while the other half of them, 
even though they could not be convinced of the existence of de-ethnicisation, but at least 
they do not think that Malaysia politics is moving backwards to an even more extreme 
form of ethnic politics.  For these reasons, with a large majority of informants in 
agreement, as well as the political shifts in attitude, it is justifiable to argue that  















As previous chapters have shown Malaysian politics is gradually moving towards the 
direction of de-ethnicisation of politics through various measures such as the opening up 
of  party membership, changing party stances to more liberal and inclusive directions and 
so on.  However, this discussion can only show that those political parties do have the 
ambitions to make changes.  It does not necessarily equate to the notion that they do have 
the courage to take the first step into their ambitious political rejuvenation in real politics, 
which is election (political power).  Even if they do have the courage to make practical 
changes such as de-ethnicise their election candidates, it does not necessarily mean that 
voters are open to such a new idea.  Therefore, in this chapter, I would analyse the trend 
and the practicality side of Malaysian politics.  Two main issues will be addressed in this 
chapter.  Firstly, it is on whether voters themselves are showing the readiness to accept 
non-ethnic politics in Malaysia.  To answer this question, I would look at the voting trend 
through the ethnicity perspective, which is whether voters can accept their representative 
as somebody coming from other ethnic groups.  The second issue to be addressed is on 
whether political parties have taken new measures in de-ethnicising their real politics 
strategy.  For this issue, I would be looking at whether political parties are ready to 
nominate candidates coming from the minority groups within their party to contest.  This 
readiness is important because unlike political rhetoric from previous chapters which may 
cost a political party's image should they not follow through on their talk, in real politics 
(elections candidature), nominating a candidate away from the conventional practice is a 
big gamble to them.  Should they lose, it is going to cost them a real political loss, which 




 Although the ethnicity perspective is crucial in determining whether the 
Malaysian politics is moving towards de-ethnicisation, the political system itself, 
especially the electorate system does have a direct impact towards the winning strategy.  
It is a package for both electorate strategies and effort to push for de-ethnicisation of 
politics.  This is because even if their ambition is to encourage for a non-ethnicity based 
politics, they would need to be sure that their ambition can be executed practically.  
Therefore, one of the measures taken by them is to form a coalition party while at the 
same time, make their party more inclusive to all.  Furthermore, due to lacking of 
literatures on how a coalition party can drive to de-ethnicisation or how coalition party 
decides who to contest where and how many, therefore, for this chapter, I would look at 
whether a coalition party system is a feasible method and how this coalition party can 
help them to win the real power; election.  This is because should the coalition system fail 
to gain power or the coalition itself fail to be inclusive of all, de-ethnicisation will be a 
harder step to achieve. 
 
 
6.2 COALITION PARTY IN MALAYSIA 
A coalition government forming after an election is not uncommon due to the inability of 
a single political party to form a majority government.  This kind of working relationship 
comes after an election, and ironically, they contested again one another during the 
election (Strauss 2003).  Furthermore, such kind of coalition government will  be 
accorded their office portfolio according to their seats contribution (Magone 2000).  This 
is not surprising as well when a government period ends, these coalition governments will 
split back into their political party and contest again one another.  However, there are 
another type of coalition party which is formed before an election.  There are coalition 
parties which are formed prior to election and present themselves as a potential coalition 
government should they win the election.  This type of coalition government is the kind 
of political cooperation that works in Malaysia at the moment.  Pre-election coalition 
present themselves in a single 'identity' to their voters for consideration.  As these parties 
are ready to form the government should they win the majority of seats, the coalition 
party itself has already had a commonality in hand (Gandhi, Reuter 2013).  As suggested 
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by Benoit (2001), such a coalition party must fulfil at least three of the following criteria; 
present a joint candidature list for the election, not to contest one another should parties 
not be in a joint list, support one another 'strategically' in a multi-round election (such as 
withdrawal in a particular round).  This is one of the reasons why I argue that Malaysian 
politics, if going to move towards de-ethnicisation through the coalition model, the 
electorate strategy is important in two-ways; such a coalition will compel all the 
component parties to work together, even if they are an ethnic-based party on their own, 
they cannot show their salience too obviously or take too an extreme of a stance in 
catering for the needs of their own community only.  This is because they need the votes 
from people out of their own comfort zone.  Therefore, this encourages for a more 
moderate and inclusive policy.  On the other way round, due to the inclusivity support 
(votes from all segments of the society), this will give them an incentive not to behave in 
an extreme manner, which in the end will bring them towards moderation as well.  
Therefore, even though coalition systems may not link directly to the issue of de-
ethnicisation, but such a coalition system, in practical terms will determine to a certain 
extent whether de-ethnicisation of politics can work, based on the current political 
scenario.  Unless each of the component parties manages to gain wholesome support from 
all segments of the society, coalition party cooperation may be viewed in another 
dimension, but not for the current support trend.  
  
 Forming a coalition party may be useful to gain more support and further enhance 
their chances of governmental offices.  This is because component parties within the 
same coalition will be able to expand their support from the supporters of their 
component partners apart from their own (Duverger 1954).  However, this mathematical 
calculation may not be true all the time.  Support for a component party may be 
withdrawn should their component partner within the coalition not be a preference of the 
voters.  Should this scenario happen, a coalition party is actually a liability to them.  This 
is the concern raised by Gschwend and Hooghe (2008) that coalition with ideologically 
strange partnerships may harm their reputation for future elections.  Apart from that, 
Carroll, Cox (2007) also argue that whether participation in a coalition party can be a 
good investment.  Should such participation occur it can provide at least to a certain 
benefits for them, such as higher (percentage of) votes gained, higher chances of forming 
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the government due to net mathematical addition of one plus one equal to two without 
getting harm or liability and so on, then such a coalition is a good idea.  Otherwise, the 
liability borne will be more than the benefits received.  Therefore, Christiansen, Nielsen, 
Pedersen (2004) argue that in order to get the optimum benefits from the coalition party 
formation, component parties need to send out a clear message that they indeed can work 
together. 
 
 Another reason for forming a pre-election coalition is better than forming it post-
election is because voters would have more information about them (Golder 2006).  This 
is because forming a coalition after an election may have lots of uncertainty such as 
whether they incoming policies are consistent with one another, whether those component 
parties are compatible to one another and so on.  With such a formation, it shows that 
they are ready to govern should they win as the process of forming such a coalition is 
attached with their negotiation during the process.  Due to this, voters may have more 
confidence in voting for them rather than not having enough information and keep on 
guessing the potential future should a not yet formed coalition party win the election.  
Therefore, it is not a surprise that when Ibenskas (2015) says that pre-electoral coalition 
will change the election outcome.  Factors leading to their choice of party to vote for may 
change, especially for those fence-sitters.  However, in Malaysian politics, the opposition 
parties during the 2008 election had yet to form a formal coalition themselves (even until 
now it is not formalised yet in terms of not yet formally registering as a coalition party 
with the Registrar of Society, but at least after 2008 General Election results, they have 
started to form all kinds of necessary organisation needs, such as name, council, spelling 
out working relationships between component parties  and so on).  At that time, they were 
applying the second method suggested by Benoit, which was to abstain from contesting 
against one another (although there are some exceptional seats, which I considered as 
isolated cases). 
 
 A coalition party, according to Ferrara, Herron (2005), is a necessity for smaller 
parties in a first-past-the-post electoral system as these parties are facing extremely 
though challenges to win seats.  Unlike proportionate representatives, their percentage of 
189 
 
shares may be converted into a small amount of seats, first-past-the-post system will 
negate the votes obtained even though it is 49.99%, a high percentage of votes so long as 
their opponent gets a single vote more.  Therefore, in order for a small party to win, they 
need to combine themselves into a coalition party (Golder 2005).  In real politics in 
Malaysia, that is a factor too that encourages for the formation of a coalition party in 
Malaysia.  As discussed in previous chapters, although DAP and PAS may not be a 
rigidly ethnic-based party, however, the image portrayed onto them is as such.  This case 
is made worse when the issue of split votes for opposition occurs in a multi-cornered 
fight.  Therefore, this is crucial to combine these opposition parties together and present 
them as a single unit for their supporters. 
 
 Chakrabarty (2006) suggests an interesting premise when he argues that the 
crucial point in the process of forming a coalition party is not about 'ideological purify' 
but 'the exigency of the situation'.  This may be true to be applied to Pakatan Rakyat 
earlier formation as they at that time would need to form such a coalition if they wished 
to form state governments.  However, at the same time, this does not mean that such 
urgent needs will end up there without further action.  They themselves would need to 
prove in their governmental decision making and policy implementation that they can 
actually work together and they are moving towards the same direction, not taking 
ethnicity as an absolute agenda but on merits. 
 
 Therefore, although the formation of a coalition party may not necessarily mean 
that it can directly de-ethnicise the political landscape of Malaysia, there is no doubt that 
such a formation can be an apparatus to achieve de-ethnicisation and more practically, as 
an electoral strategy in winning an election.  Whether political parties in Malaysia are 
practically following through on their talk of putting aside (or comparatively, towards 
more de-ethnicisation) ethnicity, this will be discussed in further detail below. 
 
6.3 ELECTORAL PRACTISES IN MALAYSIA 
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In Malaysia, the electoral system that is practised is a single-member plurality system.  
Under the system, each constituency will be represented by one elected representative.  
As there is no maximum limit for the number of candidates contesting a particular seat, 
the number of candidates for each seat varies.  This also depends on the political 
cooperation among opposition parties (Mozaffar 2013).  For all the elections, BN 
nominated only one candidate as representing BN, although BN alone constitute many 
political parties within it.  For the opposition, the number of candidates depends on the 
electoral pact agreed among them (Cotts 2012).  For the 2008 and 2013 General Elections, 
due to the electoral pact formed between PKR, DAP, and PAS, most of the seats in 
Peninsular Malaysia were contested by two candidates, alongside candidates from other 
smaller parties and independents (although there exists a tiny number of isolated cases 
where PAS and PKR candidates stood for the same seat).  However, for the case in the 
2004 General Election, due to the non-existence of a political pact among opposition 
parties (the only political cooperation was between PKR and PAS), such electoral settings 
encouraged a three-cornered fight or more (Kabner 2014). 
 
 In terms of seat allocations for component parties to contest, in BN, the allocation 
is fixed for each component party, although it does permit seat swap and seat loan, but the 
number of such seats wouldn't be big (Berger 2010).  Therefore, as our focus of studies in 
BN is on UMNO and MCA, the ethnicity of the candidate contesting in a particular seat 
is fixed as well.  This is because, if a seat is allocated to UMNO, the candidate from BN 
will be Malay, and likewise, MCA seats will have a Chinese candidate.  
 
 Such ethnicity of candidates in opposition is different.  Although seat allocations 
for PKR, DAP, and PAS are fixed before the election, the ethnicity of their candidate is 
unknown until their parties announce the name of the candidate (Lim 2014).  For DAP, 
most of the candidates will be non-Malay, but in recent elections (which is to be 
discussed in a later section of this chapter), DAP did nominate a Malay candidate for their 
Parliamentary seats, and won the seats.  Similarly, (which is also discussed in a later 
section), PAS had started to nominate non-Malay as their candidate.  However, for PKR, 
the ethnicity of their candidate is largely unknown.  This is because PKR is a diverse 
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party and the party does not 'link' itself to a particular ethnic group, nor is dominated by 
any particular ethnic group. 
 The discussion above has portrayed how the electoral system works in Malaysia 
and how different political parties approach the election differently, especially in 
ethnicity terms.  However, one concept that may not be directly related to (de-)ethnic 
politics is gerrymandering.  By giving a brief idea of how gerrymandering works in 
Malaysia, readers could gain a better idea of the gerrymandering practice when looking at 
the majority votes between constituencies.  In Malaysia (similar to other countries), 
gerrymandering is a mal-appropriation practice (Samuels & Snyder 2001) where the 
boundaries between constituencies are manipulated to give advantage to one side 
(Greenberg & Pepinsky 2013).  Although such practice in Malaysia gives advantages to 
the ruling party, BN, this does not relate much to ethnicity, but instead is related to the 
political competition at that time.  At the peak of Islamisation, due to the tough 
competition between UMNO and PAS, seats are craved to be as diverse as possible, to 
give UMNO an advantage because UMNO could lure non-Muslim voters easier than PAS.  
However, at the time where non-Malays throw their strong support behind opposition 
parties, seats are craved in a way where non-Malay voters are put in the same 
constituency to give them a win in that seat, at the same time dispersing Malay voters into 
a couple of seats to increase the chances of those seats.  Therefore, although 
gerrymandering does favour BN, this is not due to the ethnic-based component parties of 
BN, but rather is due to electoral arrangements in winning more seats in number rather 
than more popular votes.  
 
 
6.4 CLASIFICATION OF GROUPS 
For this reason, the contest between identity of the candidates will be divided into three 
categories, namely Malay versus Malay seats, non-Malay versus non-Malay seats and 
Malay versus non-Malay seat.  First of all, such classifications to lump all the non-Malays 
such as Chinese and Indian into the same category is because of the nature of the problem 
that such communities are facing as explained in previous writings.  Furthermore, the 
contextualisation of Chinese and Indians in politics are less severed as compared to 
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between Malay and non-Malay.  For instance, DAP does have a significant number of 
Indian elected representatives and some of them have climbed to the highest hierarchy 
within the party. However, this is not being viewed or argued by their opponents who 
instead focus on the Malay-Chinese issue.  Similarly to PAS where attention is paid to 
whether PAS is going to field in non-Muslim candidates rather than paying attention to 
whether PAS is fielding in Chinese or Indian candidates.  The same goes to BN where the 
target of attack by the opposition is often on either UMNO alone or onto collectively 
against MCA, MIC, Gerakan and so on.  Therefore, it is justifiable for such a 
classification to be made. 
 
 On the practical side of classification, the ideal grouping will be a candidate from 
BN contesting against another candidate from the opposition.  This will make the 
classification very much easy without much criticism.  However, the practical grouping 
does not always work that way.  Therefore, a few guidelines are made in relation to such 
an issue.  Firstly, should a seat not be contested by more than one candidate (meaning the 
candidate won without contest), it will be categorised as a seat contested by the same 
ethnic group.  Secondly, should a seat be contested by 2 parties plus independent 
candidates, the classification will only be on the two political parties and this research is 
focusing on party politics instead of individual politics.  Generally, these independent 
candidates secure much lower votes as compared to the political party candidates.  
Therefore, such issue should not create much trouble. However, there are also rare 
occasions where independent candidates secure more votes than a political party.  In such 
instances, a guideline as above is drawn. 
 
 Thirdly, similar to the second guideline, this guideline is to deal with cases where 
more than two political parties are contesting in the same seats.  Although there is only a 
small number of such contests especially for 2008 (since compromising seat negotiation 
has taken place) and 2013 General Elections (as PR had then been formed), but such 
cases happened for a number of seats during the 2004 General Election as the election did 
not have political seat allocation within opposition parties.  For such instances, only the 
top two political parties would be considered (which means that the seat is considered as 
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BN against another highest votes opposition party).  Fourthly, should a candidate be a 
Muslim convert with non-Malay ethnic identity contesting against another candidate from 
either the same ethnicity or religion, they will be considered as the same identity contest.  
For instance, it has always been a contest in Kelantan state assembly for a couple of times 
where a Chinese Muslim from PAS is contesting against another Chinese candidate from 
BN.  The reason the groups the together under the same category is due to the local 
sentiment where Muslim convert "ethnic" identity is ambiguous (as the everyday-defined 
ethnicity might be different from government-defined ethnicity). 
 
 
6.5 CLASSIFICATION ON ETHNIC BLOC VOTING 
A Malay voting for a Malay may not necessarily means that he is voting along the 
ethnicity line.  At the same time, a Malay voting for a Chinese may also not necessarily 
means that he does not put ethnicity as his consideration.  The two premises above are 
true.  A Malay who votes for a Malay candidate instead of a Chinese candidate may be 
due to the Malay candidate being of a better calibre, and so on.  He is voting according to 
capability instead of ethnicity.  Therefore, such a premise is ambiguous in arguing that he 
is an ethnicity/non-ethnicity based person.  However, for the second premise, should a 
Malay be willing to vote for a Chinese candidate, this means that the person did not vote 
alongside his ethnicity line.  Although there can be other reasons for his actions, but 
generally, it is justifiable to argue that ethnicity may not be his consideration in such an 
instance (or at least not main consideration). 
 
 Therefore, for the analysis part of this chapter, I will be arguing the case through 
ideal mathematical calculations and negation of common sense statements, as similar to 
the principle explained in the two simple examples above.  As this writing is from the 
perspective of ethnicity, only seats that are contested by different ethnic candidates will 
be discussed.  To define whether a seat is considered to be an ethnically bloc voting seat, 
a few guidelines will be used for consideration.  Firstly, it is to see if the seat has been 
won by different ethnic candidates within these three General Elections.  If the seat has 
194 
 
been won by different ethnicity within these three General Elections, the seat is ruled out 
as ideally an ethnic bloc voting seat.  Although political parties might switch seats with 
their component party or shift the ethnicity of the candidate, however, as weighting 
between political party’s perspective and ethnicity perspective, this writing will pick the 
ethnicity perspective over political parties.  Furthermore, this seat swapping may be 
considered as isolated cases as the allocation of seats are generally following the previous 
arrangement (as there are no seat increment for these three General Elections).  Secondly, 
should the same ethnic candidate win the seat throughout the contestation period, it will 
then be further analysed whether the winning candidate is coming from the highest ethnic 
group of the particular seat.  If the winning candidate is not the highest percentage of the 
voters composition, the seat will be ruled out as well.  Thirdly, should the winning 
candidate come from the same ethnicity with the highest percentage of the seat 
composition, it will then be further investigated to see if the majority of votes are gained 
by the winning candidate.  Should the majority be large and requires a large amount of 
inter-ethnic voting, therefore the seat will be ruled out as well.  The fourth classification 
is when the winning candidate is coming from the same ethnic group as the highest ethnic 
voters and at the same time, the percentage of votes received is near to the ethnicity 
composition of voters for the particular seat, with such a result it may be hard to assume 
whether it is voting according or not along the ethnicity line.  This is because although 
the result may be due to ideal ethnic bloc voting, at the same time, it can also be due to 
cross-ethnic voting that causes such a result.  Therefore, such results would not affirm 
whether it is or it is not an ethnic bloc voting.  In general, the classifications in this 
writing will be based on this guideline which depends on the ideal assumption of 
ethnically voting bloc.  This is because there is no way (at least in this thesis and the fact 
that political parties are the main unit of analysis instead of voters) to affirm whether a 
person votes according to the ethnicity line, such a logically negation method is 
justifiable to negate seats that are (non-)ethnically voted.  The table below gives an 
example of different scenarios in ethnicity group naming so that it can be understand 











Different ethnic group 
candidates won in a same seat 
Non-Ethnic 
Block Voting 
If different ethnic candidates can 
win in that seat with constant (near 
to constant) ethnic composition, this 
shows that a person can win 
regardless of ethnicity. 
Malay candidate won but the 
seats are of Chinese as the 
highest voting population 
Non-Ethnic 
Block Voting 
If voters vote along ethnicity line, 
the winner should be Chinese and 
not Malay. 
Malay candidate won and the 
seats have Malay as the 
highest voting population but 




Cross-ethnic votes is needed, 
therefore, negating the fact that 
people voted along ethnicity line.  
Malay candidate won and the 
seats has Malay as the highest 
population while the majority 
votes is small  
Uncertain Should ethnic line voting be used, it 
will show such a result.  At the 
same time, should cross-ethnic 
votes happen, it may show such a 
scenario as well. 
Table 5: Classification of (non-)ethnic bloc voting 
(Ethnicity above is just for illustration only while the principle of it remains) 
  
 As discussed in previous chapters, 2004 is the best performance for BN 
throughout Malaysian political history where BN won more than 90% of Parliamentary 
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seats.  For PR, 2008 was their best ever performance at that time where they managed to 
deny a two third majority domination of BN and rule in five states.  Their Parliamentary 
performance was enhanced further in the 2013 General Election.  Therefore, it will be 
fairer to analyse the peak performance for both BN and PR as to dilute the party influence 
onto ethnicity.  This is because as a lot of the seats are fixed based on intra coalition party 
or alliance seat allocation negotiations (although there are some changes from one 
election to another), therefore, by going through the peak performance of both BN and 
PR, it can dilute the fact that a candidate won the seat based on the party influence rather 
than the ethnicity of the candidate.  This is because since BN had an upper hand in the 
2004 General Election while PR had an upper hand in the 2008 and 2013 General 
Election, the seat should shift hands according to generalisation of election results.  For a 
simple example, if a Malay candidate from BN won in 2004 General Election, the seat 
should shift to PR even if PR is fielding in a non-Malay candidate should party influence 
overwhelm ethnicity.  Although there might be other reasons for winning a particular seat, 
but for the purpose of generalisation and from the perspective of ethnicity in Malaysian 
politics, seats will be ruled in or out of ideally ethnic bloc voting category. 
 
 
6.6 ELECTION RESULT ANALYSIS 
For this section, I will analyse in depth the ethnicity of candidates and the ethnic 
composition of voters within a particular seat.  For this section, I will follow the 
classification as highlighted above in classifying whether these Parliamentary seats, are 
contested by different ethnic groups are voting along ethnicity lines or if it is the other 
way around.  Below is the classification of Parliamentary seats for 2004, 2008 and the 
2013 General Election according to ethnicity contestation.  The data is generated through 
the information from Election Commission publication and printed mainstream 
newspaper (should Election Commission have not published the report at the data 














2004 102 39 25 166 
2008 101 46 19 166 
2013 107 47 12 166 
Table 6: Classification of ethnic competition for 2004, 2008 and 2013 General Election 
Parliamentary seats (Reconstructed from Election Commission Report 2004, 2008, 2013) 
 
GENERAL ELECTION BN PKR DAP PAS 
2004 198 1 12 8 
2008 140 31 28 23 
2013 133 30 38 21 
Table 7:  Number of Parliamentary won by BN, PKR, DAP and PAS in 2004, 2008 and 
2013 General Elections. (Reconstructed from Election Commission Report 2004, 2008, 
2013) 
 
 From the table above, we can see that the number of Malay versus non-Malay 
seats is actually decreasing instead of increasing if de-ethnicisation is taking place.  This 
is because de-ethnicisation is about nominating candidates regardless of ethnicity, the 
number should be higher.  However, a higher number of Malay versus non Malay seats 
does not necessarily mean that it brings de-ethnicisation.  For BN, the allocation of seats 
are quite fixed and for instance, if the seat is awarded to MCA, we cannot expect a non-
Chinese candidate to be contesting.  Therefore, the burden should be shifted to PR instead 
as they claimed themselves to be multi-ethnic.  As there are a significant number of seats 
where BN does not allocate it to the highest percentage of ethnicity composition to their 
community party (A Malay majority seat is allocated to MCA or MIC instead), this may 
cause the alternation of the number.  For example, if a Malay majority seat is allocated to 
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MCA while PR, just for the sake of playing along ethnicity line and purposely nominates 
a Malay candidate due to the nature of the seat, the number of Malay versus non Malay 
seats may increase but not for the de-ethnicisation reason.  Similarly, using the same 
example, if PR does not care about the seat's ethnicity composition (not using ethnicity 
advantage) but nominates their candidate based on merit (and nominates a Chinese 
candidate),  the number of Malay versus non Malay seats may be lower, but for de-
ethnicisation reason.  Therefore, the number of such Malay versus non Malay candidate 
seats could not be used as a parameter to measure the readiness of political parties and 
people towards de-ethnicisation.  A better measurement is suggested above on how to 
categorise whether voters in that particular seat voted according to ethnicity line or 
otherwise. 
 
 In order to understand better on how the actual result can be translated into the 
categorisation of whether such a seat can be classified as ideally block voting or the other 
way, it is necessary to analyse those seats one by one according to states.  Although such 
analysis may be full with numbers, but such numbers, apart from  affirming (or negating) 
the idea of ideally ethnic block voting, the analysis could itself provide a wider scope on 
the kind of seats that encounter with such Malay against non- Malay contest.  Below are 
the three tables classifying ethnic competition for Parliamentary elections in 2004, 2008 
and 2013.  
PARLIAMENT 2004 







Perlis 3 0 0 3 
Kedah 13 0 2 15 
Kelantan 14 0 0 14 
Terengganu 8 0 0 8 
Penang 5 6 2 13 
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Perak 10 9 5 24 
Pahang 10 2 2 14 
Selangor 9 6 7 22 
Federal Territories 5 6 2 13 
Negeri Sembilan 5 2 1 8 
Malacca 4 2 0 6 
Johor 16 6 4 26 
TOTAL 102 39 25 166 
Table 8: Classification of ethnic competition for 2004 General Election Parliamentary 
seats (Reconstructed from Election Commission Report 2004) 
 
PARTY MALAY NON-MALAY 
UMNO 111 0 
MCA 39 0 
PKR 31 12 
DAP 3 35 
PAS 83 0 
Table 9:  Classification of candidate by UMNO, MCA, PKR, DAP and PAS by ethnicity 

















Perlis 3 0 0 3 
Kedah 13 2 0 15 
Kelantan 14 0 0 14 
Terengganu 8 0 0 8 
Penang 4 7 2 13 
Perak 11 10 3 24 
Pahang 10 2 2 14 
Selangor 10 9 3 22 
Federal Territories 5 7 1 13 
Negeri Sembilan 5 2 1 8 
Malacca 4 2 0 6 
Johor 14 5 7 26 
TOTAL 101 46 19 166 
Table 10: Classification of ethnic competition for 2008 General Election Parliamentary 
seats (Reconstructed from Election Commission Report 2008) 
 
PARTY MALAY NON-MALAY 
UMNO 116 0 
MCA 37 0 
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PKR 50 14 
DAP 2 34 
PAS 62 0 
Table 11:  Classification of candidate by UMNO, MCA, PKR, DAP and PAS by ethnicity 
in 2008 General Election. (Reconstructed from Election Commission Report 2008) 
 
PARLIAMENT 2013 







Perlis 3 0 0 3 
Kedah 13 2 0 15 
Kelantan 14 0 0 14 
Terengganu 8 0 0 8 
Penang 5 7 1 13 
Perak 12 11 1 24 
Pahang 11 2 1 14 
Selangor 10 9 3 22 
Federal Territories 7 4 2 13 
Negeri Sembilan 5 2 1 8 
Malacca 4 2 0 6 
Johor 15 8 3 26 
TOTAL 107 47 12 166 
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Table 12: Classification of ethnic competition for 2013 General Election Parliamentary 
seats (Reconstructed from Election Commission Report 2013) 
PARTY MALAY NON-MALAY 
UMNO 121 0 
MCA 36 0 
PKR 49 16 
DAP 3 33 
PAS 64 1 
Table 13:  Classification of candidate by UMNO, MCA, PKR, DAP and PAS by ethnicity 
in 2013 General Election. (Reconstructed from Election Commission Report 2013) 
 
 From the three tables above, some of the states are showing exactly the same 
composition of contest while some other states are showing a shift.  Focus will be paid on 
those Malay versus non-Malay seats and a loser look will be applied to the impact of such 
a trend towards the result.  For the first four states listed in the table above, the 
composition is almost equal.  Perlis, Kelantan and Terengganu are showing exactly the 
same composition.  Such trend is not surprising as the demography of the states are 
mainly comprised of Malays.  UMNO is contesting in all those seats while for the 
opposition, it is either by PAS (mainly) or PKR.  For the state of Kedah, the contest for 
Malay-Malay seat remains the same for three consecutive elections.  The only shift is for 
the Parliamentary seats of Alor Setar and Padang Serai.  Both seats are having a Malay 
majority voters with Alor Setar having 61.2% while Padang Serai is having 55.6% of 
Malay voters.  In 2004 General Election, where both seats were seeing Malay candidates 
against a Chinese candidate, both Chinese candidates won the seat at that occasion.  
Mathematically, both Chinese candidates have broken the trend of ethnic bloc voting 
while the subsequent 2008 and 2013 General Election is having non-Malay versus non-




 For the state of Penang, different ethnicities contesting the same seat happen in 
Nibong Tebal and Bukit Bendera (2004), Nibong Tebal and Bayan Baru (2008) and Bukit 
Bendera (2013).  Nibong Tebal is a mixed seat with Malay voters constituting 44.9% 
while Chinese and Indian voters comprise of 37.3% and 17.6% respectively.  In 2004, the 
seat was won by a Malay candidate against a Chinese candidate while the 2008 results 
showed otherwise (2013 had a Malay against a Malay candidate).  Therefore, from these 
results, it shows that the seat had been won by different ethnic groups while going against 
different ethnic opponents.  For Bukit Bendera seat, it is a Chinese majority seat with a 
composition of 73.7% while the Malay only constitutes of 14%.  Even so, the Malay 
candidate managed to win the seat in the 2013 General Election going against a Chinese 
candidate although in 2004, it was a Chinese candidate victory against a Malay candidate 
(2008 was having a Chinese-Chinese candidate).   The last Parliamentary seat in the state 
of Penang having such a trend was Bayan Baru seat.  It is a mixed seat comprises of 
49.0% of Chinese voter and 39.2% of Malay voters.  The 2004 and 2013 election were 
seeing a Chinese candidate going against another Chinese candidate.  Our focus is on the 
2008 result where it is a Malay candidate going against a Chinese candidate where the 
Malay candidate scored victory for the higher-Chinese-voters seat.  Therefore, in the state 
of Penang for Parliamentary seat, it does not show that ethnicity is relative with the result. 
 
 For the state of Perak, out of the three General Elections, those Parliamentary 
seats that saw different ethnic candidates contesting against each other were Bukit 
Gantang (2004), Tapah (2004), Lumut (2004, 2008 and 2013), Bagan Datok (2004), 
Tanjong Malim (2004 and 2008), Gerik (2008).  Starting off with Bukit Gantang seat, 
although it comprises of 64.8% of Malay voters, but the seat is won by a Chinese 
candidate.  Tapah is an interesting seat to look at.  The interesting part of the seat is that 
the seat is a very ethnically diverse seat, while Orang Asli (aborigine) from Peninsular 
Malaysia constitutes 11.8% (not a common composition for aborigine) of the total voters 
for the seat (Malay 46.5%, Chinese 27.9%, Indian 13.3%).  In 2004, the seat was 
contested by a Malay and Indian candidate in which the seat went to the Indian candidate.  
To add-on with the interesting part of the seat, this seat could hardly be ideally dissected 
according to ethnicity.  Ideal bloc voting, Indian voters alone could never have made the 
candidate win the seats.  Even with the sum of Indian and Chinese percentage it would 
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still have been lower than the Malay percentage alone, but the result may be different if 
we were to sum-up Indian, Chinese and Orang Asli votes together.  Therefore, for this 
seat, we could not claim that such a seat was from the ethnicity perspective.  Lumut, 
which is contested by Malay and Chinese candidates consecutively for 2004, 2008 and 
2013 General Election, is a seat comprised of 51.3% of Malay voters.  Although the seat 
was won by a Chinese candidate in 2004 and 2008 election, but the election was won by a 
Malay candidate in 2013 General Election with the Malay candidate securing 40,308 
votes, while the Chinese candidate secured 32,140 votes.  Therefore, the result from these 
3 elections show that Malay or Chinese candidate has won the seat before.  
 
 The next seat to be discussed is Bagan Datok Parliamentary seat where the seat is 
contested by a Malay candidate against an Indian candidate during the 2004 General 
Election.  Although the percentage of Malay voters in the seat constitutes only 56.5%, but 
the total votes that were gained by the Malay candidate were 17,049 votes as compared to 
4,510 votes secured by the Indian candidate.  Therefore, ideal ethnic bloc voting does not 
work here too by looking at the large majority of votes secured by the Malay candidate.  
A large amount of cross-ethnic voting is required for such a large majority of votes to 
take place.  Tanjong Malim, being a 53.5% of Malay voters seat, was won by a Chinese 
candidate on both occasions where a Chinese candidate was going against a Malay 
candidate (in 2004 and 2008 General elections while 2013 General election was seeing a 
Chinese candidate going against another Chinese candidate in which the seat is still held 
by the same party consecutively for these three terms).  For the reason that a Chinese 
candidate won in a Malay as then highest composition seat, therefore the seat itself is 
ruled out for the ideally ethnic bloc voting framework.  The last Parliamentary seat to be 
looked at is for the state of Perak is Gerik seat.  From these 3 General Election, Gerik was 
only contested by different ethnic candidates during the 2008 General Election.  Gerik 
seat constitutes of 68.1% of Malay voters.  In 2008 General Election, the seat was won by 
a Chinese candidate against a Malay candidate.  Its predecessor and successor was a 
Malay candidate when they went against another Malay candidate during those election.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that this seat has been won by both Malay and Chinese 
candidates before, and a Chinese candidate is able to triumph against a Malay candidate 
in this Malay majority seat.  As a summary for the seat of Perak, this state can be said as 
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scoring a perfect score in negating ethnicity as the element in ideal ethnic bloc voting (if 
we negate the Bagan Datok seat as well by looking at the large majority). 
 Moving on to the state of Pahang, the largest state in the Peninsular of Malaysia 
geographically.  Out of three latest General Elections, only three seats had seen different 
ethnic candidates contesting against one another.  These seats are Kuantan (2004 and 
2008), Bentong (2004) and Raub (2008 and 2013).  Kuantan seat comprises of 62.5% of 
Malay voters.  Both 2004 and 2008 General Elections were seeing Kuantan being 
contested by Malay and a Chinese candidates. The results were fairly distributed between 
them where a Chinese candidate won in the 2004 General Election with a Malay 
candidate winning in the 2008 General Election.  The next interesting seat to be discussed 
is Bentong Parliamentary seat.  This is because the seat has been won by the same 
Chinese candidate against all three main ethnic groups in Malaysia (in 2004, he won 
against a Malay candidate; in 2008, he won against an Indian candidate; in 2013, he won 
against a Chinese candidate).  This may or may not be coincidental, but with such a 
scenario, the composition of ethnicity does not seem to matter anymore.  The last seat to 
be discussed for the state of Pahang is Raub Parliamentary seat.  Although 2004 General 
Election for this seat was seeing two Chinese candidates going against each other, but the 
subsequent General Elections were seeing a Malay candidate going against a Chinese 
candidate, in which a Chinese candidate won in 2008, while a Malay candidate won in 
2013. Based on the analysis above, up to the state of Pahang, the Malaysian elections are 
still seeing ethnicity as non-relative to election results by looking at it on ideal ethnic bloc 
voting. 
 
 The next state to be discussed is the state of Selangor.  Selangor, being one of the 
richest and most developed states in Malaysia, has the highest number of Malay versus 
non-Malay Parliamentary seat contests in 2004 General Election and co-share the top 
position with Johor in 2013 General Election.  For 2004 General Election, Selangor was 
seeing such contests in 7 Parliamentary seats, namely Hulu Selangor, Ampang, Pandan, 
Puchong, Kelana Jaya, Subang and Kota Raja, while the 2008 and 2013 General 
Elections were seeing exactly the same trend for once again the seat of Hulu Selangor, 
Pandan and Kota Raja.  To start, let me begin with the three consecutively repeated seats 
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which are Hulu Selangor, Pandan and Kota Raja.  For the Hulu Selangor Parliamentary 
seat, it was contested by a Malay candidate against an Indian candidate throughout the 
three terms.  An Indian candidate managed to win the seat in the 2004 and 2013 General 
Election while the Malay candidate won in 2008 General Election.  Since the seat was 
won by a different ethnic group, therefore the composition of ethnicity for the seat does 
not matter in this seat.  Similarly, for Pandan Parliamentary seat, it was won by a 
different ethnic candidate with Chinese winning in 2004 and 2008 General Elections 
(going against a Malay candidate) while a Malay candidate won in 2013 (going against a 
Chinese candidate).  The similar trend applies to the Kota Raja Parliamentary seat, as 
well where an Indian candidate won in the 2004 General Election (going against a Malay 
candidate) while a Malay candidate won against an Indian candidate in the next two 
consequent General Elections. 
 
 The next dimension of discussion is for the balance of the four Parliamentary 
seats, namely Ampang, Puchong, Kelana Jaya, Subang which see different ethnic 
candidates only in the 2004 General Election.  Ampang, a Parliamentary seat which 
comprises of 55.3% of Malay voters was seeing a Malay candidate going against an 
Indian candidate during the 2004 General Election.  In that election, the Malay candidate 
won against the Indian candidate.  The Malay candidate gained 33,214 votes while the 
Indian candidate only gained 13,482 votes.  The Malay candidate’s votes were about 2.5 
times greater than that of the Indian candidate.  This case is similar to the Bagan Datok 
(state of Perak) case above where Malay constitutes between 50% to 60% of the overall 
composition only, but the large majority gained by the Malay candidate shows that ideal 
ethnic bloc voting does not work here.  Ideally, by assuming that all Malay voters vote for 
the Malay candidate, the Malay candidate still needs a large amount of votes from other 
ethnic groups in order to achieve such a large majority.  Going by this assumption, it is 
justifiable to argue that ideal ethnic bloc voting does not work over here as well.  The 
next Parliamentary seat to be discussed is the Puchong Parliamentary seat.  The seat 
comprises of 43.5% Chinese, 39.4% Malays and 15.9% Indians.  While 2008 and 2013 
General Election were seeing non-Malay candidate going against non-Malay candidate, 
2004 General Election was the most difficult one to deal with.  This is because the seat 
was facing a three cornered fight, with a Chinese candidate from BN securing 21,291 
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votes while the Malay candidate from PAS secured 9,409 votes.  The third candidate, a 
Chinese candidate from DAP managed to gain 9,185 votes in the contest.  Therefore, if 
we were to fully follow the classification outlined above, where seats with more than 2 
political parties are contesting, only the top two political parties candidates are considered.  
This means that it is a 21,291 votes against 9,409 votes.  The gap is not that big as 
compared to the Bagan Datok and Ampang examples above; and not to confidently rule 
out the possibility of ideal ethnic bloc voting in practical terms.  The gap is even smaller 
if we were to combine the total opposition parties votes and compared them between the 
Chinese BN and Malay opposition (which will make it a 21,291 votes against 18,594 
votes); a nearer reflection of ideal ethnic bloc voting.  Therefore, for this seat, I would 
argue in an abstention stance where no affirmation or negation can be made for that seat. 
 
 Kelana Jaya is a mixed seat with Chinese having slightly more voters (41.7%) 
while Malays and Indians stand at 37.9% and 18.6% respectively.  In 2004 General 
Election, the Chinese candidate won the seat against a Malay candidate.  The Chinese 
candidate gained 35,846 votes while the Malay candidate only secured 14,275.  The total 
number of votes gained by the Chinese candidate was around 2.5 times the votes gained 
by the Malay candidate.  This seat is similar to Ampang seat (same state which is 
Selangor) where the ethnicity of the winning candidate was the same as the highest 
percentage of the ethnicity composition within the seat.  However, the total number of 
votes secured by the winning candidate was around 2.5 times the total votes secured by 
their opponent.  These two seats should be considered to be in the same classification.  As 
argued above in the Ampang seat, I would put this seat as non-ideally-ethnic-bloc-voting 
seat, as well due to the large majority obtained by the winning candidate. 
 
 The last seat to be discussed for the state of Selangor is Subang.  Subang is 
another mixed seat in Selangor.  However, this mixed seat is seeing a higher composition 
of Malay voters which stands at 47.7% while Chinese and Indian voters stand 
respectively at 38.0% and 12.7%.  In the 2004 General Election, the seat was won by an 
Indian candidate (more accurately a Punjabi candidate) against a Malay candidate despite 
the fact that the Malay had a higher percentage in the electoral.  Furthermore, the 
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majority won by the non-Malay candidate is not small; gaining 32,941 votes against 
17,481 votes gained by the Malay candidate.  It can be said that this seat does not lie 
within the boundary of ideal ethnic bloc voting. 
 Federal Territories which have a total of 13 seats (Kuala Lumpur and Putrajaya in 
Peninsular Malaysia and Labuan in East Malaysia).  Out of these 13 seats, only two seats 
have experienced a competition between a Malay candidate against a non-Malay 
candidate for the latest 3 General Elections.  Bandar Tun Razak, is a seat where every 
General Election (I refer to the latest three; namely 2004, 2008 and 2013 General 
Elections in this context) saw a contest between a Malay and a non-Malay candidate.  The 
seat has 52.6% of Malay voters while the next highest percentage is Chinese voters which 
stand at 37.4% (Indian ranks third at 8.7%).  The seat was won by a Chinese candidate in 
the 2004 General Election while the subsequent 2008 and 2013 General Elections were 
won by a Malay candidate.  Therefore, the seat has in fact been won by different ethnic 
candidates which rules it out to be classified as an ideally ethnic bloc voting seat.  
Wangsa Maju is another seat within Federal Territories that had a Malay versus non-
Malay contest.  It happened in 2004 and 2013 General Election (2008 was seeing a 
Chinese versus Chinese).  The composition of the seat comprises of 53.3% of Malay 
voters while Chinese and Indian voters stand at 36.2% and 8.8% respectively.  Although 
Malay voters constituted a large percentage of voters, both occasions were won by 
Chinese candidates.  Therefore, this seat is ruled out from the ideally ethnic bloc voting 
as well. 
 
 The next state to deal with is the state of Negeri Sembilan where the state is 
having only one seat, that sees a contest between a Malay candidate going against a non-
Malay candidate.  The seat is Teluk Kemang Parliamentary seat where it is having a 
42.4% of Malay voters, 33.8% of Chinese voters and 21.4% of Indian voters.  The seat 
was won by an Indian candidate in 2004 General Election against a Malay candidate.  
However, the seat went to a Malay candidate for two consecutive terms by going against 
an Indian candidate.  Therefore, this election result history has shown that different ethnic 




 Although the next state in sequence to be discussed should be the state of Malacca, 
however, due to the absence of Malay versus non-Malay Parliamentary seat contest, the 
discussion will be continued with the next and last state which is Johor, the most southern 
state in the Peninsular of Malaysia. Those Parliamentary seats that see Malay versus non-
Malay competition are Bakri (2004), Ayer Hitam (2004 and 2008), Simpang Renggam 
(2004, 2008 and 2013), Tebrau (2004 and 2008), Ledang (2008), Sembrong (2008), 
Gelang Patah (2008 and 2013), Tanjong Piai (2008 and 2013). 
 
 Bakri Parliamentary seat constitutes of a 53.2% of Chinese voters, followed by 
Malays at 44.1% and Indian at 2.3%.  In the 2004 General Election, the seat was won by 
a Chinese candidate which gained 29,320 votes against a Malay candidate 10,261 votes.  
To add on the spice, this seat is among the handful of number of seats where DAP is 
fielding a Malay candidate.  Similar to Bagan Datok and Ampang seat, the winning 
candidate for this seat was won by the highest percentage of the seat composition.  For 
this seat, it is nearly triple the total number of votes gained by the winning candidate 
against the losing candidate.  Therefore, by comparing these seats, if Bagan Datok and 
Ampang seats were ruled out from the ideally ethnic bloc voting classification, this seat is 
definitely out too, as the total votes are triple as compared to 2.5 times for both Bagan 
Datok and Ampang seat.  If both Bagan Datok and Ampang seats were ruled in the trend, 
this Bakri seat may need further consideration then due to the majority votes.  However, 
as discussed in the section for Bagan Datok and Ampang seat, due to the large majority 
and a large number of inter-ethnic voting are needed to shows such a large majority votes, 
therefore, all these seats are ruled out of the ideally ethnic bloc voting trend. 
 
 Ayer Hitam is another interesting seat to study.  Ayer Hitam Parliamentary seat 
comprises of 57.9% of Malay voters, 38.0% of Chinese voters and 4.0% of Indian voters.  
Although Malay constitutes a higher percentage of the composition, the Chinese 
candidate won on both occasions; 2004 and 2008 General Election, with a significant 
majority of votes.  Although the 2013 General Election saw a Chinese versus Chinese 
competition, the interesting part of it is that this General Election was the first time for 




 Out of all of the seats in Johor which sees Malay versus non-Malay competition, 
Simpang Renggam Parliamentary seat is the only seat that experiences such a trend 
throughout the three General Elections.  Simpang Renggam is a seat where 56.8% of its 
voters are Malays while the Chinese voters only constitute 33.1% of the overall voters 
(Indian is having a 9.7% composition).  Even so, the Chinese candidate won in every of 
the three General Elections against a Malay candidate.  Similarly for the Tebrau 
Parliamentary seat, the seat constituted a higher percentage of Malay voters (47.4% 
Malays, 38.2% Chinese, 13.3% Indian), but a Chinese candidate won on both the 2004 
and 2008 General Election against a Malay candidate.  The same trend once again applies 
to Tanjong Piai Parliamentary seat where the seat has a highest percentage of Malay 
voters as compared to other ethnic groups (52.1% Malays, 46.5% Chinese, Indian 1.1%) 
although the Malay and Chinese percentage gap is the smallest among the three.  
Similarly, a Chinese candidate won against a Malay candidate in both the 2008 and the 
2013 General Election.  However, one interesting fact to be noted over this seat is that the 
Malay candidate is coming from DAP (lost on both occasions).  With the result of the 
Chinese candidate winning all these three seats despite the fact the Malay is having a 
higher percentage of voters, it eventually rules them out of the ideally ethnic bloc voting 
trend. 
 
 The next seat to be discussed is the Ledang Parliamentary seat.  Ledang 
Parliamentary seat constitutes of 53.6% of Malay voters, 41.1% of Chinese voters and 
4.8% of Indian voters.  In both 2004 and 2013 General Elections, it was a contest 
between Malay candidates only.  However, in the 2008 General Election, a Malay 
candidate won against a Chinese candidate by gaining 25,319 votes against 17,702 votes 
by the Chinese candidate.  So far, this is the first seat that saw a nearest trend towards the 
idea of ideally ethnic bloc voting trend. 
 
 The next seat to be discussed is Sembrong Parliamentary seat.  The seat comprises 
of 58.7% of Malays, 30.9% of Chinese and 9.0% of Indian.  Similar to Ledang 
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Parliamentary seat in terms of overall result, the seat was contested by Malay candidates 
in 2004 and 2013 General Elections.  In the 2008 General Election, the result showed a 
Malay candidate won over a Chinese candidate, gaining 17,988 votes against 6,418 votes.  
This is the difference between this seat and Ledang Parliamentary seat.  The winning 
candidates scored more than 2.5 times the number of votes as compared to the opponent.  
Therefore, this seat is more suitable to be classified together with Bagan Datok, Ampang 
and Bakri Parliamentary seat instead of being classified together with the Ledang 
Parliamentary seat. 
 
 The last seat to be discussed for Parliamentary seat with the trend of having Malay 
candidate contesting against non-Malay candidate across the Peninsular of Malaysia is 
the Gelang Patah Parliamentary seat.  Gelang Patah Parliamentary seat constitutes of 
52.4% of Chinese voters, 34.3% of Malay voters and 12.5% of Indian voters.  In the 2004 
General Election, it was contested by Chinese candidates only.  However, for 2008 and 
2013 General Election, it was contested by Malay and Chinese candidates.  In 2008 
General Election, the Chinese candidate gained 33,630 votes while the Malay candidate 
gained 24,779 votes.  Similarly, in 2013 General election, the Chinese candidate won the 
seat by securing 54,284 votes, while the Malay candidate secured 39,522 votes.  With 
such a trend, this is the second seat to be considered in the framework of ideally ethnic 
bloc voting trend.  
 
 From the discussion above, four loose categories of ideally ethnic bloc voting 
seats are defined.  The first group is the nearest to the ideally ethnic bloc voting seat.  For 
this category, only Ledang (Johor) and Gelang Patah (Johor) Parliamentary seats are 
considered to have fulfilled the guidelines set above.  For the second category, this is for 
those winning candidates whom come from the same ethnicity with the highest voter’s 
percentage in the seat composition.  However, these seats are ruled out based on the large 
majority gained by the winning candidate which requires a large cross-ethnic voting.  For 
this category, I classify the Parliamentary seats of Bagan Datok (Perak), Ampang 
(Selangor), Bakri (Johor) and Sembrong (Johor) into it.  The third category is abstention 
category where the seat could not be ascertained as to whether to rule in or rule out from 
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the ideally ethnic bloc voting framework.  Only one seat is considered for this category 
which is Puchong (Selangor) Parliamentary seat.  The fourth category is for the rest of 
those where they are ruled out directly from the ideally ethnic bloc voting framework as 
according to the guidelines above. 
 
 The intention of this paper is only for Parliamentary seats.  This is because State 
Assemblies lie between elected Parliamentarians and appointed Local Government 
Councillors.  However, it is good to at least to know about the seat distribution within 
state assemblies.  To further strengthen the case that voters do not in general vote 
according to ethnicity block voting, the table below summarises the seat per seat analysis 








- Nibong Tebal 
- Bukit Bendera 





- Hulu Selangor 
- Pandan 
- Kota Raja 
- Bandar Tun 
- Alor Setar 
- Padang Serai 
- Bukit Gantang 
- Tapah 
- Tanjong Malim 
- Bentong 
- Subang 
- Wangsa Maju 
- Ayer Hitam 
- Simpang 
Renggam 




- Kelana Jaya 
 
- Ledang 




- Teluk Kemang 
- Tebrau 
- Tanjong Piai 
 
TOTAL 12 12 5 2 




Category 1:  Different ethnic candidates won 
Category 2:  Candidate ethnic A won, seats with most voters from ethnic B 
Category 3:  Candidate ethnic A won, seats with most voters from ethnic A, but majority 
is large 
Category 4:  Candidate ethnic A won, seats with most voters from ethnic A, majority is 
small 
  
 By looking at the table above, only 2 out of 31 seats are classified as ambiguous, 
thus it could not be ascertained as to whether voters in these two seats were voting along 
ethnicity line.  The result of the rest of the 31 seats are showing that although these seats 
are having Malay candidates versus non Malay candidates, but the results do not show 
that ethnic block voting is taking place.  This is a good measurement numerically in 
proving that the voting trend in Malaysia does not suggest that people vote according to 
ethnicity while de-ethnicisation is scoring higher points than ethnic politics.  There is one 
special seat which could not be categorised into any of the groups above easily, which is 
the Puchong Parliamentary seat.  The seat comprises of 43.5% Chinese, 39.4% Malays 
and 15.9% Indians.  While 2008 and 2013 General Election was seeing a non-Malay 
candidate going against a non-Malay candidate, 2004 General Election was the most 
difficult one to deal with.  This is because the seat was facing a three cornered fight, with 
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a Chinese candidate from BN securing 21,291 votes, while a Malay candidate from PAS 
secured 9,409 votes.  The third candidate, a Chinese candidate from DAP managed to 
gain 9,185 votes in the contest.  Therefore, if we were to fully follow the classification 
above outlined above, where seats with more than 2 political parties are contesting, only 
the top two political parties candidates are considered.  It means that it is a 21,291 votes 
against 9,409 votes.  The gap is not that big as compared to the Bagan Datok and 
Ampang examples above; not to confidently rule out the possibility of ideal ethnic bloc 
voting in practical terms.  The gap is even smaller if we were to combine the total 
opposition parties votes and compare it between Chinese BN and Malay opposition 
(which will make it a 21,291 votes against 18,594 votes); a nearer reflection of ideal 
ethnic bloc voting.  Therefore, for this seat, I would argue in an abstention stance where 
no affirmation or negation can be made for that seat. 
 
 
6.7 MINORITY CANDIDATES FOR DAP AND PAS 
From the discussion in previous chapters on party membership and party core values, 
informants from both political fronts agree that ethnic politics do(did) take place.  Some 
informants opine that ethnic politics still exist in Malaysian politics while some 
informants argue that Malaysian politics is moving towards de-ethnicisation.  Therefore, 
the idea of de-ethnicisation should be discussed in real political terms.  It means that 
political parties would need to show their practical readiness in following through on 
their talk.  As discussed in previous chapters, candidates for the main BN component 
party are fixed due to their nature as ethnic-based party.  For PKR, their membership is 
diverse and therefore, is not of interest for this discussion as well. 
 
 In this section, I would look at the minority candidates for DAP and PAS.  DAP, 
although by its Constitution is a multi-ethnic party, but the party can hardly see the 
winning of Malay candidates as elected representatives. Although DAP has been fielding 
in Malay candidates for many of the General Elections, but only very few of them have 
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managed to win seats.  The table below shows the number of Malay candidates contesting 
in Parliamentary and State Assembly seats during 2004, 2008 and 2013 General Elections: 
GENERAL ELECTIONS PARLIAMENT STATE ASSEMBLY 
2004 3 2 
2008 2 1 
2013 3 1 
Table 10: DAP Malay candidates during 2004, 2008 and 2013 General Elections for 
Parliamentary and State Assembly seats. 
 
 In 2004 and 2008 General Elections, none of the Malay candidates managed to 
win a single seat in the election.  It is until the 2013 election where 2 out of 3 candidates 
for Parliamentary seats and the lone State Assembly candidates manages to win their 
respective seats.  Although DAP has been fielding in Malay candidates since long ago, 
but the yardstick for DAP is not to field in, but to win those seats. 
 
 It is different for PAS whether their yardstick is not to win a seat through non 
Muslim representative (surely winning is a bonus for them, but their first step should be 
looked at as nominating non-Muslim candidates instead).  There are no non-Muslim 
candidates standing under the symbol of PAS until 2013 (although in 2008, DHPP did 
contest for a seat using the PKR symbol.  Therefore, I discounted that as a PAS 
nomination) where PAS has fielded in 1 non-Muslim candidate for a Parliamentary seat 
and 2 non-Muslim candidates for State Assembly seats.  Such a number is tiny as 
compared to the overall seats that PAS is contesting.  Numerically, it is even smaller 
compared to DAP Malay candidatures, which is DAP Malay candidature is already being 
condemned as too small).  However, as discussed in the previous chapter, PAS has at 






In 'old politics', ethnicity is often related to political activity.  With the flow of de-
ethnicisation in Malaysian politics, the magnitude of ethnic politics is much less(Lim 
2002).  One of the measurements is to look at how people vote and how political parties 
execute their propaganda of bringing Malaysia towards de-ethnicisation of politics 
(Berger 2010).  At the first level, although the election result above could not fully prove 
that, even though voters nowadays may vote cross-ethnicity, this does not mean that they 
are voting according to a non-ethnic line. They may vote in such trends due to other 
factors.  On the other hand, such voting trends can be seen as a rejection of an extremist 
candidate.  Although it cannot prove the level of de-ethnicisation in terms of a voting 
trend, the general view from the analysis above manages to negate the premise that 
Malaysia masses still vote for their own ethnic group only.  Furthermore, such analysis 
has explored one by one Parliamentary seat with strong justification in classifying them 
as such.  Otherwise, the election result would not be as above. 
 
 For the second question raised in the introduction section, DAP and PAS are seen 
to have come out of their comfort zone, nominating their minority members or associate 
members as election candidates.  Such a move is commendable, because the risk of 
putting up such candidates is higher when compared to nominating their conventional 
dominant ethnic candidates into the election.  This could show their persistence with their 
propaganda in practising inclusivity in their party (Maznah Mohamad 2008).  As 
mentioned above, political rhetoric may give impact towards a party's image, but election 
candidature could give impact directly towards the power-gaining of a political party 
should they be willing to take such a high risk, which may cost them the seats and, 
eventually, the chance of forming a federal government (if they are in a marginal majority 
scenario). 
 
 In general, electoral politics is one of the important pillars (aside from party 
membership and party stance) in arguing on whether Malaysian politics is moving 
towards de-ethnicisation.  Although there is a lack of literature directly explaining how a 
coalition party (or other kind of political cooperation) could advance de-ethnicisation, in 
order to advance de-ethnicisation, apart from ambitious propaganda, a success from real 
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politics is needed too (Case 2009).  That is why, by making those political parties gain 
success in real politics, it is one of the steps necessary in pushing even further the idea of 
de-ethnicisation, not only in terms of rhetorical propaganda or internal party restructuring, 
































From this research, we can see that a new political landscape has emerged in Malaysian 
politics. 'Old politics', with an emphasis on ethnic politics, does not seem to be the only 
cleavage in the current political setting anymore.  It is challenged by a 'new politics', 
which moves away from the sort of ethnic politics and is replaced by a political discourse 
that no longer depends on ethnicity but rather on services provided by political parties 
and their candidates (Weiss 2013).  Although universal values such as justice, 
transparency, zero corruption and the like are becoming more salient in political 
mobilisation, Loh (2007) also suggests another dimension of 'developmentalism' as a 
complement to the universal value idea.  However, even with such a new setting, the 
importance of ethnicity has not been totally neglected.  It still occupies a certain space 
within Malaysian politics. 
 
 Overall, however, the trajectory from 'old politics' to 'new politics' in Malaysia 
leads to the emergence of de-ethnicisation in Malaysia.  Dunning and Harrison (2010) 
propose the idea of de-ethnicisation as a shift from  the current cleavage to a new 
cleavage.  This is supported by Gomez (2007) who argues that the Malaysian political 
landscape in the late 1990s following the arrest of Anwar Ibrahim (the Reformation era) 
witnessed a shift in discourse to more universal values, especially related to justice and 
corruption issues.  Such a shift has indeed taken place, not occluding the ethnic cleavage, 
but shifting it, the salient side of making new universal values cleavage more prominent.  
Secondly, it can also avoid the existence of a vacuum during such transition.  This is 
echoed by Zuckerman (1975), in how political parties are trying to shift their position to 
suit the political development at that time. 
 
 A second approach that is suggested for de-ethnicisation to occur is by re-rooting 
for similarities over differences.  Susanne (2006) suggests that in order to de-ethnicise a 
political system, it is crucial to find out the similarities among those involved.  In each 
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society, including a diverse society, even though such societies might have more 
differences among them than similarities, as long as the similarities can be derived and 
the emphasis placed more on such similarities than differences, de-ethnicisation is not 
impossible.  Such strategy is supported by Milikowski (2000), who introduced 'similarity 
strategy', where similarity is being used to counter ethnic-related elements.  In Malaysia, 
Khoo's (2016) examination of 'mobilisation of dissent' similarly shows that different 
opposition parties, namely PKR, DAP and PAS, can work together despite their different 
own political ideologies.  Their common objective to overthrow the ruling regime, BN, 
showed evidence of success when they won power in 5 states during 2008 General 
Election.   
  
 Principally, as discussed above, de-ethnicisation of politics can occur in two 
suggested ways, namely shifting to a new cleavage and re-rooting for similarities.  
However, to the extent that Malaysian politics has been de-ethnicised, such research 
questions have been addressed through the three dimensions of this discussion: party 
membership, party stance, and electoral strategy.  The changes in each of these 
dimensions will be summarised in the sections below.  However, in general, Malaysian 
politics seems to show progress in de-ethnicising the political landscape.  Political parties 
have adapted to various changes in pursuing a higher degree of de-ethnicisation of 
politics (Mitchell, Evans & O'Leary, 2009). Although such emergence is not yet perfect, 
the intention of this research is not to prove that Malaysian politics has changed to de-
ethnicisation of politics absolutely, but to argue the success of de-ethnicisation of 
Malaysian politics by political parties. 
 
 Apart from the success in attempting to answer those questions raised since the 
Introduction chapter, this research aims to be able to expand the scholarship of de-
ethnicisation of politics, which is limited to begin with.  A three-dimensional approach is 
introduced to widen the narrow perspective of how politics could be de-ethnicised, as 
opposed to other literature, which prefers to focus on the principles of the debate.  There 
is no doubt that principled debate is crucial in arguing the case, yet at the same time, the 
case application onto real examples is equally important.  However, to date, less attention 




 In this chapter, I will start with summarising how party membership, party stance, 
and electoral strategy can bring forward de-ethnicisation of politics.  This summary is 
believed to be able to provide a clearer picture of the arguments in previous chapters and 
reinforce them here.  Then, I will look at why ethnic politics has a lesser say in Malaysian 
politics nowadays, before justifying how this research can contribute to the existing 
scholarship.  The final section will be on the future prospect of Malaysian politics. 
 
 
PARTY MEMBERSHIP IN BRINGING DE-ETHNICISATION 
Political parties played a major role in pushing for de-ethnicisation to happen.  The first 
dimension of it is through party membership.  This is because the inclusion of a political 
party in terms of their membership could represent to what extent a political party is 
trying to move away from being confining within their own ethnic community only.  
According to Prasad (2016), the overall party membership of a political party in Malaysia 
can describe the 'ethnicity' of the party.  Apart from how their party Constitution portrays 
their party, or how their party members might wish for their party to be seen, the 
perspective from outside  -the party is also important.  Party membership structure also 
influences the directions parties take (Chin 2006):  party members elect their leaders and 
in return, these leaders are constrained by the wishes of the majority members should 
they wish to remain in power in their party.  From the research, we can see that different 
political parties adopt different policies.  For PKR, they do not need to prove much as 
they are a non-ethnic party to begin with.  Even so, by looking through their membership 
and leadership composition, they do have a wide representation across various segments 
of the society.  Even scholars such as Hamayotsu (2013) agree that PKR is one of the 
genuine non-ethnic (or multi-ethnic) parties. 
 
 DAP, on the other hand, was formed as a multi-ethnic party from the start, and has 
been more outward in championing multi-ethnicity in its political programme (Kartini 
Aboo Talib Khalid 2014).  From the research, we can see that they do not have much 
problem in handling the wave of de-ethnicisation, as their party is ready to accept any 
members from any background.  However, in reality, DAP fails to attract Malays into 
their membership.  This makes DAP look a Chinese-dominated party.  Even so, 
especially in the 'new politics' era, efforts have been made by DAP to attract more Malays 
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into their party.  People such as Zaid Ibrahim, Samad Said, and Aziz Bari are among the 
famous figures who have been recruited as members and assigned party responsibility. 
 
 The third group of parties to be summarised are MCA and PAS.  These two 
parties, due to their party Constitutions, are restricted from recruiting non-Chinese and 
non-Muslims respectively as their members.  MCA is a Chinese party, based on the 
interpretation of their Constitution, and the same goes for PAS as an Islamic party, as 
argued by Weiss (2014) too.  Although both parties are facing hurdles in that sense, they 
are making an effort in recruiting non-Chinese and non-Muslims as their associate 
members respectively.  This can be seen as the first step in accepting other ethnic groups 
into their parties. 
 
 The final party is UMNO.  Unlike the previous four parties, UMNO has less 
inclination to open their doors to other ethnic communities.  UMNO's Constitution 
defines them as a Malay-based party, and so, as in reality, they only accept Malay 
community as members (putting aside isolated cases, as discussed in the Party 
Membership chapter).  Even so, when compared to other political parties in terms of 
degrees of willingness to open their doors, the door is open for KIMMA (as discussed in 
the Background chapter).    
 
 From all these five parties, in terms of membership, we can see that most are 
making an effort to make their party membership more inclusive to non-dominant groups 
in their party.  This effort can be seen as one of the yardstick in arguing that political 
parties in Malaysia do have the political will to push Malaysian politics towards de-




By looking at the changes of each political party’s stance, the second dimension shows 
that Malaysian politics is being de-ethnicised by political parties.  In general, the change 
of party stance could be seen from two perspectives.  The first is that these political 
parties are becoming more pluralistic or inclusive by celebrating all walks of life instead 
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of just focusing on their own community.  This is line with Kirchheimer (1996) ideas of a 
catch-all party, and Chandra Muzaffar’s (2005) idea that an ethnic party does not mean 
that it will serve their own community only. The second approach they attempt is to move 
away from ethnic politics and focus more on universal values issues such as justice, good 
governance, and fairness.  This second attempt is applying both approaches of de-
ethnicisation (shifting to other cleavage and re-rooting similarities), as discussed in the 
Theoretical Context chapter and an earlier section in this chapter. 
 
                As party membership argues on the explicit issues, this dimension argues on the 
implicit issues: on what the party has done or intends to do in changing their party 
direction. According to Mair, Müller and Plasser (2004), a political party might need to 
adapt their party direction with the political development, to, at times, make themselves 
relevant in the mainstream politics.  This is shown by Ong (2015) through the example of 
the Spirit of 46 Malay Party which split its allegiances between two different coalitions 
from late 1980s to mid-1990s.  As its name suggests, the Spirit of 46 Malay Party is 
supposed to be a Malay party.  However, due to electoral consideration, Spirit of46 
Malay Party had to work with other opposition parties to defeat the incumbent regime.  
During that time, though, DAP and PAS were not capable of working together within a 
grand coalition (Ong 2015).  For these reasons, Spirit of 46 Malay Party formed a 
Malay/Muslim coalition (named as Muslim Unity Movement) together with PAS and 
other similar parties and at the same time, formed another coalition with DAP and its 
partner parties (named as People's Might).  In short, Spirit of 46 Malay Party is a member 
of two coalitions at the same time.  Ironically, during the PR era, DAP and PAS even 
worked together under the umbrella of PR together with PKR through a 'mobilisation of 
dissent' as described by Khoo (2016).  This shows that the party stance can be 
manipulated to accommodate changing circumstances, and as a result the post-2008 
Malaysian political landscape seems to have skewed towards de-ethnicisation.  According 
to Case (2015), with PAS joining the opposition fray, the political landscape reveals a 
more balanced ethnic composition between the ruling regime and opposition alliance.  
With such a balance achieved, the significance of ethnicity may have waned.  This is in 
part because it becomes more difficult for UMNO to claim that the opposition is 
dominated by DAP since PAS, a conservative Islamic party, has joined forces with the 
opposition alliance.  Therefore, in the Party Membership chapter and Party Stance chapter, 
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I have shown that political parties have made various changes to make their parties more 
inclusive.  Such inclusivity encourages political parties with different ideologies to work 
together (Gomez 2007).  By being more inclusive, less attention is devoted to their 
particular ethnic group, instead focusing more on a party stance that is more inclusive for 
the general community’s consumption. 
 
             We can thus see how four parties, namely MCA, PKR, DAP, and PAS would like 
to see a more inclusive politics rather than following the way 'old politics' works.  Prasad 
(2016) opines that these political parties do acknowledge the importance of non-ethnic 
politics, and some even go to the extent of amending much of their party propaganda.  
For example, PAS has come out with many taglines such as 'PAS for All', in showing 
people that it is not an exclusive party, but it welcomes all.  For MCA, their leaders insist 
that, even though they are a Chinese party, they do not isolate themselves to the Chinese 
community only.  In fact, they are opening their doors in welcoming anyone, including 
non-Chinese, should they need their help.  Furthermore, the loans, welfare, and benefits 
offered by them are open for application from all walks of life; they are not exclusively 
for the Chinese only.  Their policies manage to prove that they do not subscribe to the 
idea that the Chinese party is for the Chinese only.  DAP, as a multi-ethnic party to begin 
with (Kartini Aboo Talib Khalid 2014), do not change their party policy a great deal, as 
their policy from the day they formed until today is based on multi-ethnicity (Mauzy 
2006).  According to Prasad (2016), he believes that DAP is facing the obstacles of 
garnering support from the Malay community.  Therefore, they are trying harder in 
attracting more Malays to join hands with them, including several high-profile leaders.  
With this, it shows that, principally, DAP has been practising multi-ethnicity since the 
beginning, and can practise what it preaches much better than before.  For PKR, similar 
to the above (party membership), they do not need to make many changes, as they 
themselves are the most 'genuine' multi-ethnic party in terms of membership and 
leadership composition (although it still does not exactly reflect the population 
composition). 
 
            The special political party that takes a different stance to the four of them is 
UMNO.  A different leader provides a different opinion on how they view UMNO's role 
and their party's stance in dealing with non-Malay issues.  One of the informants is more 
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liberal, saying that the UMNO is a party for all as well, and is willing to serve other 
communities should the need arise.  This liberal strain within UMNO, according to 
Mauzy (2006) has gained traction because Malays feel socio-politically and economically 
more secure, making it easier to waive their Malay privileges, or at least not feel threaten 
by the non-Malay community. However, another informant argues that BN is practising 
cooperation between component parties.  Should Chinese issues arise, MCA could help to 
solve them.  It does not necessarily mean that UMNO must be the one to solve such 
encounters.  Even so, this does not mean that UMNO is doing nothing for the non-Malay 
community.  This is because UMNO and all other component members are working 
under the same roof, which is BN.  This doesn’t surprise Mauzy (2013) who 
acknowledges that although BN might appear to be practising a more coercive 
consociationalism where UMNO seems to be more powerful compared to other 
component parties.  BN is practising nominal consociationalism where UMNO seems to 
be more dominant within the coalition instead of equal sharing of power.  However, at the 
same time, this latter group of UMNO leader inclines to believe in self-serving among 
each ethnic group.  They believe that community leaders should serve their own 
community as such method is more effective compared to mixing different ethnic groups 
of leaders together in serving the overall community.  Therefore, for this issue on party 
stance, it could be concluded that most of the political parties are in agreement that 
Malaysia should no longer confine itself to ethnic politics per se, but be more inclusive to 




The third dimension, which proves that Malaysian politics have been de-ethnicised by 
political parties, is through their electoral strategy.  Political parties no longer talk on one 
hand and walk on the other.  They have shown their consistency with party membership 
and party stance by making their electoral strategy more inclusive.  This is because the 
voting trend is fluid and is movable from one party to another (Madrid, 2008). People 
from an ethnicity other than the dominant ethnicity in the political party have been made 
candidates in the elections.  This is most common in PKR due to the fluidity of their 
candidates.  However, for DAP and PAS, their candidates are more likely to align with 
the predicted ethnicity of the candidates (Malay or non-Malay,as discussed in Electoral 
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Strategy chapter) due to the nature of their party membership, though even with them 
there are some minor exceptions (Lim 2014).  This is because there is only a small 
percentage of non-dominant ethnic group in the party (referring to Malays in DAP and 
non-Malays in PAS).  In practical terms, UMNO and MCA do not have much choice as 
their members’ pool consists of single ethnic groups only (Kartini Aboo Talib Khalid 
2014).  It cannot be ascertained whether they are keen to put non-dominant groups within 
their party to contest in the election under their name.  This is because, even if they wish 
to cut across ethnic boundaries, they still are not able to do so because they have none.  
Therefore, the focus will be on the opposition bench, and the comparison is being made 
through the classification of seats and competition of different ethnic groups.  This is 
because all three opposition parties have various ethnicity members, be it full members or 
associate members.   
 
On the level of competition between different ethnic groups, the Electoral Strategy 
chapter has shown that out of all the seats, which see Malay versus non-Malay candidates, 
most are being classified as non-ethnic bloc voting seats.  This means that the result has 
shown that ethnic bloc voting does not occur.  Should ethnic bloc voting occur, the results 
will not be the same as those published results.  At the same time, there are two seats that 
show the possibility of ethnic bloc voting.  As this approach is based on assumption and 
mathematical calculations, these two seats may not necessarily reflect whether people in 
these two constituencies are voting for their own ethnic group only.  This is in line with 
Riker’s (1962) game theory idea of deducing the result from as much available data as 
possible.  Such intelligence is based on the idea of assumptive probability, which can be 
true in general circumstances.  Even if this assumption turns out to be true that they vote 
according to ethnicity, the percentage is still very small: it happened with only two seats.  
Therefore, for this level of argument, the General Election results show that voters voted, 
most probably, not according to ethnicity. 
 
            The second level is regarding the electorate action taken, especially by DAP and 
PAS.  Although DAP has been nominating Malay candidates for decades, Malay 
candidates can barely score results.  No doubt, there are a few exceptions, but these are 
considered as isolated examples.  In the flow of 'new politics', DAP Malay candidates 
seem to be able to win seats.  This is in line with the arguments put forth by Khoo (2016), 
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Gomez (2007) and Mauzy (2006), who all suggest that Malaysia is moving away from 
ethnic politics.   DAP itself also intends to nominate more Malay candidates should the 
seat allocations permit.  This is because DAP has the smallest number of seats to contest 
when compared to PKR and PAS.  Among the small number of seats, a large portion is 
already allocated to incumbents, party veterans, and party office bearers.  One of the 
informants makes a good point when he argues that it is not really about not wanting to 
nominate more Malay candidates, but it is because there are a lack of seats to contest.  
For PAS, the party has started to nominate non-Muslim candidates under their own 
banner.  Although the number may be small, only one Parliamentary seat and two State 
Assembly seats, this has shown that PAS is ready to be even more inclusive to non-
Muslims, up to the level of giving them a chance to contest in the election.  This is 
because for decades, the main crux of PAS struggle has been about religion, confronting 
UMNO head-on (Welsh 2015).  Even though it is viewed as only a small step, but such a 
small step can represent PAS readiness in practising their tagline, 'PAS for All'. 
 
            Therefore, for this dimension, in both levels, political parties are seen to be 
pushing for more inclusive politics.  Such inclusivity is crucial in bringing de-
ethnicisation, as explained in previous chapters.  This is because, at the first level of 
discussion, ethnic bloc voting does not seem to take place, while at the second level, DAP 




THE RISE OF DE-ETHNICISATION OF POLITICS 
From this research, for most of the political parties, we can see that party membership 
nowadays is more inclusive when compared to the era of 'old politics'.  Political stances 
and positions taken by political parties are no longer exclusively for themselves or their 
own community only.  Voting trends have also shown that voting according to their own 
ethnicity may not necessarily be the case.  All these changes are due to the political will 
of those stakeholders in making changes towards the Malaysian political landscape.  
These three-dimensional approaches, which inter-link, fit nicely into the effort of de-
ethnicising the society.  This is because this approach covers both explicit and implicit 
227 
 
changes in their party, while being supported by the electoral strategy in practising their 
efforts in elections, instead of leaving propaganda as mere propaganda. 
 
 Although political parties have tried to make changes themselves, when it comes 
to the context of politics, voters are voting according to the available options for them to 
choose.  This option generally refers to political parties that contest the election.  In order 
for ethnic politics or non-ethnic politics to work, political parties and voters play a major 
role in leading the direction to where Malaysian politics should head.  Previous General 
Elections, especially the 2008 and 2013 General Elections, have shown that the voters, 
particularly the non-Malay community, are inclined towards opposition parties that 
propagate many issues, which include non-ethnic politics.  With such heavy support 
towards the opposition parties, non-UMNO component parties have started to restructure 
themselves in order to survive in the latest political trend.  With such new alternation 
towards non-UMNO component parties, it 'encourages' the collapse of ethnic politics 
among the non-Malay voters.  This is what I call a two-way influence.   
 
 On the other hand, Malay politics is a bit difficult.  UMNO are in the centre line 
of wanting and not wanting to restructure themselves to be more inclusive.  As discussed 
above, even within UMNO there are leaders who prefer to see UMNO becoming more 
inclusive, while another camp prefer to see UMNO as it is currently.  However, there is 
no doubt that even for the Malay community, especially by looking at the cross-voting of 
PAS and DAP supporters, at least as a comparison with 'old politics', the magnitude of 
ethnic politics is much lower nowadays.  With these factors, it makes ethnic politics hard 
to survive in Malaysian politics at the moment, although it still occupies some space, but 
is no longer the dominant force. 
 
 
CONTRIBUTION TO EXISTING SCHOLARSHIP 
 
The scholarly field on the de-ethnicisation of politics is still in its infancy.  De-
ethnicisation is a more developed area of investigation in  immigration research (see, for 
example  Joppke & Morawska 2014, Pujolar & Gonzàlez 2013, and Amelina & Faist 
2012),.  This literature focuses on how immigration policies of countries can be de-
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ethnicised through more liberal approaches immigration control and naturalisation.  They 
do not focus on political systems or how political parties are being de-ethnicised.  There 
are other scholars who explore de-ethnicisation from an identity perspective (see, eg, 
Purdekovà 2008, Ruane & Butler 2007).  These scholars are interested in how 'ethnicity' 
and 'nationality' are being, in some cases, de-ethnicised.  They are less interested, 
however, in how political parties can be de-ethnicised.  Their field of interest in within 
the 'identity' perspective rather than political system mechanism perspective.  Finally, 
there are other approaches who explore de-ethnicisation from the perspective of culture 
(Milikowski 2000) and sports (Poli 2007).  None of these approaches, however, attend in 
any systematic fashion to a detailed analysis of political system or how political parties 
can be de-ethnicised within those systems.  That is where my research can contribute to 
the scholarship of de-ethnicisation in politics.  This research could have added in other 
literature to the existing scholarship.  One of the contributions is the focus of this research 
on the mechanism part, which has been narrowed down to party membership, party 
stance, and electoral strategy in de-ethnicising Malaysian politics.  This empirical focus 
on Malaysia’s recent political landscape is distinct.  To my knowledge, I believe that 
there is no such literature in the existing literature as yet.  Therefore, this research could 
provide an insight on a narrowed argument on de-ethnicisation of politics on the 
mechanism level, rather than just on a principled basis.  Furthermore, this research 
attempts to approach in a way that most ethnic politics scholars are less inclined to 
approach.  Instead of arguing on why ethnic politics occurs, how it occurs, and so on, I 
am arguing it from an opposite approach of why ethnic politics is less likely to occur, or 
why it could not sustain itself, as was previously the case. 
 
 The second added point is in regard to the application of a classification system in 
the Electoral Strategy chapter.  Firstly, this paper is arguing the 'ethnicity' by recreating a 
new 'ethnic' identity (or more precisely an amalgamation of ethnic identities).  In this 
writing, the Chinese and Indian communities tend to be grouped together under a single 
category.  This works for the decision in determining the third component party in BN to 
be interviewed, a combination of an Indian-based party with another Chinese dominated 
multi-ethnic party.  More specifically, in the Electoral Strategy chapter where analysis is 
being done on different ethnic groups that compete against one another, Chinese and 
Indian candidates (including other minority ethnic groups such as Sikh) are being 
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grouped as one.  Therefore, in the analysis of different ethnic competition, it is Malay 
versus non-Malay.  Such a combination may or may not work outside Malaysia.  Even 
inside Malaysia, it would largely depend on which field such a combined 'new ethnic 
group' is to be utilised.  For this case, combining both Chinese and Indian ethnic groups 
during the competition analysis is justifiable because, firstly, many of the problems faced 
by the non-Malay communities are similar to one another.  Furthermore, nominating a 
Chinese, Indian, or even a Sikh candidate does not make much difference, but should 
these ethnic groups be replaced by a Malay candidate, it can attract big media attention.  
This could also be due to the local sentiment where there exists a stronger sense of 
differentiation between Malay and non-Malay, as compared to between Chinese and 
Indian. One of the reasons might be due to the fact that special privileges are only 
attached to the Malay ethnic groups.  Therefore, from a political perspective, categorising 
non-Malay under a single ethnic group is more viable when compared to categorising 
them according to their actual ethnic identity. 
 
 The third contribution, also in the Electoral Strategy chapter, is regarding the 
classification system in determining whether ethnic bloc voting is occurring.  Such 
assumptive classification, similar to the above premise, may or may not be suitable to be 
borrowed for outside of Malaysian occurrence.  The reasons why such a self-invented 
classification could well be utilised in the political scene in Malaysia, especially in 'new 
politics' are because, firstly, Malaysia is practising first-past-the-post electorate rules with 
single members for single constituencies.  It eases the assumptive work further when 
most of the seats are contested on a one-on-one basis (excluding independent candidates, 
due to the nature of them rarely being accepted by local voters).  When it is a one-on-one 
contest, you will have to choose either A or B (putting aside those absentee voters).  With 
such classification, the votes gained by a particular candidate could be guessed quite 
accurately, providing the majority difference is large.  The Electoral Strategy chapter has 
also clearly justified how the voting trend is predicted, based on the common probability 
assumption. Therefore, such a classification system could classify whether voters of a 
particular constituency are voting by ethnic affiliation. 
 
 Therefore, in this research, apart from adding on to the limited scholarship of de-
ethnicisation specifically in politics, it has also introduced two distinct classification 
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systems, where the ethnicity classification system could explain the ethnicity competition 
in elections more accurately, while the ethnic bloc voting classification system could 
provide an alternative to mathematically assuming the voting inclination of voters shows 
the voting results. 
 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH PROSPECT 
As the scholarship centring on de-ethnicisation of politics is limited, it is time to expand 
the scholarship and literature to focus more on the scope of de-ethnicisation of politics, 
rather than expanding scholarship on ethnic politics or de-ethnicisation of immigration, 
culture, and so on.  This is because the latter scholarship has a substantial amount of 
literature when compared to de-ethnicisation of politics.  Such a scenario is due to the 
lesser attention by scholars in the scope of de-ethnicisation of politics.  An advancement 
of this literature is believed to be able to widen the idea of de-ethnicisation of politics.  
Furthermore, as this research inclined towards a top-down approach where political 
parties dictate how de-ethnicisation can take place through their political parties, future 
research perhaps can view de-ethnicisation from another perspective, such as the bottom-
up approach, as to how the masses can force political parties to amend themselves.  
Although both top-down and bottom-up approaches are inter-linked, even in this research, 
the inclination perhaps could be on a quantitative methodology on how people want 
political parties to be and behave. 
 
 Apart from the different perspectives on looking at the process of de-ethnicisation, 
future research could also try to focus at a different level of elections.  As this research is 
focusing on national politics, future research may want to consider the lower level of 
electoral politics, such as local elections.  This is because the lower level of elections 
usually involve a higher magnitude in touch with the masses (solving their daily 
problems), as compared to the national level elections that involve a lot of national 
policies.  By doing this, future research could compare whether different levels of 
elections would affect different degrees of de-ethnicisation of politics. 
 
 Even at the same level of national election, specifically in Malaysia, future 
research may want to focus on East Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak) politics.  As the East 
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Malaysia political landscape is quite distinct from Peninsular Malaysian politics, 
researchers may be interested in looking at the level of ethnic politics and the progress of 
de-ethnicisation of politics in these two states.  This is because there is much speculation 
that Sabah and Sarawak have a higher level of inter-ethnic tolerance when compared to 
Peninsular Malaysia.  Mosques and churches can be built next to each other and lend their 
compounds to their neighbours on religious event days (such as Muslim Friday prayers, 
Christian church services, and other religious celebrations).  Therefore, a more empirical-
based research on such an area is welcome. 
 
 
PROSPECT OF MALAYSIAN POLITICS 
This research has shown that de-ethnicisation politics has emerged and altered the 
political landscape in Malaysia.  The question is, can this de-ethnicisation trend continue?  
No doubt, this whole research has argued for de-ethnicisation, and for political parties to 
justify how they push for de-ethnicisation to flourish. We have to bear in mind two things.  
The first is the coalition party structure.  Undeniably, BN has provided an inclusive party 
structure, although its main component parties are ethnic-based.  Even during the days of 
ethnic politics, BN was still being viewed as an inclusive party, mainly due to there being 
no other option that could cater for the whole society.  However, with PR formation, PR 
can provide an alternative choice for the people to choose.  The coalition party itself is 
inclusive, while its component parties’ status (whether it is inclusive or exclusive is 
arguable) is debatable.  Nevertheless, the structure itself has provided an inclusive 
platform for people to support. 
 
 However, even with such a structure on the explicit level, the implicit level of 
whether these opposition parties can perform in governance is still in question.  This fits 
nicely into the second issue of whether opposition-turned-government parties are able to 
rule.  To start the circle of government changes, such as happen in many developed 
democracies where a single party would not rule for a long term, it is not easy, because 
people have doubts and have no idea what is going on.  However, thanks to the 2008 
General Election where opposition parties managed to win five states, consisting of 
developed and rural states, it provided a chance for people to judge them on their 
capability.  Therefore, in the current Malaysian politics, it is no longer the question of 
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whether opposition is capable to rule, but rather whether you agree with the way they rule 
or not. 
 
 We can see from the 2008 and 2013 General Elections, PR, which champions for 
de-ethnicisation of politics through the three dimensions as mentioned in this research, 
has managed to capture the hearts of voters, and such support generally comes from 
educated groups and younger age groups. These two groups are generally growing 
positively over time.  This means that parties who champion for de-ethnicisation of 
politics may garner more support, providing other factors with their competing parties are 
the same. Therefore, with the current trend continuing, I do have confidence that the 
progress of de-ethnicisation would flourish from day to day and over the long term.  At 
the same time, if the competing parties are no longer providing the same characteristics, 
the trend may face hindrance.  By comparing BN and PR, main component parties such 
as UMNO, MCA, and MIC seem highly attached to BN.  Therefore, there is no problem 
for them to provide an explicit inclusive option.  However, for PR, as happened to many 
opposition coalition parties (or in the form of cooperation), such relationships do not last 
long.  Should any of these three parties (PKR, DAP or PAS) withdraw from PR, the 
progress of de-ethnicisation may be hampered.  As discussed in the previous chapters, 
inclusivity is not just to be done but also to be seen to be done.  Unless there is a strong 
replacement for the absence of any of these parties, such coalition could be seen to 
provide inclusivity.  Yet, at the same time, should such break up happen years after a 
strong belief of inclusivity has been formed, such a break up may not affect the trend of 
de-ethnicisation too greatly.  Similar to the hegemony of BN against voters as a single 
inclusive party during ethnic politics years, hegemony is not easy to be formed.  However, 
once formed, it is not easy to be broken.  Therefore, whether the trend of de-ethnicisation 
of politics could last long will depend on to what extent political parties can change the 
mindset of the people to believe in it. 
 
 In conclusion, through this research I have become more confident in claiming 
that de-ethnicisation of politics is taking place in Malaysia.  Such emergence does receive 
support from most of the political parties.  By looking at the current trend, such de-
ethnicisation of politics may last for the long term, leading ethnic politics, if not 
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